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1 
1 Introduction 
Evo Morales won a landslide victory; with more than 50 percent of the popular vote, in the December 
2005 election in Bolivia. Morales was the first indigenous elected into office in Latin America in 150 
years. The presidential inauguration of Morales took place in an indigenous ceremony/rite on 21 
January 2006, in Tiwanaku, a former religious and administrative center of a pre-Inca population. The 
Aymará, an indigenous group in Latin America
1 to which Morales belongs, claim to be descendants of 
this Pre-Inca group. The official inauguration took place in the presidential palace in La Paz, next day, 
on 22 January 2006. 
The indigenous movement, with its claims for equality and power, was personified by Morales. 
Morales is a coca grower, who grew up in poverty in the Altiplano (high lands)
2, and was schooled only 
to the sixth grade. Morales was previously the presidential candidate for the Movimiento Al Socialismo 
(Movement Toward Socialism, MAS) during the 2002 election. Despite losing the election to former 
president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Goni), Morales and the MAS continued to campaign, 
particularly against United States (US) influence in the country, and neoliberal policies, much to the 
displeasure of the White House. 
US Ambassador Rocha said in 2002 that, if Morales won the election, the US might reconsider 
its developmental assistance package to Bolivia.
3 A dispute with Ambassador Rocha helped the MAS 
gain popularity in Bolivia and revealed the political biases of the US, as well as Bolivian government 
adherence to US instructions. The years between 2002 and 2005 were used by the MAS to deepen 
their campaign goals, generating a program based on three pillars: (a) setting up a new constitution; 
(b) a new land distribution policy in favor of the indigenous and landless (who squat in uninhabited and 
unused territory -- this land will be turned over to the state and then to the people); (c) nationalization 
of the gas reserves and negotiating new agreements on the basis of the 2004 referendum imple-
mented on 1
 May 2006.
4 
Expectations where high in Bolivia, for Morales, and his administration. It remains to be seen if 
he can secure rights and equality for the indigenous people of Bolivia despite US and neoliberal he-
gemony; measures leading to genuine peace and justice. Bolivia’s indigenous were calm – or rather 
unsuccessful in reaching their demands - in comparison with those of other Latin America states. De-
mands for economic and political rights reached mixed results. The ‘calmness’ in Bolivia is surprising, 
since social inequality (ethnic and geographic) is the second greatest in the continent, surpassed only 
by Brazil. Indigenous groups in Bolivia have only begun to successfully protest against the govern-
ment. These protests are centered around neoliberalism, rather than ‘indigenous issues,’ since the 
Water War in 2000. This was followed by the riots in 2003 (Gas and Tax War), which ousted president 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. Disrespect for political and economic rights of the indigenous and poor 
                                                 
1 40 ethnic groups live in Bolivia. The largest and most known are the Aymará, Guaraní and Quechua. 56 percent of the popula-
tion is indigenous, 22 percent are white, and another 22 percent are mestizos (of mixed race). (F.A.Z. et al. 1999: 191). 
2 Terms in Spanish are written in cursive throughout this thesis. Next to these a translation by the author in English will appear in 
parentheses. Some quotes from literature may contain cursive writing (to emphasize relevance). The author left them in cursive 
to conserve the original meaning. Contrary the authors practice, other literature might not write Spanish words in cursive or have 
words in cursive writing that are not Spanish. The author did not alter this in quoted phrases as to not tamper with the original 
meaning. 
3 One of the campaign posters depicted Morales and the words “Bolivians: You decide: Who governs? Rocha or the voice of the 
people” below him. Morales was uninterested in a public discussion with the media: “The only one I want to discuss with is 
Ambassador Rocha – I prefer talking to the owner of the circus and instead of with the clowns”, he said. 
4 In this referendum the Bolivian people voted that a gas pipeline for export be built through Peru (rather than Chile).  
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population by the elite is nothing new: historically, the indigenous have been ignored since the found-
ing of the Republic in 1825.  
Oppression of the indigenous people lasted through the War of the Pacific (1879 - 1883), and 
the Chaco War (1932-5), even though the indigenous were partners with the political elites during 
these conflicts. During the Revolution of 1952
5 the situation for the indigenous worsened. The words 
Aymará and Quechua, as well as all names for other indigenous groups, were eliminated from official 
discourse and replaced with the umbrella term campesino (peasant) in the interests of an agrarian 
reform.
6 Spanish was the only language taught in public schools. Similarly other means of cultural 
identity were forbidden by several Bolivian governments. Throughout the 1970s indigenous social 
movements criticized the agrarian reform and the Spanish-dominated school system. Their political 
parties never surpassed the three percent electoral threshold (from 1979 to 1989) which would have 
earned them seats in parliament, a fact attributed to clientilism, and institutional mechanisms hindering 
participation of indigenous voters in the elections. 
Oppression of indigenous groups, and the stark inequality characterizing all Latin America, 
have not only been of profit to the Bolivian elite, but have benefited the US. The US has secured its 
economic, political and security interests in ‘their backyard’ through the Monroe doctrine and through 
military techniques (e.g. the School of the Americas which educated many military dictators such as 
Hugo Bánzer) and implementation of the concepts of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of 
Economics. Neoliberal policies were brought to the region by the World Bank (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), also known as 
the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
The Bretton Woods Institutions have secured Bolivia as a market for the US, and have applied 
neoliberal (monetary) policies that began in the 1980s, and have lasted until today. Adherence to the 
US will, and its political and economic ideas, was enabled by consent and cooperation of the ruling 
elite, most prominently the administrations of Hugo Bánzer and Goni. Most Bolivian governments were 
probably as racist toward the indigenous population as the US government itself has been, in the be-
lief that non-whites were not yet ready for self-government – blaming the indigenous for the ‘back-
wardness’ of the country.
7 Decentralization reforms in Bolivia were implemented throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, much to the pleasure of the international community. Particularly the International Finance 
Institutions ( IFIs) were pleased as these reforms matched their ideals. Economic and political 
restructuring of the country “added cultural pluralism to the Washington Consensus” (Kohl and 
Farthing 2005: 11), empowered local councils, and weakened corporate-campesino negotiations (Gray 
Molina 2005: 11). Furthermore, the US linked coca eradication to development aid budgets, most 
successful during the second administration of Hugo Bánzer (1997 to 2001). The coca plant is used 
for medicinal purposes, and is part of Bolivian life style and culture (not as a drug). Coca is also the 
backbone of B olivia’s economy: income from coca surpasses national GDP by 300 percent. US 
demands for coca eradication are a cultural change imposed from above. No viable alternatives for 
coca growers have been found. Eradication processes violated human rights and have sparked anger 
                                                 
5 This revolution led to universal suffrage (Gray Molina 2004). 
6 The ‘Law of Colonization’ declared the lands of the Amazon as “uninhabited and open for colonization”. In 1991 indigenous 
groups (Yuracare) protested, motivating the government to overturn the law of 1966 (Becker and Leon 1998). 
7 “Thomas Mann, the assistant secretary of state for economic affairs under Eisenhower and a long-time Latin American special-
ist, baldly declared: ‘I know my Latinos. They understand only two things – a buck in the pocket and a kick in the ass.’ Few 
Americans of the day viewed the peoples of the Third World with any sense” (Lauderback 2004: 112).   
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been found. Eradication processes violated human rights and have sparked anger in the Bolivian 
population. 
The idea that ‘one Bolivia’ (based on ethnicity, class or social background) had never existed, 
but was an historical, social, political and economic construction, received momentum when neoliberal 
measures failed to show the promised success. The population had not believed in them from the 
beginning, as the multiple protests and road blockades by unions and other social groups show. 
Disillusion with democratic rule heightened during the protests of April and September 2000 (Water 
War). Protestors demanded their rights after the state sought to privatize water. This had led to price 
increases of up to 500 percent. Protests continued throughout the years, heightening in the 2003 Gas 
and Tax War. Rioters criticized the selling of gas to a US corporation and cuts in social spending 
demanded by t he structural adjustment program (SAP) of the IMF. The Gas and Tax War re-
emphasized that the majority of the population did not profit from neoliberal policies.
8 Dissatisfaction 
with neoliberal policies, and US control over Bolivian politics and economy, grew within the Bolivian 
population throughout 2005, and led to Morales election into office in December 2005. 
This thesis will focus on verifying an assumed change of discourse within the Bolivian elite 
concerning neoliberalist policies by the IFIs: the IMF, World Bank and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and control by the US. Verification is based on the comparison of three newspapers, all 
representatives of elite discourse, and the attitudes they voice during two important events in Bolivian 
history. The first event, the Gas War of 2003, is a moment of crisis for the neoliberal hegemonic 
system and the second (post-crisis) period is the first month of government by the MAS administration 
(January and February of 2006). Anti-neoliberal critique (of a neoliberal government) was first 
successfully voiced during the Water War of 2000 and continued to prevail in 2003. The Gas War is 
the less prominent but more successful of both wars, as it ended with the ousting of a president and 
therefore presents a (potential) turning point in the Bolivian elites opinion. Perhaps the Gas War 
deepened a break of neoliberal hegemony. President Morales was formerly a key figure in the anti-
neoliberal riots and the MAS demanded alternative economic policies and social justice. The MAS 
election into government two and a half years after the riots may have been supported by a (potential) 
frustration by the elite of Carlos Mesa or a support for anti-neoliberal policy. Static in state policy 
toward neoliberalism might have prompted the elite to vote for a different actor than before. Thus, 
superficially, it seems as if the demands made in 2003 have become a reality through the election of 
2005. An analysis of newspaper articles during the first month of the MAS government is the second 
part to the case study of 2003 and proves whether neoliberal hegemony in the elite has been broken 
or not. 
The opinions of the elite (not those of all the population) on neoliberalism and the MAS will be 
examined through a newspaper analysis based on articles written from 2 to 19 October 2003 and 22 
January to 22 February 2006 in three newspapers and comparison thereof. The first, La Prensa (The 
Press), is a conservative daily based in La Paz and one of the most important newspapers in Bolivia. 
La Prensa represents most Bolivian newspaper and elite thought, as will be explained in chapter 5. 
The second newspaper, La Epoca (The Epoch) is a moderate weekly newspaper, whose primary task 
                                                 
8 The dissatisfaction of the Bolivian population with their government and neoliberalism exemplified by the fact that four presi-
dents governed since August 2001. No presidents term lasted more than a year, except Goni, who held his post for fourteen 
months.  
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is not to inform, but to analyze events in contemporary Bolivian politics. La Epoca is critical toward 
both the government and the opposition. The bi-weekly leftist newspaper, El Juguete Rabioso (The 
Angry Toy), is a unicum in the Bolivian newspaper landscape. It is part of the analysis, as a depiction 
of the streams of thought in the new elite, because its association with and support of the elite is ques-
tionable. Similarly, the old elite would not associate or support this newspaper (openly). As Morales 
and the MAS existed in 2003 and their opinions toward the government and neoliberalism remain the 
same, it is feasible to compare the reactions by the elite to the 2003 riots and those to the MAS gov-
ernment acts in 2006 to each other. The results will answer the central question of the author: Has a 
shift of opinion toward neoliberalism taken place within the Bolivian elite? 
Prior to presenting discourse analysis and change thereof, the author explains critical theory 
under Antonio Gramsci and Robert Cox in Chapter 2. Cox claims neoliberal hegemony and its 
existence depends on consent by the elite of a country. Consequently, definitions of neoliberalism and 
its political incarnation will be presented before staging the methodology of this thesis (Section 2.2). 
Neoliberal discourse in Bolivia’s elite is presented in two chapters. The historic chapter (3) and the 
important contemporary topics chapter (4), which are both based on secondary literature. They prove 
the existence of neoliberal hegemony in the Bolivian elite by depicting their standpoint on state 
policies (and opposition to them) throughout Bolivian history and particularly the 1980s and 1990s. 
Chapter 3 also delves into the opposition to neoliberal reforms. Beginning in the year 2000, Section 
3.4 describes, in the form of a brief outline, what led to and was the Gas War of 2003, the starting 
point of neoliberal hegemony’s crisis in Bolivian elite. This section will focus on the demands of the 
rioters and depicts the goals of MAS from their founding in 2002, throughout their campaign of 2005 
and the beginning of their governing period in 2006. Dissatisfaction with neoliberal policies presumably 
culminated in the election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous president in Bolivia and the second in 
the history of Latin America in December 2005. Chapter 4 outlines the factors apart from neoliberalism 
which surround and influence discourse in Bolivian society and the elite in particular. It offers five 
sections on relevant topics to Bolivian economy and politics and therefore continues the symbiosis 
with Cox’ critical theory: including the relevance of social construction in one’s analysis. Chapter 5 
(newspaper analysis) explores whether consensus on neoliberalism in the Bolivian elite has been 
broken from 2003 throughout 2006 by aide of a press analysis. The press analysis in the empiric 
section is conducted with help of eight topic categories which are all derived from critical theory. It will 
be proven whether a change of consensus toward neoliberalism exists within the elite and if this 
change expressed itself in the election of Morales and the MAS into government and in agreeing with 
their policies. Chapter 6 presents an overall conclusion and discusses the significance of the findings 
of this thesis to Bolivia’s future.  
 
5 
2 Critical Theory in International Relations 
The second chapter of this thesis, focuses on neoliberalism as hegemony and the role of the state in 
reference to Gramsci and Cox. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian theorist on hegemony and civil society, 
writing throughout the 1920. Robert W. Cox is the former director of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and founder of neogramscianism. This second chapter concludes with a section on 
methodology, tying together principles of critical theory and events in Bolivia from 1980 to 2006. 
International relations as a discipline is basically interested in studying states. In analyzing the 
role of the state, one of many methods in the international relations discipline draws on Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, or more specifically on gramscian critical theory developed by Robert 
Cox.
9 It is assumed that within the past decades, the state has added to its role as an actor that 
pursues interests through foreign policy, to include civil society functions toward internal peace for an 
entity which primarily acts in the interest of the market – an expression of neoliberal hegemony (Cox 
1981: 86). This thesis will focus on the analysis of elite discourse, as critical theory views the elite (the 
(old) bourgeoisie) as controlling hegemony and therefore society’s values and state policy. 
2.1 Neoliberal hegemony and the State 
The following section depicts critical theory in international relations as envisioned by Robert Cox in 
reference to Antonio Gramsci. It explains the role of state from the perspective of this theoretical 
framework, and tries to say why neoliberalism is the hegemonic world order. The specification of both 
authors is necessary, are many critical theories (Behrens 2004: 41) as in philosophy and other 
academic disciplines.
10 All of these derive from the concepts of enlightenment, emancipation, 
reification, criticism (social criticism vs. criticism of science), society, communication (discourse; e.g. 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School) and the practicality of theory. This chapter seeks not only to 
create an understanding of Gramsci’s and Cox’s theories and perspectives, but also to show how they 
can be applied to the Bolivian case, more specifically to the case study conducted by this thesis. 
As the term suggests, neoliberalism is a new form of liberalism, and is, defined roughly as the 
withdrawal of the state from the economy, as was propagated by liberal thought schools in the early 
nineteenth century. The neoliberalism, as sought for by the IFIs, the state is minimally involved in eco-
nomic matters, but is in charge of creating a framework that favors free trade, and the unrestricted flow 
of capital, and that all (e.g. social and environmental) matters will regulate themselves as the market 
does: these are the basic principles of neoliberalism. Peet cites John Williamson, a senior fellow at the 
(Washington D.C.) Institute for International Economics, summarizing sets of economic policies par-
ticularly for Latin America, known as the Washington Consensus: 1. Fiscal discipline; 2. reducing pub-
lic expenditures; 3. tax reforms; 4. increase savings through altering interest rates; 5. create competi-
tive exchange rates and follow these with tax reductions, 6. liberalize trade; 7. encourage foreign direct 
investment; 8. de-regulate the economy to benefit competition 9. secure property rights (Peet 2003: 
204 -207). The term also refers to a set of economic policies favored by the IFIs, who push the inter-
ests of the policy-makers (leaders of the G-8 and other industrialized countries) – all bona fide neolib-
erals. On a global basis, IFIs continue to pressure and encourage developing countries, such as Bo-
                                                 
9 Gramsci is associated with the hegemony of the proletariat. He took current ideas in the circles of the Third International, in 
which “the workers exercised hegemony over the allied classes and dictatorship over enemy classes” (Cox 1983: 126).  
10 For an example see: Contested Knowledge: A guide to critical theory by John Phillips, 2000. Or “Main Concepts of Critical 
Theory” in: Educational Science: Hermeneutics, Empirical Research, Critical Theory by Christoph Wulf, 2003, p 108 – 127  
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livia (Chapter 3), into adopting neoliberal policies, by tying development aid to conditions, and threat-
ening to cut aid upon failure to comply. Neoliberalism appeals to the Bolivian elite who ferociously 
pushed its policies since 1982. Links to US government or corporate influence exist since the begin-
ning of recent Bolivian history (see Section 3.1). Thus, neoliberalism is hegemony on a global and 
national (Bolivian) levels. The principles underlying neoliberalism appeal to all kinds of people across 
time and space and “ensure conformity of behavior in most people most of the time” – as Cox said 
(1983: 127). 
2.1.1 Critical Theory developed by Gramsci and Cox 
Gramsci applied the idea of hegemony to the pre-WWII bourgeoisie, capitalist world order. Bourgeois 
hegemony was “firmly entrenched in civil society” to the point that the ruling class needed to make no 
effort to run the state itself. The bourgeoisie had intellectual and moral leadership: “Ideology, culture, 
philosophy and their ‘organizers’ – the intellectuals – are thus intrinsic to the notion of hegemony” 
(Fontana 1993: 140). The state, as defined by Gramsci, is not only the administration and government, 
but the entire political structure and civil society. Civil society acts to internalize certain modes of 
behavior and expectations through a combination of measures that produce consent. In his analysis, 
Gramsci distinguished between two types of European societies. The first, societies which had already 
adapted a thorough social revolution and had thus implemented new modes of production and social 
relations. The second are those which imported the new order of the first described society “without 
the old order having been displaced” (Cox 1983: 129). In this second type of society, no bourgeois 
hegemony has (yet) been established, but the dominant classes created conditions which Gramsci 
named ‘passive revolution,’ a term describing the power of the subordinate classes as enough to 
threaten the state, but not sufficient to dislodge it. Bolivia could count as belonging to this second type 
of society – as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Leaning on Gramsci’s theory on hegemony, and the notion that education, hegemony and 
politics are interrelated (Fontana 1993)
11, Cox, former director of the ILO, explored the plurality of 
states from core, to semi-peripheral to peripheral countries across the globe. For Cox every theory (in 
international relations or elsewhere) represents a point of view and serves a purpose from the 
theorists position in time and space.
12 Therefore, reality is perceived; not an objective truth. Cox 
identified the contradictions which help transformation of the world order, rather than explaining the 
forces maintaining the system, through contrasting two prevailing theories in international relations 
(1981: 87). Cox believed that a “proper study of human affairs (…) reveal both the coherence of minds 
and institutions characteristic of different ages, and the process whereby one such coherent pattern 
[historical structure…] succeeds another” (1981: 13f). In connecting the present with the past, 
according to Cox, knowledge of changing modes of social reality are revealed. Therefore, this thesis 
extensively recounts history from the beginning of the republic to the present and presents short 
discussions on topics of contemporary Bolivian economics and politics (Chapters 3 and 4). 
                                                 
11 “[T]he question of whom the knowledge addresses assumes decisive importance; for it is through addressing of the subject 
that the knowledge defines itself and unfolds ‘nel temporale.’ The type of knowledge, and the type of subject that is addressed 
and that knows it, are therefore necessarily of a similar and corresponding character” (Fontana 1993: 108).  
12 “The knowledge is the product of a particular posture toward the world; it is the outcome of a being in movement – indeed, this 
being in the movement is itself what constitutes the knowledge, such that the consciousness of the subject is the consciousness 
of this active and dynamic becoming” (Fontana 1993: 112). Knowledge is acquired through a filter of moral, culture and ideology 
(Fontana 1993: 140).   
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Contrasting problem-solving theory (which is tactical in nature and limits itself to setting up 
guides for action) to critical theory (that is strategic and questions the origins of structures of all kinds 
and seeks to understand social power relations within the large picture) Cox concludes that the latter 
better serves his purpose for revealing dialectical processes: critical theory “seeks to understand the 
processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved” as well as considering historical 
change (of social and political order) therefore “continually adjust[ing] its concepts to the changing 
object it seeks to understand and explain” (1981: 89f). Additionally, critical theory contains problem-
solving approaches, that are transcendent of the existing order and thus better clarifies options for 
change than problem-solving theory which assumes one solution to be universally applicable across 
time and space (Cox 1981: 90, 94). Viewing neorealism through the eyes of critical theory to then 
compare it to historical materialism, Cox labels neorealism as assumptive of a certain rationality and 
morality among competing actors, which exist in an anarchic state system (1981: 92). Neorealism is 
not value-free (and serves a purpose of someone somewhere) and predisposes that “each state has 
adopted this neorealist rationality in order to maintain security within the inter-state system” and that 
those discarding neorealism will retreat to their own moral sense of order (Cox 1981: 93). In contrast, 
historical materialism, defined as an examiner of “the connection between power in production, power 
in the state and power in international relations” (1981: 96), might be more appropriate for Cox’ goals.  
Neoreal problem-solving approaches and historical materialism share four important aspects. 
First and second points are the relevance placed on conflict by both theories that results in a dialecti-
cal outlook on the level of history
13 and logic
14. These commonalities remain true even though histori-
cal materialism sees contradictions as a cause of change and neorealism views contrary opinions and 
actions as a consequence of the recurrent structure (Cox 1981: 95). Third, both theories focus on im-
perialism to explain state relations. Fourth, both examine the relationship between civil society and the 
state (even though it is debated whether the state is an expression of particular interests or an 
autonomous force expressing general interests) (Cox 1981: 96). Historical materialism might focus on 
the production process to explain history (the creation of wealth within a society; as an explanation for 
foreign policy and the states power), whereas neorealism ignores production as an explanation for 
history and also does not include the importance of social forces (Cox 1981: 102). Remembering 
Gramscis theory on hegemony, which stated that the reciprocal relationship between structure (eco-
nomic relations) and superstructure (the ethic-political sphere) “contains the potential for considering 
state/society complexes as the constituent entities of a world order and for exploring particular histori-
cal forms taken by these complexes” (1981: 96), Cox concluded that political conflicts either maintain 
or change power relations of production within a system. The analysis of this thesis ties in at this point. 
It examines whether a political conflict maintained or altered power relations, particularly after an anti-
neoliberal coca grower and indigenous person was elected president three years later. This thesis 
explores whether the Bolivian elite joined anti-neoliberal thought: is a new historic block in place? 
                                                 
13 Confrontation results in development of alternatives. 
14 Contradictions are sought through dialogue.  
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As Cox demonstrates, stable hegemonies are based on a coherent conjunction “or fit between 
a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (…)
15 and a set of insti-
tutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality (…)” (1981: 103). Cox pre-
sents five guidelines of his critical theory based upon a logical consequence stable hegemonies basis: 
1.  action is never free, but dependant upon the framework within which it occurs; 
2.  theory is a result of time and space; 
3.  the framework within which theory and action occur are subject to change; 
4.  framework always has some kind of coherence (historical, material or institutional)
16; and 
5.  the framework should always be regarded from either below or outside, so that conflicts within can be instrumen-
talized to change structures (Cox 1981: 95ff).
17 
Hegemonic structures contain three interacting sources: material capabilities, ideas
18 and insti-
tutions. The latter reflect and encourage collective images of power relations (Cox 1981: 98). Particu-
larly points four and five apply to Bolivia (see Chapter 3). Institutions are important aspects of hegem-
ony. Hegemony cannot be reduced to institutional dimensions, but institutions, exactly like hegemony, 
efficiently confront conflict with a minimum of force. Institutions are expressions of hegemony, but not 
hegemony itself. Structures (or historical structures) have three interrelated/interdependent levels: 
organization of production, form of the state and world order. Change on one level alters another (Cox 
1981: 101).
19 Cox named five conditions an institution must fulfill to be an expression of hegemony. 
These conditions are listed below (in table 1), together with an application to Bolivia: 
As will be shown in Chapter 3, the IFIs are considered part of neoliberal hegemony. Also, they pres-
                                                 
15 Norms. 
16 “These structures constitute the context of habits, pressures, expectations, and constraints within which action takes place” 
(Cox 1981: 97). 
17 “The social group or class that is capable of forming its own particular knowledge and value systems, and of transforming 
them into general and universally applicable conceptions of the world, is the group that exercises intellectual and moral leader-
ship.” Intellectuals are the organic links between elite and the rest of society (cultura alta and cultura popolare) and because the 
values and ideas are so universal, the system is stable (Fontana 1993: 141). 
18 Ideas can be: “intersubjective meanings (shared notions of the nature of social relations) or collective images of social order 
(view on nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meaning of justice and public good)” (Cox 1981: 99). 
19 “The relationship among the three levels is not (…) unilinear. Transnational social forces have influenced states through the 
world structure, as evidenced by the effect of expansive nineteenth-century capitalism, les bourgeois conquérants, upon the 
development of state structures in both core and periphery. Particular structures of world order exert influence over the forms 
which states take: Stalinism was (…) a response to a (…) threat to the existence of Soviet state from a hostile world order (…)  
the prevalence of repressive militarism in periphery countries can be explained by the external support of imperialism (and by a) 
Table 1: Characteristics of Hegemonic Institutions and their relevance to Bolivia 
Criteria  Explanation 
1. Facilitate expansion of hegemonic world order 
Gear at economic expansion, rules governing monetary and trade 
relations 
Provide safeguard for institutions for domestic social concerns. 
National policies are consistent with goal of liberal world economy. 
Floating exchange rates maintains principle of prior commitment to 
harmonize national policies in the interest of a liberal world 
economy – as done in the 1980s. 
2. be a product of hegemonic world order 
State support establishes the economy and controls acquiescence of 
other states. Second-rank countries are consulted and only some 
peripheral nations are asked for their consent. Informal structure of 
influence reflect the different levels of real political and economic 
power which underlie the formal procedures for decision-making. 
Formal participation weighed in favor of dominant powers (IMF & 
IBRD) 
3. ideologically legitimate norms of the world order 
Define policy guidelines for states; legitimize certain institutions and 
practices on the national level 
Recommend features such as monetarism. Adapt Millennium 
Development Goals (like Goni; see Chapter 3) 
4. Co-opt elites from peripheral countries 
Equal with transformismo (uniting two groups of different political 
spectrums; assimilate and domesticate potentially dangerous ideas 
through adjustment to ideals of the dominant coalition (Section 
2.1.3)) 
Individuals should work within the structures of the passive 
revolution. Modernization is transferred to peripheries, if this is in 
interest of established local powers. Bolivia was threatened with 
cutting of development aid by the IFIs and the US should it not 
implement measures as demanded by these expressions of 
hegemony (political demands such as coca eradication are linked to 
economic “benefits” successfully co-opting elites) 
5. absorb counterhegemonic ideas 
Transformismo imbibes contradictory into hegemonic doctrine. 
Arguments against neoliberal policies voiced during the 1980s were 
adapted into Gonis Plan de Todos in the 1990s.  
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sure Bolivian governments to adapt their blue prints of state policy. Beginning in 1982 Bolivian gov-
ernments became expression of neoliberal hegemony, as Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 4.1 discuss. 
2.1.2 The State in a Hegemonic World Order 
As has been shown, within hegemony, the state is no longer an independent explanatory factor, but 
part of many. Both the pax americana and pax britannica were similar as each contained norms of 
liberal economics and “provided a universalistic ideology which represented these norms as the basis 
of a harmony of interests ” (Cox 1983: 103f). Pax americana only differed from pax britannica in its 
rigidity. Pax americana created alliances to contain the Soviet Union. By establishing rules for an in-
ternational (hegemonic) economic order (through the revised liberalism of the IFIs) pax americana 
ensured national power for itself and blurred the lines between economy and politics (Cox 1981: 103f). 
States received a “legitimate and necessary overt role in national economic management” and 
multilateralized the management of the international economic, making it an intergovernmental quality 
matter (Cox 1981: 104). The world is thus a pattern of interacting social forces “in which states play an 
intermediate though autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and local 
configurations of social forces within particular countries” (Cox 1981: 105). 
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy 
with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It 
is also a complex of international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries. World 
hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one 
of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and 
mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national 
boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production. (Cox 1983: 137)  
  In a hegemonic world order, the system runs itself without control by those in whose interests 
the system functions, as states adapt to the system through internal and external measures. Similarly 
to imperialism, the IFIs are representatives of a hegemonic world order, as they include core and pe-
ripheral states, all of which have internalized the structure
20 assuring that certain norms are applied 
through requiring borrowing countries to adapt certain norms for good (Marshall Plan) (Cox 1981: 
107f). Internationalizing the state therefore means internationalizing of production and the integration 
of production on a transnational scale: different phases of a single process are carried out in different 
countries. 
Furthermore, states have (on an internal level) created certain agencies (with internal respon-
sibilities) “in the context of national corporatism” which are not only key points in but also subordinated 
to the adjustment to international economic policy (Cox 1981: 109). This change in the world structure 
over the past decades created a link between central agencies of government and big business. 
These changes overshadowed older and more formalized national corporatism and reflected the 
dominance of the big business oriented sector over nationally oriented areas of the economy - as was 
the case in Bolivia of the 1990s (Section 3.3). Consequently, a transnational managerial class
21 
emerged with an own ideology, strategy and institutions of collective action (Trilateral Commission, 
                                                                                                                                                   
particular conjunction of internal forces. Forms of state (…) affect the development of social forces through the kinds of domina-
tion they exert, (…) by advancing one class interest and thwarting others” (Cox 1981: 101). 
20 “The IMF was set up to provide loans to countries with balance-of-payments deficits in order to provide time in which they 
could make adjustments, and to avoid the sharp deflationary consequences of an automatic gold standard. The World Bank was 
to be a vehicle for longer-term financial assistance” (Cox 1981: 108). 
21 “The members of this transnational class are not limited to those who carry out functions at the global level, such as execu-
tives of multinational corporations or as senior officials of international agencies, but include those who manage the internation-
ally oriented sectors within countries, the finance ministry officials, local managers of enterprises linked into international produc-
tion systems, and so on” (Cox 1981: 111).  
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IFIs and the OECD). The transnational managerial class developed both a framework of thought and 
guidelines for policies on a global scale. The rise of this class is linked to the increasing importance of 
non-established labor and expressed in the high availability of semi-skilled labor in peripheral coun-
tries. Governments of these countries have sought to “pre-empt the possibility of this new social force 
developing its own class-conscious organizations by imposing upon its structures of state corporatism 
in the form of [state-controlled] unions (…)” (Cox 1981: 112). As will be shown throughout Chapter 4, 
unions in Bolivia were a part of government throughout five decades, sharing particularly the first 
twelve years of government after the 1952 Revolution. Bolivian unions continually lost influence, par-
ticularly because of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. 
Cox predicts that third world industrial workforces may not see improvement of their situation 
despite a new class consciousness among the elites of said countries. Rather, their conditions will 
deteriorate and they will remain marginalized in the world economy “having no employment or income, 
or the purchasing power derived from it” (Cox 1981: 113). This exclusions will create a major problem 
for international capitalism, and, as Section 4.2 explains, this has been the case for Bolivia. For 
international capitalism to be hegemonic, it must “neutralize the effect of this marginizing of perhaps 
one-third of the world’s population so as to prevent its poverty from fuelling revolt” (Cox 1981: 113). 
International capital must also continue the dominance of i nternational over national capital and 
internalize the state. Cox correctly predicted the Soviet sphere entering the world economy of 
international production and the international division of labor, although he did not name a specific 
date. He also correctly writes about the combat of social conflicts in core countries through enterprise 
corporatism and social conflicts repression through state corporatism in peripheral countries (Cox 
1981: 114). Most importantly, Cox envisioned the possibility of counter hegemony developing in third 
world countries. Opposition to neoliberalism has become acute throughout the past six years in 
Bolivia, where explicitly anti-neoliberal protests have been staged and even succeeded in expulsion of 
a president and the election of an anti-neoliberal activist into government. Therefore, modes to 
overcome hegemony are explained, before acquainting the reader with Bolivian history. 
2.1.3 Overcoming Hegemony 
Gramsci suggested the proletariat could adopt two strategies in overcoming hegemony: war of the 
movement; and war of position. The latter would be more fruitful for the European proletariat, accord-
ing to Gramsci, as it would “slowly build up the strengths of the social foundations of a new state” (Cox 
1983: 128) and install so-called bridges between subordinate classes, benefiting the creation of 
counter-hegemony through establishing alternative institutions and intellectual resources (Cox 1983: 
129).
22 War of the movement was less apt, because its assertiveness and pre-maturity (such as a 
coup d’état) would cause the bourgeois to reveal the weakness of the opposition and benefit the re-
institution of their dominance. The bourgeoisie would “simply reproduce the social and political pattern 
of existing power relations” (Fontana 1993: 150). A third strategy is the so-called transformismo, which 
consists in gathering two groups of different political spectrums in order to assimilate and domesticate 
potentially dangerous ideas “by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition” which is not 
class-based (Cox 1983: 130). Transformismo can be a ssumed for Bolivia. Class differences were 
                                                 
22 For such a process, knowledge is necessary, according to Gramsci: “Political life represents the overcoming of the thought 
and practice of the feudal past, the creation of a new conception of the world that puts human beings at the center of the world 
and the world as their conscious creation” (Fontana 1993: 111).   
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glossed over by replacing all ethnic terms with the word campesino after the 1952 Revolution. Until 
today, people from all spectrums of society unite when pursuing one goal (against the state), but they 
will disperse around other issues (see Section 4.2). 
Cox ties together passive revolution (which we remember to be a state in which a society is in 
as explained in Section 2.1.1.) and  transformismo, which he finds “particularly apposite to 
industrializing Third World countries” (1983: 131). Passive revolution is exemplified on a national level 
by the spread of revolutions throughout the world such as the French, Revolution in the US and 
Russia. These revolutions were based upon the reflection of international developments and 
transmitted their ideological currents to the periphery (Gramsci 1971). A country undergoes a passive 
revolution by adapting hegemonic structures without a “real” revolution while also not disturbing old 
power structures. Passive revolutions refrain from adopting hegemonic political models, as Bolivia did 
(Cox 1983: 137). Hegemony on a global level is  thus intense and consistent at the core, but 
contradictory at the periphery. Cox interprets Gramsci’s as  not meaning an indigenous social 
movement in a third world country that is engaged in building a new economic base and social 
relations with this definition. Rather, Gramsci meant “an intellectual stratum which picks up ideas 
originating from a prior foreign economic and social revolution” (Cox 1983: 135). Therefore, war of 
position, as Cox agrees with Gramsci, is the only way to successfully change structure. This strategy 
entails the building of a socio-political base and the creation of a new historic block (Cox 1983: 140). 
This point is examined in this thesis: has the old elite been replaced by a new one? 
A new historic block is characterized by the existence of a hegemonic class. Within the new 
historic block “ideas and material conditions [are] always bound together, mutually influencing one 
another, and not reducible to the another” (Cox 1983: 132). In other words: a new historic block forms 
when other (formerly ruling or ‘old’ elite) classes are subordinated (by a ‘new’ elite) and when these 
new governors have own intellectuals, like the bourgeoisie (or hegemonic class) did. Furthermore, a 
successful overcoming of hegemony entails political preparation. A new hegemony is created, when a 
structure transforms into the sphere of superstructures: its institutions and ideologies are then 
universal, satisfying not only the ruling elite, but subordinate classes, too (Cox 1983: 133). Within such 
a superstructure, ideology and political organization shape the development of both aspects of 
production. Production however also shapes the superstructure. This stage of overcoming hegemony 
might not be examined in the case study of this thesis. It might not reach  far enough into the 
present/future. 
Looking at International Relations, Gramsci saw great powers with freedom to determine their 
foreign policy according to domestic interest and smaller powers with less autonomy. Hegemony can 
be applied at the international level,
23 according to Cox, and is not only founded upon the regulation of 
inter-state conflict but also based upon a global civil society (“i.e. a mode of production of global extent 
which brings about links among social classes of the countries encompassed by it” (1983: 136)). A 
smaller powers economic life is intertwined with that of powerful nations. Economic life of a small pow-
                                                 
23 Hegemony can be dominance of one country over another or a euphemism of imperialism. Cox labels hegemonic and non-
hegemonic periods in history; e.g. 1875 - 1945 as non-hegemonic (British supremacy was questioned, destabilized balance of 
power in Europe lead to two world wars), 1945 to 1965 was hegemonic (US-controlled) and 1965 to present (read: 1983) is non-
hegemonic, even though it encompasses a “reconstruction of hegemony with a broadening of political management on the lines 
envisaged by the Trilateral Commission; increased fragmentation of the world economy around big-power-centered economic 
spheres; and the possible assertion of a Third World-based counter-hegemony with the concerted demand for the New Interna-
tional Economic Order as a forerunner” (1983: 136).  
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ers is further complicated by the existence of structurally diverse regions within a subordinate country 
(Cox 1983: 134). The  structurally diverse r egions have different relationship patterns to external 
forces; as is the case of Bolivia: its economic and political levels are highly dependant on the outside. 
Peripheral countries may be vulnerable to revolutionary actions (such as the 2003 riots), but riots may 
not be consistently successful. A successful international movement must unite international produc-
tion, bridging peasants and urban marginals together (Cox 1983: 141). As Chapter 3 and Section 4.2 
show, this criteria applies to Bolivia. Accordingly, using critical theory for analysis purposes in this 
thesis, the following section ties together theory and practice. 
2.1.4 Joining theory and practice 
Gramsci, at the beginning of the past century, and Cox, in the early 1980s, spoke of hegemony on a 
global level. Their criticism of theories in international relations, as outlined in Section 2.1.1., was 
voiced particularly against the then prominent neorealism (for Cox) and centered upon its limited 
perspective. Cox and Gramsci found fault particularly in neorealisms focus on states and its 
understanding of a power-oriented hegemony. Above all they criticized its ahistoric understanding of 
the world; which ignored aspects of inner-state politics and transnational factors (Behrens 2004: 29). 
One might consider global governance. As Behrens points out, critical theory b elieves global 
governance may organize the new complex reality that exists as a result of change. Global 
governance might also serve as orientation for political action. The drawback to global governance, 
according to critical theory, is that “world problems are viewed as consequence of globalization and 
not [as] an integral part [thereof]” (Brandt 2001: 101 in Behrens 2004).
24 Thus, the social democratic 
approach delivered by global governance cannot replace the neoliberal paradigm, but may only 
belabor its consequences: “economic globalization is equated with laws of physics in the eyes of 
critical theorists, to which global governance is merely reacting” (Behrens 2004: 34). Criticism of global 
governance goes further: it is perceived as disciplining neoliberalism, or, specifically: as an instrument 
creating a discursive framework for a new societal consensus directed at a sustaining neoliberalism. 
At this point, the reader may recall the brief review of Bolivian history in the introduction to un-
derstand why critical theory can be used to verify whether a potential discourse change within the elite 
particularly in 2003 and 2006. According to critical theory, interests, structures and identities are em-
bedded in a historical context. Consequently conflicts are illuminated transcendentally through the 
eyes of critical theory, by consideration of both the historic and social construction as this thesis does 
in Chapters 3 and 4. Examined on the basis of history truth becomes subjective rather than objective. 
Individuals do not express interests “just like that.” Rather, interests are a result of interaction within 
society and are rooted in time, space and language contexts, as pointed out in Section 2.1.3. Interests 
of the Bolivian elite or the IFIs are therefore expressions of neoliberal hegemony, like the Chapter 3 
depicts. As time progresses, space adapts and language contexts evolve. Interests will change ac-
cordingly. Counter hegemonic ideas are always absorbed to ensure the survival of the structure. As 
will be shown throughout this thesis, Bolivian parties have done just that: turning over private property 
to the state during one governing period and privatizing state companies some decades later. Simi-
larly, states are not firmly cemented systems, but are flexible; exactly like power relations such as 
                                                 
24 The literature for this thesis was drawn from different countries and languages. For a more comfortable reading the author 
translated all foreign language quotes into English bit did not label these as translations – all works are cited in the original 
language of the text in the bibliography. The author may be held accountable for any mistakes.  
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hegemony (Behrens 2004: 43, 48). This flexibility is what critical theory seeks to analyze. Critical the-
ory also shows that history and the present are inter-related. Further, structural change can be pre-
dicted upon the factors explicitly named by critical theory: the interdependence of ideas, institutions 
and material capabilities within structures and the relevance of global social and productive relations 
and their dialectics. The notion that the status quo is formed by dialectical processes also implies that 
the state is not only composed of the government and the administration but of the national and trans-
national powers within the state (see Section 2.1.1) (Behrens 2004: 53). Understanding Bolivian his-
tory, the conflict concerning neoliberal policies becomes predictable; contemporary Bolivian politics 
and economics were formed by a historic and social framework. 
As known, hegemony exists when the ruling class (or hegemonic block) convinces 
subordinated classes to internalize the system and hegemony faces crisis when conflicts are settled 
violently (Behrens 2004: 49). In the case of Bolivia, where conflicts seem to be resolved on a violent 
rather than negotiating basis (Kohl and Farthing 2006), this criteria applies. According to Bieling and 
Deppe, r ecent changes in international relations (read: the fall of the iron curtain) brought a 
renaissance of international political economy and “in the center of many observers view [now] stands 
the relation b etween the world market and the nation state” (1996: 729). In international relations 
theory the state is either seen as a primary entity, followed by the state (realism) or as driven by the 
market (liberalism). However, both theories view the internationalization of the state as complementary 
to the globalization of productive, financial, service and social relations. The state has taken over the 
function of a transmission belt in the global economy and been weakened in turn, resulting in an 
increasing political incoherence and a more rigid economic coherence (Bieling and Deppe 1996: 735). 
The transnational historic block and the heightened relevance of social actors opposing political forces 
translate in the weakening of the power of the nation, while the transnational managerial class gains 
strength (proven by the IFIs and existence of think tanks).
25  
Cox’s dynamic structuralism concentrates on these levels: structure of accumulation, state 
type, world order and intermediation between the spheres. Thus, the “global oriented elites and the 
ideas and philosophies produced by them are in charge of the dynamic for social change” – kind of a 
class consciousness (Bieling and Deppe 1996).
26 In part, this can be verified for Bolivia: the elites are 
globalization-oriented, but rather for own profit than for the system itself. Bieling and Deppe recall 
Cox’s five criteria which a structure should fulfill in order to be called a hegemony: 
1.  Examining hegemony in its historic context: “International hegemony was exercised through economic and political 
strength and a leading role in ideology by one single nation state” (1996: 730). 
2.  Social relations: whose and which class interests are being catered to how within the state.
27  
3.  The structure must be an international historic block: a coherent system of socio-economic, civil and political society; 
a relation between several states during a certain historical epoch (see Section 2.1.2.) 
4.  Hegemony spreads through passive revolution, universalizing norms, rules and institutions. Contradictory positions 
are either neutralized or marginalized. 
5.  Revealing contradictions in current (read: hegemonic) power relations is equal to finding ways to break and overcome 
hegemony (1996: 732). 
                                                 
25 For a thorough introduction and analysis of the IFIs, their histories and spheres of influence please see Peet (2003). 
26 The three levels of economic consciousness and their purpose: (a) Economic-corporative (be aware of specific interests of 
other groups; (b) Solidarity (class consciousness; remains at the economic level); (c) Hegemonic (Harmonizes interests of 
leading and subordinate classes. Interprets/expresses ideology in universal terms) (Cox 1983: 133).  
27 “[T]he structures of international hegemony are based on societal power relations including their social, cultural and ideologi-
cal reproduction (…) linking this concept to global capitalism this means that it is hegemonic like a certain development model 
became a standard for societal modernization and is stabilized through transnational regulations” (Bieling and Deppe 1996: 
731).  
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Bieling and Deppe caution, that it is subject to debate whether a new hegemony exists after the fall of 
the iron curtain. Peet proves the existence of hegemony at least in terms of economic policy by the 
IFIs, citing three kinds of hegemonic institutional actors economic, bureaucratic and political, assisted 
by the media and academia (Peet 2003: 201 - 204). As will be shown in Section 3.2 Jeffrey Sachs of 
Harvard set up the economic shock program in Bolivia during the 1980s, and is a prime example for 
what Peet cites as a “stamp of scientific approval on the theoretical knowledge that underlies eco-
nomic policies” (2003: 203). Different national debates on positions since the beginning of the 1990s 
have shown the transition from a Keynesian welfare state to a national competitive state on the basis 
of neoliberal policies, as was done in Bolivia during the Sánchez de Lozada administration (see 
Section 3.3). Neoliberal deregulatory politics aim at three areas:  
1.  transnational liberalization of good and capital flows (GATT) 
2.  privatization of transport and communication as well as for social security systems and the minimization of other 
public services while extending the repressive areas of the state (prisons, police, monitoring), as was done in Bolivia, 
beginning in 1989. 
3.  Austerity-oriented politics and demounting of the welfare state with the goal of weakening the unions and the 
dissolution of every system with collective rules (wage agreements, social rights, collective labor right) which might 
benefit institutional framework of said power (class compromise). Both of these measures can be noted in Bolivia, as 
Section 3.3.2 will show (Bieling and Deppe 1996: 736). 
On an international level the riots in Seattle in 1999 are seen as the beginning neoliberal hegemonies 
crisis. The rioters in Seattle demanded – roughly – economic and political policies that respect both 
human and environmental rights, participation of affected groups in IBRD and IMF affairs, ensure fair-
ness, for a better distribution of wealth across the globe, and are sustainable toward all peoples of all 
nations, examining the role of the IFIs (Peet 2003) similarly to demands of the protestors of the Water 
War in 2000 in Bolivia and during the Tax and Gas War. For example, during the Water War of 2000, 
the rioters demanded the government revise laws on water, natural resources, biodiversity and land 
use and a land reform as well as labor rights – and they opposed particularly neoliberal policies which 
they considered counterproductive to their interests (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 123). These demands 
joined those voiced throughout the past two decades as Sections 3.2 and 3.3.2 depict. The Tax and 
Gas War of 2003 was sparked in February by the demands of the IMF to reduce national deficit by 
three percent by raising taxes in Bolivia. Goni, complied with this decision and put forth a proposal for 
a 12.5 percent tax hike. The riots opposed the demands by the IMF and turned violent when the police 
went on strike simultaneously, leaving 29 people dead. Even though Goni withdrew the proposal, the 
political opposition continued calling for his resignation, especially in October, rioting against selling 
gas to the US. Goni resigned and fled the country to the US and where he has remained, residing in 
Bethesda, Maryland. During these riots the MAS were both in parliament and on the streets, demand-
ing the end neoliberalism and Goni’s resignation. The MAS campaign of 2005 had three pillars and the 
issue of gas was one of them. As the rioters, they demanded its nationalization, which came into effect 
on 1 May 2006, on the hundredth day of Morales in power and international labor day. In 2003, the 
MAS had demanded the Bolivians finally profit from their natural resources rather than transnational 
corporation. They criticized that for every 24 US-dollars a transnational corporation made, Bolivia re-
ceived only one US-dollar. Goni had o ffered a re-evaluation of contracts with the private contract-
parties (excluding rioters) in 2003. He rejected nationalization altogether. October of 2003 and Janu-
ary/February of 2006 seem adequate for comparison. They will be used to explore whether the crisis 
of neoliberal hegemony in Bolivia of 2003, adapted counter-hegemonic ideas into elite discourse or 
whether neoliberal consensus was broken and gave way to an alternative vision in the elite.   
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Material concessions bring new groups into the political spectrum. Particularly when these 
new groups are important to neoliberal politics. Subalterns should the while receive treatment that 
makes every day life bearable (Bieling and Deppe: 373). Applying Cox’s critical theory to Bolivia, proof 
that neoliberal consensus within the country existed and has been shaken, would also translate into 
the old elite having lost their conflict regulating capacities. This is clearly true when glancing upon the 
2003 riots. They only seized after the president resigned and fled (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 126). The 
following section explains the methodology used to conduct the case study (press analysis) in Chapter 
5. 
2.2 Methodology 
Discourse analysis, is traced back to Foucault and Habermas. It is a relatively unexplored field in the 
discipline of International Relations (Behrens 2001: 65), whereas other fields commonly use this 
method for conversation analysis (by examining forms of speech, symbolism, structure of discourse), 
to find the roots of discourse reproduction and power relations (Behrens 2001: 66). Critical theory is 
different from other theories in international relations because of its research a nd methodological 
understanding (Hummel 2000: 60). According to Foucault, the dominating discourse expresses power 
relations (in case of this thesis neoliberal discourse of the elite represented by president Goni, the US 
and the IFIs), and these will be questioned by alternative discourses (in case of the 2003 rioters and 
the MAS) and are thus in permanent danger (Behrens 2001: 67). Furthermore, hegemony exists when 
a set of norms (or economic policies) are internalized and left unquestioned, and when conflicts 
remain “invisible” (Hummel 2000: 123). But how to study a change of power relations in discourse? By 
comparison of two relevant periods of one process (assumed through the eyes of theory). And in 
homage of Hartwig Hummel’s (2000) study on the trade conflict between the US and Japan, a 
discourse analysis based on critical theory and a newspaper analysis. Hummel notes that Cox’s 
analyzes only one area of human activity rather than the entire picture and that it’s important to show 
how structures reproduce and maintain themselves (2000: 64 - 67). 
The historic framework, which is conceived by discourse, decides which world orders are seen as possible options in the 
future, which historic possibilities fit into this framework and which possibilities don’t. (Hummel 2000: 69) 
This thesis presents a single country study, conducted through the eyes of critical theory and 
based upon statistics created by the author. The case study seeks to verify or reject the hypothesis 
that a discourse change occurred in the Bolivian elite between 2003 and 2006. Before presenting the 
newspaper analysis, the historic and social framework within which neoliberal hegemonic discourse 
was and is placed is outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. A break or prevalence of neoliberal consensus and 
power relations will be reflected by comparison of the attitudes three newspapers expressed toward 
certain topics relevant to neoliberalism and counter hegemonic discourse in two time-frames. This plan 
reads well. To assure it is thoroughly explained, the author presents an ‘interview’ with herself: 
 
 
1.  On which basis were the two time-frames of analysis chosen and why are they compatible for 
comparison to one another? 
October of 2003 and January of 2006 are two important eras in Bolivian recent history. The second 
part of the Tax and Gas War were chosen due to their representative function: the beginning of a con- 
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flict in neoliberal hegemonic discourse. The riots known as the Water War 2000 and riots in early 2003 
circled around one set of complaints against neoliberalism, the government and the IFIs. Perhaps the 
Water War would be more suitable? No, it is not. The Water War of 2000 might be famous, but in con-
trast to the riots of 2003, it did not oust a president. The riots of 2003 changed discourse. They 
showed that a certain group of people (perhaps even a majority) were dissatisfied with a set of policies 
another group propagated and forcefully implemented, despite protests. The first half of October of 
2003 is most apt landmark in neoliberal hegemony’s break. 
An end of neoliberal hegemony and the implementation of another historic bloc might express 
itself in the results of the 2005 elections. Rather than analyzing the weeks surrounding the election, it 
seemed better to chose the first month of government. The study examines elite evaluation of leaders 
of counter-hegemonic (anti-neoliberal) discourse. Particularly of those involved in the 2003 conflict and 
in charge of state affairs in 2006. The events of October of 2003 and January 2006 are intimately 
related and comparable to each other. The first counts as a potential societal conflict that broke 
neoliberal hegemony and a ltered power relations. The second will either confirm or shatter this 
assumption, by showing how leaders of societal conflict are evaluated while in power. Both time 
frames include articles on comparable topics, particularly neoliberal policies and attitudes toward the 
opposition and their demands (or gifts, depending on the perspective). The study reveals change of 
relevance of certain topics throughout these two significant periods in Bolivian history. Both time 
frames of analysis offer newspaper articles on one actor, albeit in different power positions.  
2.  What purpose do the historic and social construction chapters fulfill and why are they necessary? 
How do all of the chapters of this thesis relate to each other? Why? 
Foucault claimed that power relations were expressed in discourse (Behrens 2001: 68). Fairclough 
and Wodak proposed historic comparison of discourse to exhibit power relations and structures 
maintaining them. This thesis specifically adhered to critical theory developed by Robert Cox (see 
Section 2.1), who like Foucault believed that (neoliberal) hegemony is the result of historic and social 
construction. Both elements of critical theory are discussed in detail before delving into the analysis 
which studies attitudes by the elite (represented by three newspapers) within two relevant time frames. 
Therefore, Chapters 3 and 4 lay ground work for the empirical study conducted in Chapter 5.  
In other words: the social and historic context of neoliberal hegemonic discourse is depicted 
first to prove it existed. Only then are conditions met to conduct said study. Chapters 3 and 4 serve 
several purposes: inform the reader on the studied subject, show Bolivia’s historic background and 
create an understanding of Bolivian society and politics. And to honor critical theory in its claim that 
history explains power relations in discourse. These two chapters are the first stop on the way to a 
successful discourse analysis. Chapter 4 builds upon its predecessor, the historic chapter, and 
explains the ‘soft facts.’ These are important to conceive contemporary Bolivian politics and 
economics and the non-historic factors influencing all actors regardless of their hegemonic or counter 
hegemonic placement. Discourse analysis is completed by the press analysis. 
Chapter 5 contains the newspaper analysis. It presents the discourse analysis case study by 
comparing attitudes toward debated themes in discourse on neoliberalism. Newspaper analysis cate-
gories are rooted in critical theory, as will be shown in answer of question 5. Analysis results include 
references to the historic and social factors depicted in Chapters 3 and 4. Finally, Chapter 6 ties up  
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Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 4, and reveals whether neoliberal hegemonic discourse has been broken or not. 
Chapter 6 considers neoliberal theory as a blue print to explore whether and how the results of the 
case study in Chapter 5 apply or not, by referencing Chapters 3 and 4. The author then gives a broad 
outlook and prediction of what should, will and might not happen. 
3.  Why base a discourse analysis tracing change in power relations on a press analysis? On what 
basis were the newspapers in the study selected? How are they analyzed? 
As Behrens points out there is no systematic way to conduct a discourse analysis through sampling. 
Further, discourse analysis as a method is based upon the assumption that change roots in conflict 
(dialectic relationship) and that confirmation or rejection of whether old discourse has been replaced 
by new or whether the old discourse absorbed counter-hegemonic arguments is found by comparison 
(Behrens 2001: 73). The newspaper analysis of this thesis is thorough: including all editions published 
by all three newspapers during both time-frames.  
Illiteracy is prevalent in Bolivian society. The ability to read and write shows someone’s 
relative high social standing. The media landscape in Bolivia is wide but homogenous (in terms of 
opinions) and newspapers are political actors (or owned by them) (see Chapter 5). That is why the 
study presented in this thesis can only account for elite opinion and not claim to make statements 
about the entire Bolivian public as for the most part they can or do not use the media to reflect their 
political opinion. The three newspapers are representative of possible streams of thought (from 
conservative to leftist) in Bolivian elite. It is noted that newspapers are not as matter-of-fact as official 
documents, as Behrens points out (2001: 71). In the Bolivian case, they can be seen as influencing, 
maintaining or altering actors in neoliberal hegemonic discourse. Newspapers belong to the elites or 
depend on elite funds for survival. Each newspaper represents a different political spectrum and 
streams of thought in Bolivian elite: one conservative (La Prensa, a daily), one moderate (La Epoca, 
weekly) and one leftist (El Juguete Rabioso, bi-weekly). 
As Behrens notes, discourse change has to be proven (2001: 77). The analysis thus includes 
key phrases or words used by the “old” elite to legitimize neoliberal hegemony. Behrens suggests 
limiting each discourse analysis to one topic (or actor). This actor is chosen according to his or her 
institutional relevance. The actor in discursive society can either be placed as the discursive elite (in 
our case “old, neoliberal Bolivian elite”) or a social movement with a collective discursive identity (in 
our case the “new elite”; the MAS). The newspaper analysis integrates actors new to discourse and 
their topics – in our case the MAS and the topics relevant to the old elite – as will become obvious in 
answer 4. Newspaper categories were drawn from the perspective of the MAS in government and the 
topics relevant in 2006. The categories the articles are placed in hail from a time in which counter 
hegemonic ideas might have replaced old hegemony. To cover all spectrums of elite political thought, 
each newspaper is different: conservative, moderate or leftist. This distinction will reveal h ow the 
varying trails of thought within the elite handle counter hegemonic discourse by using an empiric-
analytical method (Behrens 2001: 6). Newspaper articles are evaluated from perspective of the MAS 
(negative, positive or neutral): it is an examination of the old elites evaluation of counter hegemonic 
thought during two time frames. The quantitative method works best for institutional and socio-cultural 
framework analysis (Behrens 2001).  
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4.  Which categories are newspaper articles placed in and why? How is the evaluation measured? 
Where do categories stem from - critical theory or reality? How are results compiled, evaluated 
and why? 
As discourse analysis roots in critical theory, all articles are placed in categories to show the results of 
the newspaper analysis in the form of statistics. The quantitative method was chosen, because the 
large mass of material and the scope of this thesis did not allow otherwise. Analysis context is 
extensively examined in Chapters 3 and 4, allowing a rough qualitative analysis of the results, without 
delving into each and every article in detail. The articles will be placed in one of eight categories of 
political or economic relevance in (counter) hegemonic neoliberal discourse, creating a deeper, orderly 
analysis. The analysis also reveals the change of importance (qualitative estimation) of topics across 
time (by variation in quantity).  
Newspaper articles inform. But whether intentionally or unintentionally, they convey opinions 
and evaluate events, actors and opinions themselves. The articles included in the analysis will receive 
one of three possible degrees of evaluation: neutral, positive or negative. This evaluation will always 
be made from perspective of the (hegemonic neoliberal) “old elite” in judging the “new elite” (the rioters 
and their goals, the MAS and Evo Morales). Based on critical theory eight categories were created. 
Subsequently these eight categories are presented, as well as their roots in critical theory. 
1.  Neoliberalism and IFIs: Includes all articles on neoliberal hegemony brought to Bolivia from  outside. This category 
includes articles on policies as formulated in the Washington Consensus (see Section 2.1). Evaluation of articles shows 
attitude toward neoliberalism or the IFIs or consequences of the Plan de Todos. This category distinguishes itself from 
the others as does not evaluate the MAS. Rather, this category evaluates attitudes toward neoliberal hegemonic actors 
outside of Bolivia in 2003 and 2006. 
2.  Economic Policy and Development: All articles written on Evo Morales and MAS idea of how (counter-hegemonic) 
economic policy and development within Bolivia should be and how these ideas were evaluated are included in this 
category. This area of anti-hegemonic argumentation is especially important and thus the area of economics and politics 
within Bolivia deserve an own category. The category also includes Morales’ handling economic inheritances from 
previous governments. 
3.  MAS goals and policies: This category includes all articles written on the counter hegemonic actor and their 
opinions/state policies. The MAS expressed several anti-neoliberal goals during their participation in the 2003 riots and 
during their 2005 campaign. MAS ideas and opinions are translated into state policy (e.g. halving state salaries, land 
reform, nationalization of gas) since January 2006, when the MAS became the “new elite.” Articles written on any of the 
following topics are to be found in this category: (a) constitution reform; (b) altering government structure; (c) fighting 
corruption; (d) land reform; (e) reduction of salaries in the public sector; (f) indigenous rights; (g) ending (historic) 
structures of oppression. 
4.  Hydrocarbons: This category is an extension of category 3 and includes all articles written on gas and oil reserves and 
how the idea of nationalizing these (a counter-hegemonic goal) was perceived. As Bolivia’s natural resources are very 
important to neoliberal policy and the countries development in general and in contemporary politics (see Section 3.4) 
this area receives special attention. 
5.  Bolivia’s foreign relations (non-US): Similarly to categories 1 and 2, this category and the following examine 
evaluation of foreign relations by the MAS government (e.g. access to the sea) or how foreign countries speak of the 
protestors goals or the MAS government, as interpreted by the old elite. 
6.  Relations with the United States: this category examines articles written on Bolivia’s relations to the US, with a 
particular emphasis on the coca/cocaine issue. Both the coca leaf and US are very intimately linked to one another on a 
historic and social level (see Section 4.4). The US is regarded as the hegemonic actor on a global level and their primary 
topic of conversation with the Bolivian government is coca/cocaine, which they link to all other economic, political and 
social matters. 
7.  Inner Politics in General: rioters and MAS are spoken of in relation to all topics covered by the preceding six 
categories, but are also linked (by purpose, coincidence or reality) to other events. The MAS and rioters might be linked 
(positively or negatively) with topics or events (and their outcome) they were or were not involved in. The category seeks 
to find out if the MAS government has legitimacy as a state actor in the eyes of the Bolivian elite, particularly in regard to 
their background as protestors. This category examines how Bolivian elite perception of counter hegemonic discourse 
and their participants becoming responsible for state affairs prior to 2003 or how they perceived protestors involvement 
in events then. 
8.   Comment, Editorial, Interview: Bolivian newspapers include many “opinionated” articles, which are labeled specifically 
as such. Other articles are followed by smaller (but independent) text blurbs citing opinions on certain issues by 
“experts” on the issue of the main-article (in any are of the previous seven categories). To distinguish regular 
(informative) articles from “opinionated” articles”, the author chose to keep these in a separate, this, category as to not 
slant the analysis. This category reflects the overall attitude of the old toward the new elite.  
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The results of the newspaper analysis are compared twice: all newspapers among each other, once 
for 2003 and again for 2006. Then, the results are compared across the years, to show how 
newspapers changed attitudes (or not). This leads to the verification or rejection of the hypothesis: a 
change of discourse toward neoliberalism in the Bolivian elite took place. First, the existence of 
consensus in the Bolivian elite must be proven, thus without further hesitation, the author presents the 
chapter on Bolivian history which will be followed by a glance into relevant economic and political 
topics in contemporary Bolivia.  
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3 Neoliberal discourse in Bolivia before the year 2000 
Recalling Robert Cox’s critical theory and its manner of understanding societal processes, it is 
important to examine historical and societal construction of the studied object. The following chapter 
depicts Bolivian political and economic history, creating an understanding of how contemporary Bolivia 
was shaped. The historic chapter considers the dialectic processes: o pposition to relevant 
governmental or societal actions. As critical theory emphasized: the context in which hegemony 
operates changes. The fourth chapter explores seven topics relevant in contemporary Bolivian 
economics and politics. But in order to understand how neoliberal hegemony was so successful (at 
least on a superficial level) during the past 25 years, Bolivia’s early history is examined first. 
3.1 Introduction to Bolivia: history to 1982 
In contrast to the elite, the majority of the population lived on the Altiplano which offered little possibility for agrarian activity as it 
is more than 3.000 m above sea level. Quechua and Aymará were excluded from all development or benefit from social, political 
and economic aspects. The result was social and economic backwardness. (Neumann 1997: 87). 
Bolivia is an Andean landlocked nation of the size of 1.1 million km² (three times the size of Germany) 
(F.A.Z. et al. 1999: 183). The landscape is quite varied and differing with height (the Sajama, the 
highest mountain in the Bolivian Andes, has 6,540 m altitude, and the lowlands of the Amazonian 
basin are 150 m below sea level), with a corresponding variety of climatic zones, flora and fauna. Two 
fifths of the Bolivian population live in the highlands of the Andes, the remaining three fifths live in the 
lowlands of the east and north (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 13). 
Bolivia is the poorest country in South America, with 73 percent of the eight million citizens 
considered poor, about half live in absolute poverty (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 15, F.A.Z. et al. 1999: 183). 
Bolivia has the highest amount of indigenous people in Latin America, including about 41 tribes 
(divided in Andean indigenous in the highlands of Quechua and Aymará, and the lowland indigenous, 
the  Sevicolas and  Tupí-Guaraní) (Cordova de Hernichel 2000: 66). About 57 percent of Bolivians 
belong to an ethnicity (26 percent Quechua, 18 percent Aymará, 1.4 percent Guaraní), about 0.04 
percent are Afro-Bolivians; the remainder of the population are  mestizos and a relatively small 
population of whites, who control politics and economics and can therefore be considered the elite 
(Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 14). The official state language is Spanish; since 1976 (although this date is 
debated in literature) Quechua,
28 Aymará and Guaraní are also official languages. According to the 
1992 census 60 percent of Bolivians consider one 35 indigenous languages their native tongue. About 
half of the population speaks Spanish (in public and at home), the other half speak their native tongue 
at home; close to 12 percent of Bolivians do not speak Spanish at all. 
The elite mostly lives in the cities of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Sucre. El Alto, a 
satellite city to La Paz, and the second highest metropolis in the world (Potosí being the highest) also 
houses the highest airport in the world and is the only exception of elite living there: 500.000 citizens 
reside on 4,000 m a bove sea level, most of them indigenous migrants from rural areas (Stadler-
Kaulich 2003: 13). El Alto residents and their opinions have been important for the outcome of recent 
political events. Their perseverance (or support for protests and demands made in them), particularly 
                                                 
28 Quechua was the official language of the Inca and is the general term for a language that has several different regional dia-
lects, with various forms of grammar, sentence structure, vocabulary and pronunciation. Until present, no terms for modern day 
things such as technical objects have been found (like in Latin). Some Spanish words have entered every-day Quechua vo-
cabulary and vice versa (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 25). Bolivian introduced a 33 character alphabet in 1954 for Quechua, which is 
seldom used. “Quechua (…) is the language of the ‘uneducated’ Indian population of the rural regions (and migrants to urban 
areas)” (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 28).  
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during the 2003 Gas War and the 2006 election, greatly impacted the results of these events. Accord-
ing to a BBC journalist, the residents in El Alto d ecide which president stays in office and which 
doesn’t (BBC 2006). The influence of the masses on Bolivian politics is quite recent (and not set in 
stone), changing the century long structure of unquestioned power by the elite over all cultural, eco-
nomic and political matters. The concept of an authoritarian state hails from the Inca Empire, the 
Spanish conquest and all governments thereafter. As Section 4.1 depicts, politics was always a dirty 
business in Bolivia, in which clientilist practices and corruption dominated (Hofmeister 1996: 28). The 
change of the power structure, if it in fact exists, is an accomplishment of a process that presumably 
began during the same time as oppression. 
Before the Spanish  Conquista in the late 1400s, the Bolivian territory was part of the 
prosperous Inca Empire. The Incas, a society with authoritarian s tructure, and no social mobility, 
desired a homogenized people (Mansilla 1987: 6). Even though the Incas deported entire villages to 
uninhabited areas to populate their empire and spread their ideology, they left the structure of the 
communities, mainly the so-called Ayllus (village communities) of the cultures they conquered in the 
Bolivian territory, intact. Ayllus were autonomous, collective and community-oriented, culturally and 
economically self-sufficient. The Inca empire, a centralized, planned and a grarian economy, a 
“despotically organized socialism”, suffered no economic crises, and the masses were treated better 
than by any government which ruled Latin America in the aftermath of the colonization (Cordova de 
Hernichel 2000: 19f, 22). 
Colonization by the Spanish was violent and bloody, as can be read in history books and 
therefore it doesn’t need to be explained any further. Despite their brutality the conquerors struggled in 
adapting the old world order into the structures of the new world. With some minor changes, such as 
integrating Inca values into their belief system,
29 the creation of a paternalistic and centralistic order 
under Spanish conquest was a prime example of hegemony (Mansilla 1987: 14; Stadler-Kaulich 
2003). During this time, Potosí was basis for economic growth until the 1700s, when its population 
shrank massively (Mansilla 1987: 87). Spanish values, of Arab influence, such as  Machismo,
30 
became part of the Bolivian value-catalogue. Furthermore, the conquerors adapted the old world 
school system to that of the new world (even though only the elite derived benefit from this, leaving the 
masses illiterate for centuries). These schools taught Spanish and Christian values, such as humility, 
obedience and selflessness, and granted a more to the conquerors. Internalizing of these values by 
the conquered created dependence as they implied discipline and unquestioned trust in authority (no 
critical thinking) (Cordova de Hernichel 2000: 24).  
The tendency to ignore the needs of the majority of the population, the indigenous, the poor 
and the rural, throughout the political processes between the Conquista and the founding of the Re-
public in 1825, continued. The development of Bolivia to a modern state began in the 1800s, initiated 
by the increase of silver and tin prices, creating a bourgeois elite, but no profit for the indigenous and 
poor, particularly farmers (Sejas 2002: 24). The idea of emancipation was popular during the 1800s 
with the elite. Yet, the matter of including the indigenous in emancipation, was out of the question. 
                                                 
29 Authoritarianism, integrating or tolerating Inca religious rituals so that Christianity became a “second nature” in the eyes of 
many – my favorite is that the devil is a Spanish import. 
30 Machismo not only labels degrading treatment of women, but also defines degrading treatment of those with different opinions 
than one’s own; it also labels those with militaristic tendencies (Mansilla 1987: 8f, 47).  
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Liberals (intellectual criollos) and conservatives (land owners, merchants and colonial officers) differed 
on the concepts of freedom, equality and justice and on the type of state Bolivia should be. While the 
conservatives wanted an aristocratic, hierarchic, traditional and centralized state with a protectionist 
economic policy, the liberals insisted on an export-oriented economy based on agriculture and mining 
(Cordova de Hernichel 2000: 27). Indigenous were mere instruments of labor; 36 ethnicities were 
united arbitrarily in the terrain that became known as Bolivia (Revollo Fernández 2004: 60f).  
The image of the elite in the eyes of the Bolivian population was first questioned during the 
Chaco War between 1932 and 1935, as the conflict cost many lives, particularly of farmers, indigenous 
and the rural population, who eventually mobilized against the war (Sejas 2002: 24). The causes 
which led to the war are disputed by historians. Some suggest Bolivia is to blame for escalating the 
conflict into war; that it was a measure of then president Salamanca to pull the elites back on his side, 
as they were increasingly dissatisfied with him due to the economic world crisis and its effects on the 
Bolivian economy (Herzig 1996: 90). However, it is a fact that Latin America became capitalistic 
because of the dominance of British capital – between 1820 and 1914 most of the capital invested 
was British, benefiting the latifundios (squires) and their say in politics (voting rights were tied down to 
land ownership and education, excluding ninety percent of the population) (Herzig 1996: 30ff). 
Nonetheless, in 1860, 40 percent of state income came from the indigenous, and 60 percent of 
income was received from silver and tin exports. By 1920, 72 percent of Bolivian exports were tin; the 
tin barons and the government agreed on virtually no tax payment by this business. The elites did not 
make structural adjustments during this prosperous time and maintained old structures throughout the 
modernization phase, rendering no profit for the country or the population as a whole. A 30 percent 
decline of tin prices during the 1920s resulted in a 28 percent loss of income for the government 
(Herzig 1996: 37-38, 44-46). By this time, Bolivia was already highly indebted to foreign lenders, using 
37 percent of the state budget to pay back loans and another 20 percent on the army. Throughout the 
early 1930s tin exports declined (from 47,087 tons to 14,957 tons between 1929 and 1933), creating a 
larger crisis for the Bolivian than the Paraguayan elite at the beginning of the Chaco War (Herzig 
1996: 168). 
Other historians claim the Chaco War was an issue between Standard Oil of New Jersey 
(Exxon) and the Royal Dutch Shell (Shell), due to their (not officially confirmed) involvement in the war 
through financial assistance to the respective governments (particularly Exxon to Paraguay). Many 
other foreign companies
31 profited from the war due to the large amount imports required to participate 
in the conflict. The interest of the oil companies in Bolivia is known to have evolved during the 1920s, 
when president Salamanca opposed giving a concession to exploit the oil reserves to Exxon. The 
concession was given to Exxon and Shell lost the concession and was expelled. Exxon claimed the 
Bolivian oil reserves to be dry. However, the company smuggled oil to Argentina between 1925 and 
1926, avoiding to pay taxes to Bolivia. Throughout the war Argentina sold (Bolivian!) combustible to 
Paraguay, which it used in the Chaco war against Bolivia. Exxon refused to produce fuel for the Boliv-
ian army; referring to a paragraph in the contract between the government and the company in which it 
should not be involved in state affairs, as it could lose its concession as a consequence (Herzig 1996: 
46, 68-82, 84f). President Salamanca threatened Exxon with taking away its concession and Exxon 
                                                 
31 Fiat, Krupp, Mauser, Oerlikon, Semag, Schneider, Stokes Brandt, Vickers-Armstrong to name a few.  
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provided Bolivia with fuel and began to pay taxes. Later, when the involvement of Exxon in the conflict 
became apparent, its concession was taken away and the company was turned into state property. 
Exxon was the first company turned into state property in all of Latin America. What became the Ya-
cimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) drained twice as much oil from the “dry” Bolivian oil 
fields as Exxon. The Chaco War was also referred to as La Guerra Estúpida (the dim-witted war) 
(Herzig 1996: 86, 165).
32 
Between 1900 and 1952 Bolivia lived through two transformations: the consolidation as a na-
tion-state and the integration of the country into the capitalist world market as a producer of minerals, 
and a revolution that ruptured the social fabric of the country (Lagos 1994: 8). The Chaco War was 
followed by 17 years of political confusion. Bolivia was hit harshly by WWII, resulting in only one buyer 
for its minerals. Journalist Demetrio Canelas, who lived in Bolivia between 1920 and 1956, wrote in an 
article dated 1947 that a rehabilitation for Bolivia comparable to the Marshall Plan would be an ade-
quate compensation for the losses due to the World War (1992: 425). Canelas viewed corruption 
within (private) enterprises (such as the mines) as a reason for Bolivia’s development problems. En-
terprises have to cooperate with the state, who cannot solve all problems on its own, he wrote in 1952 
(Canelas 1992: 438).
33 In 1951 the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary 
Movement, MNR), a party of young intellectuals who were frustrated with the middle class, won the 
election. The MNR campaign included anti-feudal, anti-capitalist and anti-oligarchic sentiments and 
ideas. The MNR strived for a class-overarching movement to control the state, dismiss all foreign 
powers out of the country and introduce a new development concept (Hofmeister 1996: 28). The party 
was prohibited after the military’s rise following immediately the election. In a violent fight known as the 
1952 Revolution, the MNR (whose members, among others, were future presidents Paz Estenssoro 
and Siles Zuazo) gained power over the government and implemented various reforms (due to pres-
sure by the unions, particularly the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (Syndic 
Federation of the Mining Workers, FSTMB) (Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 118; Hofmeister 1996: 28), in-
cluding universal suffrage. After the 1952 Revolution, the state sought to achieve economic growth 
through the reactivation of the mining sector, “modernization” of agriculture and the development of 
the Oriente (eastern lowlands). Economic growth was to come from producing export crops and im-
port-subsidizing of crops and livestock, but spending only an average of 3.2 of GDP p.a. on Oriente to 
build roads to Santa Cruz and to El Chapare (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975 :40 in Lagos 1994: 65). 
The development program included credit, price-support programs, colonization projects and the pro-
motion of mechanized modern agriculture. 
The agrarian reform disowned squires
34 and gave land to those who worked on it.
35 The land 
could be taken away just as easily from those who seized to work it, a threat Bánzer made us of during 
                                                 
32 US-involvement in the conflict was criticized. Senator Huey Long (Alabama), claimed the US negotiated and did not mediate 
in the talks between Bolivia and Paraguay. Long claimed Exxon sought access to the oil reserves of the Chaco Boreal and the 
Paraguay river in order to transport the product to the US. Throughout the 1920s, the US followed a highly protectionist strategy. 
The Hoover, Hughes and Kellogg administrations implemented an aggressive capital and product export expansion, resulting in 
high growth within the US. Simultaneously, Latin American governments owed the US. Dues accumulated to thrice the amount 
borrowed. As a result energy and resource production in the peripheral countries rose to astronomical heights, surpassing 
demand, resulting in the crash of the agrarian market. Many Bolivians lost their jobs and the government was unable to com-
pensate them, due to the financial shortage (Herzig 1996: 35, 36; 83, 101).  
33 For a detailed description of important historic events (Chaco War, Issue of the sea with Chile, 1952 Revolution) as they were 
happening by Canelas, please see “Dictadura y democracia en Bolivia” Editorial Canelas S.A. Cochabamba (1992). 
34 In 1954, four percent of the population owned 92 percent of land. Lagos writes that 92 percent of arable land was owned 
by 6 percent of land owners.  
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the 1970s. The agrarian reform was successful, but met resistance in Santa Cruz, where the richest 
and most conservative squires resided. The agrarian reform is not always seen as successful, as it 
failed to create new production factors or improve existing factors of production. According to Nohlen 
and Nuscheler, the agrarian reform failed as it did not benefit the socio-economic life standards in rural 
areas and limited the development of and social mobility in the country (Nohlen and Nuscheler 1995 in 
Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 17). 
Furthermore, after the revolution, the three largest mines (Patiño, Aramayo and Hochschild)
36 
were nationalized and the Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) was founded. Canelas catego-
rized the nationalization of mines as a punishment of the owners, who had abused the Bolivian econ-
omy, but spent their profits elsewhere (Canelas 1992: 443). Anthropologist Maria L. Lagos considers 
the nationalization of the mines as the most important reform of the Revolution, as it abolished slavery 
(or unpaid labor) (1994: 51). The reform also introduced of the term campesino (farmer), replacing 
words such as Quechua, Aymará and other labels for ethnicity, summarizing them in one term. This 
cause many campesinos  to deny their roots and adapt a western style of clothing and living (Revollo 
Fernández 2004: 61f). A Department for Campesino Affairs (Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos) was 
created in May of 1952 as that it would cater to indigenous and peasant needs. To Lagos the land 
reform presents a political compromise between squires and the government. This is why the cam-
pesinos had to work the land, but could never own it and why the state was in position to re-seize it 
quickly. The land a person could own was limited and depended on the location (arability and fertility). 
The Revolution gave incentive to some indigenous to “awaken,” taking over haciendas and killing their 
owners and led to campesinos continual contesting those in power (Lagos 1994: 61): 
In 1956, when rampant inflation eroded some of the massive popular support the MNR had previously enjoyed, Bolivia 
received the largest amount of United States aide to Latin America to implement the Plan de Estabilización Económica. (…) 
[T]he Bolivian government was pressured by the International Monetary Fund to end state intervention in the economy and 
promote foreign investment. This led to the realignment of forces. The MNR turned against the left and labor, began to 
reorganize the army, and relied on peasant militias to control the forced challenging the government. The peasant-labor alliance 
was thus broken up. (Lagos 1994: 61) 
After 1952, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB; Bolivian Worker’s Central/Union) was highly 
involved in the government affairs. Hurtado labels the COB involvement in the state throughout the 
agrarian reform of 1952 as a demobilization and demounting of the masses (1986: 21). Even though 
the COB was not legitimated by vote, like the MNR, it made decisions on an administrational level. 
The MNR and COB brought political ideology to Bolivia and coined it for over 30 years. The MNR 
stood for revolutionary nationalism for the bourgeois, while the COB was Marxist/Leninist with 
trotzkyist influences. These factors inhibited them from consoling with bourgeois democracy, keeping 
conflict between the parties alive (Hofmeister 1996: 29). The post-revolutionary government also failed 
to restructure and weaken the military and put it under civil control. The MNR was the only party to 
profit from this dispute: it ensured (and controlled) indigenous support until the military coup in 1964: 
[T]he MNR hindered the strengthening and creation of other political powers through corruption, manipulation of 
elections and cooptation. (Hofmeister 1996: 29) 
The twelve years after the revolution were dampened by conflicts, some ending bloody, be-
tween fractions of the MNR on issues of political direction. Conflicts ended in a military coup in 1964 
                                                                                                                                                   
35 „La tierra para quien trabja“ (Sejas 2002: 24). 
36 The owners were later compensated with 120 million US-dollars (Gebhardt 2002: 12).  
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and brought General René Barrientos Ortuño to power.
37 Barrientos expanded the agrarian reform. He 
assisted rural infrastructure through an alliance between the peasant unions and the military govern-
ment, the so-called pacto militar-campesino (peasant-military pact) (Sejas 2002: 24). Barrientos at-
tempted to rehabilitate the state mines by limiting the power of the unions, firing workers and cutting 
social benefits. The workers protested and fought bloody clashes with the state. 
Between 1964 and 1980 governments (not based on parties) ruled in cooperation with the 
military and the union apparatus. Barrientos was the first in a series of generals to govern Bolivia 
(Hofmeister 1996: 29). Barrientos passed away in an accident in 1969, and was succeeded by Luis 
Adolfo Salinas, a member of the left wing of the military. The governments of General Alfredo Ovando 
Candia (September 1969 to October 1970) and General Juan José Torres Gonzales (until August 
1971) were supported by Bolivian intellectuals. The country experienced democratic openness and 
political mobilization under Torres Gonzales: the oppression of the miners unions ended, their wages 
rose and a nation-wide alphabetization campaign b egun. Two US-companies, Mine Matilde 
Corporation and the International Metal Processing Company, were expelled. The governments of the 
generals were, however, characterized by a polarization of the population. Marxist student groups 
occupied US-institutions and fought against fascist gangs (Sejas 2002: 24f). The COB proclaimed the 
most radical declaration of its history, and said to be a legitimate part of the government. The COB 
boycotted General Torres’ government and demanded the introduction of a socialist societal system in 
mid 1971. Tensions within the population rose. Particularly entrepreneurs feared the xenophobic and 
unpredictable property policy under Torres. In August 1971, General Hugo Bánzer became president 
through a coup; assisted by military and industrials. Bánzer stayed in power due to a “weird/strange” 
coalition between MNR and the fascist  Falange Socialista Boliviana (Bolivian Socialist Phalanax, 
FSB), the MNRs largest political opponent during the 1950s. Animosities between all parties 
continued, assisting Bánzer his declaration of sole power over the country in 1974 (Sejas 2002: 25). 
Bánzer wanted to suppress communism, in agreement with the red scare in the United States 
at the height of the Cold War. He replaced many leaders, including some in the campesino movement, 
with protégés and rendered the unionization of truckers, cab and bus drivers mandatory in 1973 
(Lagos 1994: 62). Bánzer patronized the campesinos and controlled all unions in the country. He did 
not hesitate to crush a road blockade in Cochabamba which protested the inflationary effects of the 
devaluation of the Bolivian Peso and killing an unknown number of men, women and children (Lagos 
1994: 63). The campesino alliance of the department of Cochabamba was polarized by this conflict, 
and divided its members into the nationalist  Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia (Only Syndic Confederation of the Campesino Workers of Bolivia, CSUTCB), 
and a dissident organization of the COB, which opposed the military-campesino alliance, called 
(Sindical de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia  (Confederation of the  Campesino  Workers of 
Bolivia, CSTCB). 
From his principal aim of rapid economic growth, Bánzer pressured the campesinos. During 
the land reform, the MNR had expected the campesinos to evolve into agricultural entrepreneurs and 
increasing production. Yet, the opposite occurred. Immediately after the reform, agricultural production 
                                                 
37 In the Cochabamba valley two factions fought over the control of the campesino movement between 1959 and 1964. The 
dispute ended by intervention of General Barrientos, who overthrew the MNR government in 1964. Barrientos (a populist) set-
tled the conflict, winning sympathy of the campesinos (Lagos 1994: 62).   
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declined, leading to threats by the government to take away the land (Lagos 1994: 64). The state pri-
orities concerning development are apparent when glancing at rural development credits: between 
1964 and 1979, the Banco Agrícola de Bolivia (Bolivian Agrarian Bank, BAB) granted half of its total 
loan volume to medium- and large-sized farms, most located in Santa Cruz. A remaining 41.5 percent 
went to associations, groups or societies. A mere 8.6 percent of credit was assigned to campesinos. 
Distribution of credit changed during the mid-1970s, when US-Aid financed the Second Agricultural 
Refinancing Fund and other similar credit lines designed to provide credit to small farmers and coop-
eratives. Similarly to the agricultural sector, the educational system did not improve for the majority of 
the population throughout the dictatorships. Curiously, university attendance grew exponentially during 
this time.
38  
Reasons for the failure of the agricultural reform are attributed to state policy. During the 
Bánzer era seeds were only sold by the government, in turn fertilizers were distributed for free in a 
very successful campaign. Promotion measures, such as exempting markets in certain areas from 
taxes failed as the markets for campesino harvests already existed. Interestingly enough, even though 
few campesinos became entrepreneurs, almost all of them became dependent on commodity markets. 
Of course in an “asymmetric and subordinate” position.  
At the center of this intensification of petty commodity production, the state focused its small capital investment on 
agriculture not in the campesino regions, but in the lowlands. (Lagos 1994: 65) 
This fact served as a confirmation to the government (and the elite) that the campesinos and 
their characteristic laziness  were t o blame for the backwardness and underdevelopment in the 
country. Most parties did not succeed in contradicting Bánzer and the policies during his governing 
era; others increased in popularity such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (Revolutionary 
Movement of the Left, MIR) and the Partido Socialista (Socialist Party, PS) (Hofmeister 1996: 30). 
Even though economic growth of 6.1 percent p.a. was recorded during the Bánzer years, the 
country remained highly indebted on an international level (2,234 million US-dollars). The government 
continued taking out loans with long grace periods and interest rates of twelve percent. Real income 
increased during the 1970s, but dropped throughout Bánzers administration: according to COB 
sources by 33.8 percent. This trend continued throughout the early 1980s. By 1980 the interest rates 
reached 20 percent of state budget; in 1979 the IMF forced a credit of 115 million US-dollars on the 
Bolivian government. The Peso suffered a de-valuation of 25 percent, while basic commodity and fuel 
prices increased, sparking campesino protests. By 1982 national growth was negative by 2.8 percent 
and all sectors (mining, production and agrarian) stagnated. Urban unemployment in the formal 
economy increased from 5.8 percent to 10.9 percent between 1980 and 1982. The simultaneous 
expansion of the informal economy was the only solution for survival for many. External debt rose to 
3,612 million US-dollars; in 1982 the amount used to pay back loans was 43.4 percent of total export 
income, enforcing the influence of the IMF and other IFIs (Krempin 1990: 6-8). 
A coup brought García Meza to power in July 1980 and made coca/cocaine the primary axis of 
the economy (an estimated 115 million US-dollars income), making Bolivia even more dependent 
upon the illegal income and the informal sector. After the end of the Bánzer Regime in 1978, Bolivia 
had had seven military and two civil governments by 1982. The turmoil was ended through the coali-
                                                 
38 Between 1972 and 1983 enrollment rose 270 percent. In the years afterward a yearly increase of 56 percent has been noted, 
and continued until present (Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 169).  
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tion under president Hernán Siles Zuazo, which was instable in face of the economic crisis (Hofmeister 
1996: 30). The hopes and expectations for the results of his administration were high, and he did not 
try to curb their enthusiasm (Krempin 1990: 9). Siles Zuazo from the Unión Democrática y Popular 
(Democratic and Popular Union, UDP) took over the administration in 1982 and had many inherited 
issues to confront. 
Reasons for the failure to improve the livelihood of most Bolivians, namely those living in poor, 
rural areas and the indigenous people, lies in endogen and exogenous factors. One of them is the 
political culture and the unfair practices pervading all areas of economic, social and cultural life within 
the Bolivian society, such as depicted in Section 4.2. 
3.2 Reforms of the 1980s, and their results 
When Siles Zuazo (UDP) took over the government in 1982, the country was in shatters and highly 
indebted. The formal economy had lost many employees and the tax income decreased from 2.8 
percent of GDP in 1981 to 3.1 in 1982 to 0.6 in 1984. Politicians were surprised by the severity of 
sanctions imposed on the country by the IFIs after the development programs had not worked 
(Cariaga 1996: 14; Faguet 2005: 4). The state capitalism and control of prices of basic commodities, 
which benefited the middle class and left out of scope the rural poor, had to end (Cariaga 1996: 143, 
145). Inflation rose to the seventh highest recorded in human history (24,000 percent inflation p.a.; 
price raises of 1.4 percent p.h. and a total 628.8 million US-dollars loss to the Bolivian economy). 
Simultaneously natural disasters hit the country, creating a deficit of 30 percent in agrarian production 
compared to the year before. This led to high migration of campesinos to coca growing or urban areas 
(Cariaga 1982: 24; Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 132; Eróstegui T. 1996: 37; Krempin 1990: 15). Demands 
by the unions to adapt wages to the inflation rates led to even higher inflation and an economic and 
social crisis (mass demonstrations and strikes). Much of the rural population realized that the 
government was not going to solve their problems immediately. After losing their crops, sheep and 
llama herds, entire villages on the  Altiplano were abandoned. Villagers migrated to the cities, 
becoming beggars, partially because much of foreign financial aid sent for these people did not arrive 
at its designated destination. Rather, middle-men profited politically or financially from these funds and 
contributed to the increased dependence of the campesinos on outside help (Lagos 1994: 145f). 
With much encouragement and assistance by the IFIs and the Bolivian elite, the government 
implemented a structural adjustment program (SAP) based on neoclassical economic theory, giving 
direction to the measures implemented for administrations to come during the 1990s  (Goni and 
Bánzer) (Soliz Rada 2002: 7; CEDLA 2003: 9, Von Gleich 1998: 21). Throughout the November 1983 
and March 1985, the UDP government pushed through five economic packages. Some adhered to the 
concepts and suggestions of the IMF, some did not, particularly aiming at stabilizing the economy. The 
last package adhered entirely to IMF ideas. All of these packages failed due to the weak position of 
the government and the strong opposition to the program (Cariaga 1996: 51f). Neoliberal hegemony 
was imposed on Bolivia by the ruling elite, such as spoken of in Chapter 2. Cariaga, a future finance 
minister of Bolivia, participated in the secret committee that concocted reform plans of the Paz 
Estenssoro administration (1985 – 1989). He refers to the program of the Siles Zuazo administration 
as “our own perestroika [or “Moscow Line”], as it was the key to development everyone thought of as 
legitimate” (Cariaga 1996: 17; Soliz Rada 2002: 1).  
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The first package of the Siles Zuazo administration was implemented in November 1982. It 
fixed one US-dollar at 200 Pesos and demanded all transactions within the country to be made on 
basis of the Peso. This measure was called the “de-dollarisation” of the economy (Krempin 1990: 10; 
Cariaga 1996: 47f). Entrepreneurs speculated upon the new package, profiting from the decrease of 
their loans which had been taken out in US-dollars. Some took out loans (in reality designated to 
encourage production within Bolivia) and changed them into dollars. They then paid back the loans 
and kept the difference lost due to inflation. As production within Bolivia decreased, entrepreneurs 
most likely made more money from speculation than production. Prices of petrol products doubled. All 
subsidized products received a price cap and the prices of basic products were adjusted (Cariaga 
1996: 48f). The economic package created import-prohibitions for about 500 goods (luxury and 
products which were made in Bolivia as well), pensions were frozen and medicine prices declined by 
45 percent. Minimum wage was fixed at 8,490  Pesos and all wages i ncreased by 30 percent 
(Eróstegui claims it was 40 percent). The New Political Economy (Nueva Política Económica, NPE) 
also included measures such as a new, investor-friendly legislation, particularly in the mine and natural 
resources sector. It also integrated a reform of state institutions (judicial system) and securing property 
rights and the flow of capital in- and outside of the country (Cariaga 1996: 20). After consultation with 
Price Water House Coopers, the state closed some state mines and reduced the number of workers 
from 26,500 to 5,000, leaving over 20.000 unemployed but keeping production levels the same (Von 
Gleich 1998: 23; Kohl and Farthing 2006: 54f). The decision was in large part influenced by a subsidy 
system the government could no longer afford. 8,000 COMIBOL workers received 400 liters of petrol a 
month, costing 11.5 million US-dollars. This subsidy was ended by the reform. The YPFB in turn 
almost doubled its workforce from 4,500 to 8,000 workers between 1980 and 1984. Yet, its income 
shrunk from 9.1 percent to 7.8 percent of total GDP. This is due to the tax elimination on raw 
materials; as had been suggested by the IMF (Cariaga 1996: 32, 197). As outlined in Section 3.2, 
hegemonic institutions fulfill five criteria (expand hegemony, be a product of hegemony, legitimate it, 
co-opt elites and absorb counter-hegemonic ideas). In the case of the economic and political 
measures implemented in Bolivia during the 1980s, it is obvious that they were neoliberal and in sync 
with the nine points of the Washington Consensus (see Section 2.1). 
The shock-therapy of the Siles Zuazo administration failed. It led to inflation and an increase of 
external debt (Cariaga 1996: 47f). In January 1983, some MIR ministers, who had been elemental in 
planning and supporting the first economic package, resigned. The population lost belief in the abilities 
of the government, while drought and floods also hit the country and lowering the availability of basic 
goods. The rigidity of the opposition against the Siles Zuazo government grew, partially because the 
administrations measures were not implemented with the desired consequence. This created opportu-
nity for employees of the Central Bank and the YPFB to expand their power (Krempin 1990: 12). Many 
measures envisioned in the economic packages reached the opposite of their intentions: (a) dollar 
exchange rates on the black market were much higher than the official rate in an estimated relation of 
one to ten, devaluing the Peso even more; (b) bread and flour, which was subsidized to benefit the 
poorest, was smuggled to Peru and sold there as were other basic commodities (rice, sugar and gas); 
(c) the import and duty policy of the Siles Zuazo government favored smugglers. Particularly industri-
ally produced goods for consumption were re-sold to Bolivia’s neighboring countries and  income from  
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legal imports decreased (Krempin 1990: 12); (d) the informal economy thrived, particularly cocaine 
export, estimated at five times than GDP of the formal economy. By 1984 58 percent of the population 
worked in the informal sector (opposed to 47 percent in 1976 or 53 percent in 1980). The government 
failed to curb inflation rates of 20,000 percent between August 1984 and 1985 (Krempin 1990: 11-13). 
Bolivia’s debt to the international community continued to burden the country: in 1984 paying off ex-
ternal debt made up 49.8 percent of total export income (Cariaga says it was only 25 percent (1996: 
59)). As mentioned, the economic packages by the Siles Zuazo government were not accepted well by 
the population and particularly opposed by the COB, which organized many strikes.
39 
The Siles Zuazo administration was not all bad. For one, it respected democratic rights and 
freedoms as no other administration did  prior or afterwards. It never proclaimed the state of 
emergency when people protested the reforms, as Paz Estenssoro and Paz Zamora did later 
(Krempin 1990: 15). Incentive to cut the military budget came from the Siles Zuazo administration. 
This incentive was not enough to alter the traditional relationship between civil society and the military, 
which refused to be controlled by parliament. While the armed forces received 393 million US-dollars 
in 1980, the amount was reduced to 133 million US-dollars by 1990. Not only the military lost power 
throughout the 1980s, but also the second most important political actor did: the COB (and political 
parties). Political structures also lost credibility (Birle 1996: 20). The IFIs had little confidence in the 
Siles Zuazo administration, particularly after Mexico declared bankruptcy and feared Bolivia would do 
the same. Problems of the outside economies profited inflation: the crisis of external debt and the 
public spent all its money upon receiving and benefited the vicious cycle (Krempin 1990: 14). 
As the Siles Zuazo government failed to create supportable solutions for the structural issues 
within the country, the UDP lost the election to the ADN and MNR in 1985. At this point financial chaos 
hit the country. Paz Estenssoro was elected into office, although he and his party reached only placed 
second by entering a coalition with the MNR, which begun its neoliberal period then and there. Former 
dictator Bánzer had earned the highest amount of votes. Cariaga narrates his involvement in a secret 
committee which concocted the reforms between 1985 and 1989, even though he had formerly been 
an electoral advisor to Bánzer. Cariaga and others who conceived Bánzers electoral campaign 
traveled to Harvard to consult with Oliver Oldman and Jeffrey Sachs to develop on an economic 
program Bánzer would propagate during his electoral campaign with them (Cariaga 1996: 91; Soliz 
Rada 2002: 2).
40. Then-President of the senate Sánchez de Lozada had invited Cariaga, who 
hesitatingly accepted. Cariaga felt that Paz Estenssoro was too populist, but accepted to be Minister of 
Finance, next to Goni who was Minister of Planning (1996: 94; 130). Sachs was important in the 
development of the economic program of the Paz Estenssoro administration. An a cquaintance of 
Bolivian ambassador to US Fernando Illanes, Sachs was elemental in restoring Bolivia’s credibility in 
front of the IFIs. Their will to render economic relief ended a six year period during which Bolivia 
received no loans from the IBRD (Cariaga 1996: 104). Until 1986, only the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) and the Corporación Andina de Fomento (Andean Association for 
Promotion, CAF) loaned to Bolivia (Cariaga 1996: 79).  
                                                 
39 In 1983 278 strikes cost 802 working days. In 1984 1,500 working days were lost due to 422 strikes (Cariaga 1996: 27). 
40 Bánzer wanted to get rid of his image as a dictator by being involved in the civil party ADN (representative of private enter-
prise interest) (Hofmeister 1996).  
 
30 
Cariaga’s on the importance Sachs’ opinion for the IMF, presidential candidate Bánzer and 
later president Estenssoro should not be underestimated. Re-calling structures of hegemony as listed 
by Peet the reader knows hegemony hails support by institutional actors from the economic, bureau-
cratic and political spheres. The media and academia support hegemony. The latter legitimizes sets of 
policies, such as the Washington Consensus (see Section 2.1.3). In the same breath, failure of said 
policies are not attributed to the policies themselves, but (in Sachs’ and Bolivia’s case) the “mediterra-
nean condition of our country” (Soliz Rada 2002: 2). Sachs is perhaps to blame for the mass 
dismissals in the public sector. The extent of the influence of the Harvard professor will forever be 
unknown. However, Cariaga cites a mysterious memorandum which Sachs sent to Paz Estenssoro. 
No one but the president ever read it. Before agreeing on a program with the IMF in June 1986, Paz 
Estenssoro already initiated the neoliberal era in Bolivia through Decree 21.060 on 29 August 1985. 
The shock-therapy (also known as NPE was to be implemented from 1985 to 1989. It demanded 
parallel economic and structural reforms, sought to reduce inflation and create reasonable tariffs for 
services and goods and commercialize Bolivia’s gold reserves (Cariaga 1996: 106; Soliz Rada 2002: 
11). 
The Decree sparked protests and continued criticism already voiced against Siles Zuazo. A 
year after decree 21.060 was implemented, 23,000 workers of the state mines and 45,000 other em-
ployees of the state and in the private industry lost their jobs (Eróstegui T. 1996: 38). Continuing the 
crisis initiated during the Siles Zuazo administration, the COB further lost power, particularly due to 
capitalization of state owned firms. Rather than recognizing the loss of powers as a crisis, the COB 
labeled this period as a “state of tiredness” and attributed this state to the many conferences, strikes 
and meetings since the beginning of hyperinflation. Particularly one branch of the COB, the FSTMB, 
lost many members, leading to a discussion on de-proletisation within the COB and the increasing 
importance of new societal actors. The FSTMB discussed if the campesino branch of the COB should 
receive more weight in the decision-making process. The COB ideologically split in two fractions: one 
claiming privatization of mines would improve the state of the economy, the other fraction disagreed 
(Krempin 1990: 40). Despite its “state of tiredness”, the COB protested the political package of Paz 
Estenssoro extensively. It particularly criticized the social spending cuts, which were larger than those 
of the previous dictators. By September 1985, the government declared the state of emergency after a 
general strike of the COB; sending 143 union leaders to desolate forest areas (Krempin 1990: 38f). 
The MIR also split in two ideological spectrums: Leftists founded the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (Move-
ment for a Free Bolivia, MBL).
41 
Unfortunately, none of the protests stopped the Paz Estenssoro reforms, manifesting the 
amount of power the unions had lost. The closing of a state mine in August 1986 left 4,800 miners 
unemployed. The March for Life (Marcha para La Vida)
42 protested this measure. 5,500 mine-workers, 
their wives and children walked to La Paz, growing to 10,000 people by the time the crowd was a two 
day walk away from the city center (Molina 2006 cites 50,000 participants). The Paz Estenssoro ad-
ministration sent the military to corner the protestors. Unarmed, the marchers consented to be re-
                                                 
41 Their principal campaign goals are anti-corruption, the fight of indigenous discrimination and. The party does not oppose 
neoliberalism, but wants a second agrarian reform and a strengthened state in economic and social matters. MBL is an impor-
tant stabilizing factor in politics and has been scandal-free as the politicians are fairly young. They have provoked new confi-
dence in politics and the governing system (Hofmeister 1997). 
42 Many social groups appear to hold events labeled the March for Life (see section 4.4) or Mujeres Marchistas 1996.  
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turned to their homes by government transport. The March of Life was useful. After mediation by the 
catholic church, the FSTMB and the government re-drafted government policy, keeping 13,000 mine 
workers in total. Unions official quit protests, dissatisfying their basis. The result of said re-drafting of 
state policy was more than other critics of the shock package could ever hope for: teachers and stu-
dent protests failed, and workers of the YPFB and the coca growers reached only partial implementa-
tion of their demands and only due to many strikes and street blockades (Krempin 1990: 41).  
By June 1986, Paz Estenssoro agreed on a stand-by package from the IMF worth 186 million 
US-dollars and an SAP of 57.59 million US-dollars. These were followed by an even more elaborate 
SAP in April of 1988 worth 136.05 million US-dollars. During this period, gas and oil prices increased 
and were controlled by the state, securing substantial income for the government (Cariaga 1996: 128). 
Many state employees were fired: 1,000 workers of COMIBOL, 4,000 from YPFB, 21,000 miners and 
23,500 other employees. Taxes were raised to gain the trust of the IFIs. All imports were taxed and 
taxes on property, vehicles, cigarettes and alcohol were raised (or created) (Cariaga 1996: 253, 156; 
167). The higher educational sector was liberalized through an educational reform, leading to the 
founding of many private universities; a result of the pressure by the private sector.
43 The Universidad 
Boliviana later criticized the educational reform. It was implemented upon advice of the IBRD and 
pushed through without consideration for Bolivian reality (Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 134, 220). All of 
these protests and arguments against the neoliberal reforms by the state voiced by different social 
groups of Bolivian population underline the Cox’ prediction that the third world industrial workforce 
would not see improvement of their situation despite a change of structure and new class 
consciousness among the elite and that they would remain marginalized in the world economy (see 
Section 2.1.2). 
The Paz Estenssoro administration achieved the end of hyperinflation
44 and reduced public 
deficit (Krempin 1990: 16), even though it feared Bolivia was dying, as the president said (Soliz Rada 
2002: 2; Peredo Leigue 2002). The many negative effects, the extent of which have not officially been 
calculated, are not to be ignored. The speculation between the official and the black market by 
entrepreneurs/companies continued throughout the Paz Estenssoro administration. By creating the 
Bolsín (currency exchange), to control trade prices for money, Paz Estenssoro legalized money 
laundering and contributed to the stabilization of the newly introduced currency. It is understandable, 
because Bolivia’s economy is dependant upon 60 individuals (or as the case may be, institutions) who 
own  eighty percent of bank d eposits in foreign currency. Withdrawal of these monies would have 
drastic consequences. Pressured from in- and outside, the Paz Estenssoro government created the 
Ley de Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas (Law 1008), the first law against drug business 
(Krempin 1990: 26f), much to the displeasure of the campesinos.  
The reforms in general and the liberalization of trade in particular heavily impacted the Bolivian 
economy. Especially for the industrial sector, which was highly vulnerable to competition from 
neighboring Argentina, Brazil and Chile (Krempin 1990: 17). The number of permanent employees in 
the industrial sector sank from 35,000 to 17,000 during the reforms. The new tariff reform catered to 
smugglers and is to be blamed for this development. Unemployment in the cities reached 25 percent. 
                                                 
43 By 1988, there were 37 private institutions for higher education, manifesting the populations’ distrust in public institutions 
(Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 138).  
44 From 8,170 percent in 1985 to 66 percent in 1986 to 10.7 percent in 1987.  
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Not even the Fondo Social de Emergencia (Social Fund for Emergencies, FSE) that accompanied the 
SAP (Cariaga 1996: 19) made the negative effects disappear. The FSE was to keep the negative ef-
fects of the shock-program to a minimum and create 733,000 new employment opportunities a month, 
indirectly benefiting a total of 1.738,988 Bolivians. About 200,000 people were helped directly through 
FSE, tying together organizations of civil society and the state. The FSE served as an example for 
similar programs in 35 other nations implemented with SAPs up to 1996 (Cariaga 1996: 201f). Timely 
with the FSE, a Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Inversión Social, FIS) was implemented, creating 
coverage for health and education services for the poorest in demand-driven projects (e.g. requested 
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) (Cariaga 1996: 203f; Von Gleich 1998: 37). The slow 
effect of the shock program is to be found in the lack of approval by the Bolivian people (and the gov-
ernment), according to Cariaga. The economy would not uplift only because of a decree. Similarly the 
lack of modification in the mine and petrol sector and the slow process of privatization (begun in 1989) 
as well as the absence of an integrative state reform contributed to the weary modernization and re-
form of the economy (Cariaga 1996: 214). The Siles Zuazo administration faced a hard task and 
paved the way toward a liberal and democratic Bolivia (Cariaga 1996: 54; 72). Cariaga firmly believes 
that the Bolivian economic policies between 1985 and 1989 were successful. Also, they could have 
been tougher; as hard as the government had originally planned. For example, originally all additional 
wages and bonuses should have been eliminated (they were) and people were to work Saturdays 
(Cariaga 1996: 101). SAPs today include wage compensation, whereas the Bolivian case did not. 
Each case of offering compensations resulted in asking for higher compensations and lead to week-
long general strikes (Cariaga 1996: 196). 
The package by Paz Estenssoro excluded encouragement of small agrarian institutions, en-
couraging Bolivians to buy foods such as onions, beans, lenses, eggs and fruit from Chile (Krempin 
1990: 18). Overall, the Bolivian population was discouraged from consuming national goods contrary 
to the intention of the reform. Consumption of national goods sank from 70 percent in 1985 to 50 per-
cent in 1989. The mine sector confronted many problems. The dropping of the international mineral 
prices affected wages and exports. The government closed seven of 24 state mines. It kept the eight 
most profitable and turned the remaining nine over to mine worker corporations (Krempin 1990: 18). 
From 30,172 workers employed in state mines as of 31 August 1985, 23,069 lost their job by 22 May 
1987. Another 6,000 were fired from public mines. Krempin estimates another 20,000 people being 
fired from the public sector, including teachers. This created particularly high unemployment rates 
among the members of COMIBOL and furthered the goal of debilitating the unions (Krempin 1990: 
22). Nonetheless, COMIBOL production increased by 20 percent. These developments explain the 
thrive of the informal economies throughout the Paz Estenssoro administration as well as the anger 
toward these reforms within the population and the devaluation of the  Peso by 15 percent p.a. 
(Krempin 1990: 19). The poor suffered most during this time, as they were affected worst by the ten 
percent tax raised on all goods. According to the IMF, Paz Estenssoro’s reforms, particularly decree 
21.060 began to show results. Tax income increased from .9 percent of GDP in 1985 to 2.7 percent in 
1987 (Krempin 1990: 19). The demands by the IMF had to be met, as the grounds for receiving a five 
year moratorium on paying back loans by the IFIs and rescheduling debt was only possible if their 
conditions were met. Further, debt was to private banks was to be reduced from 456 million US-dollars  
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to 222 million US-dollars (Krempin 1990: 22). As Cariaga might agree, the reforms of the Paz Estens-
soro administration were labeled as successful, but it is evident, as Krempin puts it, that the five year 
shock-period was only an opportunity “to catch a breath of fresh air.” Given the sacrifices and conse-
quences of the shock-program in the social sector, one cannot speak of a stable economy (Krempin 
1990: 23). If one were to speak of a stable economy in Bolivia after Paz Estenssoro’s reforms, it is 
important to remember that the stability was owed to the “support” by the cocaine sector, which upheld 
the reforms through money laundering. If the cocaine sector were to leave Bolivia, the economy would 
collapse. This will only happen, when cocaine is no longer a fashion drug or after it can be produced 
synthetically. 
The COB resisted state reforms (decrees 21.060 and 21.660) throughout March and July 
1987. It criticized the dismissals, lifting of dismissal protection, the new wage policies, the tax reform 
(Krempin 1990: 44). The ideological split within the COB deepened and resulted in the fall of Juan 
Lechín, who had led the COB since 1952. Lechín was also a member of the Partido Revolucionario de 
la Izquierda Nacional (Revolutionary Party of the National Left, PRIN) and was voted out of office by 
thirty votes (Krempin 1990: 37). The loss of power by the COB accelerated, and was drastically made 
visible during the teacher strike in July and August of 1987. The motivations for protests by the 
teachers were legitimate, given the poor pay. Nonetheless, the population did not support the strikes, 
an attitude the government took advantage of (Krempin 1990: 45). The discussion within the COB on 
the distribution of seats in favor of the  campesinos continued throughout September, when the 
campesinos walked out on the VIII COB congress. This led to the creation of a second secretary for 
the  campesino unions and implementation of more democratic structures and a just society, as 
manifested during the X COB Congress (Eróstegui T. 1996: 39).
45 
After change of government policy in 1985, the coca growers repeatedly organized against the 
state and were supported by the COB in its anti-government and anti-US argumentation (Shams 1992: 
56). Between 25 April and 7 May 1988, 10,000 workers participated in a hunger strike, only 
interrupting their protest for the visit of the pope, as the administration had promised to revise its 
policy, resulting in a 16 percent increase of wages (less than inflation rates and not nearly enough) 
and the seizing of protests. The coca growers emphasized resistance to state policy through impeding 
eradication plans of June and July of 1989 by road blockades (see Section 4.4). 
Following the Paz Estenssoro administration and the end of one of the first SAPs world wide, 
Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR) was elected into government. Paz Zamora won third place in the election 
and was forced into a coalition with Bánzer and the ADN. Goni had won first place with 23 percent, 
while the ADN had reached 22,7 percent and the MIR 19,7 percent (Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa: 753). 
This was a strange combination, given that Paz Zamora was persecuted during Bánzer’s dictatorship. 
The scars on his face hail from a helicopter crash instigated by Bánzer. The ADN received half of the 
cabinets posts: the ministries for foreign relations, defense and finance (Krempin 1990: 29). Paz 
Zamora continued along the lines of Paz Estenssoro and signed the  Acuerdo Patriotico (Patriotic 
Agreement) with the IMF which was to decrease Bolivian debt by 20 percent. It should also continue 
                                                 
45 According to the COB, the end of societies development has not been reached. Society should develop from a liberal democ-
racy to socialism: a democratic socialism, not a dictatorship by the proletariat. Democratic socialism is specified as “a doctrine 
against every form of oppression: economic, political, social, cultural, ethnic, based on sex and in any other thinkable way, with 
the perspective to a society coined with brotherhood” (COB 1995 X Congreso Nacional. Documentos y resoluciones. La Paz in 
Eróstegui T. 1996: 39).  
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the liberalization of the economy, beginning with privatization (Cariaga 1996: 145, 154). Paz Zamora 
restructured bilateral debt (289 million US-dollars) to Argentina and Brazil (Cariaga 1996: 183). 
Throughout the Paz Zamora administration, petrol and other state product prices increased. 
Small duty walls were implemented, but exports did not develop as desired. The only exception was 
soy (on which high tariffs were placed) that survived against Brazilian soy (Peterson 1996: 59). The 
government promised further privatizations so that it could receive more credits by the IFIs and did so 
by decree 22.407, which also created the FIS (budgeted with 20 million US-dollars). Paz Zamora was 
the first president who officially recognized the relevance of drug-trafficking to the Bolivian economy. 
He spoke of 100 percent more illegal imports than prior governments. About 1.2 billion US-dollars 
worth of imports circulated in the Bolivian economy, while official imports reached a mere 600 million 
US-dollars (Krempin 1990: 30f). 
Opposition to neoliberal reforms continued throughout September 1989, when the COB held a 
hunger strike and the government declared the state of emergency in November, when teachers also 
demanded higher wages. These strikes led to several arrests and 146 unionists were deported to the 
tropics (Krempin 1990: 49). The Permanent Human Rights Assembly in Bolivia supported the 
teachers’ endeavor and stated it was unacceptable that social problems remained unsolved and 
hungry bellies were filled with violence (Krempin 1990: 31). While neoliberal reforms continued to be 
implemented, the discussion on the re-distribution of power among the mine workers (6,000), street 
merchants (80,000) and  campesinos (550,000) within the COB continued (Krempin 1990: 48). 
Campesinos pointed out the relevance of coca growers to the union by voting a coca grower vice 
president of their Congress. However, the COB did not create viable alternatives to coca growing 
(Krempin 1990: 49). The COB also failed to overcome its crisis by being unable to redefine its role 
toward the parties and finding more common ground than just their critique of neoliberalism and anti-
imperialist argumentation. The COB crisis was just what the government and neoliberal hegemony 
had envisioned: reducing the unions power (Krempin 1990: 54).  
The Paz Zamora government were billed during the December 1989 communal election when 
CONDEPA (Conciencia de Patria, Patriotic Conscience)
46 and UCS (Uníon Cívica Solidaridad, Civic 
Solidarity Union)
47 received many votes, displeasing the government and leftist parties (see Section 
                                                 
46 CONDEPA is populist and unpredictable. Palenque, a journalist and owner of TV and radio stations (RTP) was particularly 
known in the Altiplano before his passing in 1997. His voters were primarily workers from the informal sector. When the author 
lived in Bolivia during the early nineties, Palenque appeared live on TV-Show, that lasted several hours, called Tribuna libre del 
Pueblo (Free Tribune of the Peoples) every afternoon on his TV station. Dozens of citizens would pilger to the show and tell 
Palenque their sorrows (and some times joys). The politician would sympathetically sneer, a mental picture which still makes the 
author shiver. El Compadre, as Palenque was also called, would promise the shows attendants to find solutions to their prob-
lems, hold pictures of missing relatives into the camera, listen to greetings or pleas and never miss to emphasize the vastness 
of his empathy. Politically, Palenque disfavored the economic and political reforms of the PGDES and propagated an endogen 
model of state intervention; an German evaluation of politics cited Palenque as an unpromising participant for the presidential 
race (Hofmeister 1997: 34). Monica Medina de Palenque, Carlos’ wife, is also a member of CONDEPA and involved in politics. 
She was mayor of La Paz and was voted among the most promising politicians by Time Magazine in 1994. The Palenque mar-
riage ended during the election campaign of 1997 and also split the party. Palenque died of a heart-attack (rumors say in bed of 
his mistress) in March of 1997. His death provoked a massive procession through the city of La Paz. People then did not want to 
leave his coffin, fearing to miss his resurrection. CONDEPA received 17 percent of votes in the 1997 election (after Carlos had 
died), and entered coalition with Bánzer, which lasted for a year. Monica Medina and Carlos’ second wife Remedios Loza as 
well as his daughter Violeta fought over Palenques material and political inheritance publically and entertaining the Bolivian 
population with their soap opera which revealed many uncomfortable truths about all feud participants. The public accused 
Medina of murdering her husband, after it was revealed, that she also had affairs during her marriage with Palenque, sparking 
anger among the population as that Medina did not leave her house for several months (Goedeking 2001). 
47 UCS was founded by entrepreneur Max Fernández and was led by him until his sudden death in an accident in 1995. His 
economic success contrasted with his political unpredictability which consisted of economic, social and populist remarks and 
‘massive election gifts’ rendering him 14 percent of votes in the 1993 election. UCS is a permanent member of congress. 
Fernández son was elected new party leader after his father’s death.  
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4.1) (Krempin 1990: 32). This was also a bill to the COB, whose former supporters re-directed their 
hopes to the populist parties CONDEPA and UCS rather than leftist parties (Krempin 1990: 46; 52). 
The Paz Zamora administrations term ended in 1993 and power was handed to president-elect 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR).  
3.3 Neoliberalism at its height: the Plan de Todos 
The structural reforms of the 1980s and those of the first term of president Sánchez de Lozada (1993 
to 1997) were a bona fide example of SAP-implementation. The reform included 22 new laws
48 imple-
mented, from 1994 to 1997, with help from the IBRD (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 65f). The most impor-
tant reforms are introduced here: the privatization of state companies and the Law of Popular Partici-
pation (LPP). The so-called  Plan de Todos brought Bolivia uninhibited access to the sea (due to 
MERCOSUR and other free trade agreements) and continued the uninterrupted economic growth 
since 1987. Most importantly, this was neoliberalist policy at its height and its most thorough form. All 
measures propagated by the Washington Consensus (see Section 2.1), securing property rights, cut-
ting social spending, liberalizing trade and creating a more competitive economy, were implemented 
during the Goni administration. Thus, the first legislative period of the Goni administration is also re-
ferred to as the “second generation of reforms,” those following the first, the shock-therapy by Paz 
Estenssoro (Petersen 1996: 52). Above all, the Plan de Todos decentralized on a political and eco-
nomic level and was the third attempt to pass this reform through congress. The concept (reform of 
government spending and structure; decentralizing education and health) passed in October1994, 
after failing both in 1988 and 1990 (Mercado 1996: 43; Von Gleich 1998: 38f). It only passed congress 
then, because in 1992, all parties had signed an agreement which stated that a constitutional change 
should involve decentralization. In early 1993,  the senate passed a law that allowed the implementa-
tion of departmental governments.
49 Despite the international acclaim for the structural reform, which 
was based on the highly acclaimed Millennium Development Goals (MDG), implemented during Goni’s 
first term, growth and prosperity did not reach the majority of the population.
50 Lack of competitiveness 
did not lift the structural problems the reform of the second generation were to overcome. 
The MNR first voiced neoliberal ideas throughout the eighties, after having turned all institu-
tions over to the state and campaigning against foreign capital in the country during the 1952 Revolu-
tion. It developed the ideology to perfection in the Plan General de Desarollo Económico y Social de la 
República. El Cambio para Todos (Plan the Todos, General Plan for Economic and Social Develop-
ment of the Republic, The Change for All, PGDES). The PGDES sought to soothe skeptics of the de-
mocratic process, the increasing social problems, show orientation toward market regulation as well as 
defining a new role for the state (privatizing state-owned companies) (Hofmeister 1996: 32; Birle 1996: 
9, 15). The Goni government aimed at turning the land-locked nation into a central mark of the conti-
nent by creating a large export corridor toward the sea (via free trade agreements with Argentina, Bra-
                                                 
48 For a list and detailed descriptions of these laws, please see Kohl 2006: 64-74. 
49 For a list of institutions set up by the PGDES please see Von Gleich (1997: table 12). 
50 Capital accumulated in urban areas which held 72.2 percent of GDP in 1998 (see Section 4.2). This explains why migration to 
urban areas is popular. Total population growth is 2.35 percent p.a., whereas population growth in urban areas (particularly the 
three cities mentioned above) is four percent (F.A.Z. et al. 1999: 190, 195).  
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zil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and MERCOSUR
51) and by privatizing state firms to bring the world to Bo-
livia. Another plan envisioned the export of gas to Brazil via a pipeline and prepare export efforts to 
Chile and Paraguay (Petersen 1996: 60). In joining MERCOSUR, Bolivia and all members lowered 
their tariffs, as that by 2005 95 percent of traded products would be tariff-free. The Bolivian industry 
eyed this measure with skepticism. Bolivia’s joining of MERCOSUR was a “diplomatic masterpiece” by 
Goni, because the country stayed a member of the Andean Union (Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and 
Venezuela). 
The Plan de Todos (also referred to as “the revolution from above”) was a structural reform of 
the state and an orientation for sectoral and decentral development. It sought to decentralize power 
and overcome Bolivia’s dependence on the export of its natural resources. It geared at making Bolivia 
more competitive on an international level, reducing social inequality by ending all (cultural, ethnic, 
racial and sexist) discrimination, strengthening the democratic process by encouraging participation 
and, of course, protecting the environment (Petersen 1996: 53). Goni’s neoliberal pioneership was no 
surprise, given that he was the neoliberal head during the Paz Estenssoro administration, in which he 
held the post of the Minister for Planning. To legitimize himself in front of the indigenous voters and 
emphasize how much these were to benefit from his plans, indigenous activist and pedagogue Víctor 
Hugo Cárdenas from the  Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación (Revolutionary 
Movement Tupac Katari for Liberation, MRKTL), was named vice-presidential candidate. In turn the 
demand for multicultural and bilingual education and the recognition of indigenous communities as 
well as an assurance for their participation in state affairs included in the program (Hofmeister 1996: 
32; Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 66). Cárdenas was the first indigenous vice-president of Bolivia (Grootaert 
and Narayan 2001: 12). It is said that the MNR, because of its paternalism, did not govern with the 
MRKTL, which only received two percent of votes, but as if they had won the election on their own 
(Birle 1996: 17). 
After taking office, Goni implemented two d evelopment ministries (one for sustainable 
development and the environment, the other for human development), precisely as the newest ideas 
in the development discourse, namely sustainable development, demanded and was suggested by the 
MDGs (Birle 1996: 9). Goni created the Consejo Departamental del Medio Ambiente (Departmental 
Council for the Environment) in every department after 27 April 1992 (Mansilla 2000: 34, 37). The 
PGDES was welcomed by the international community as it reformed all political and social areas. The 
German weekly Der Spiegel called Bolivia “Reforms’ Dreamland” – and it was. Like any official of the 
IBRD or IMF would describe a successful reform of politics and economy, the PGDES furthered 
neoliberal hegemony, internalizing modes of behavior in sync with the Washington Consensus (and 
hegemony as understood by critical theory developed by Robert Cox). 
The Constitution was altered in 1994: Bolivia referred to itself as “multiethnic and pluri-
cultural”; the executive powers governing period was extended from four to five years and the re-
election of a person into the same office was only permitted after a pause of one term (Birle 1996: 15). 
Additionally, the executive branch was re-structured: the 23 Ministries shrunk to nine. Three of these 
became “super-ministries”, housing three resorts each, so that they could cater to the administrations 
                                                 
51 Members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Beginning 1997 all members were to lower their tariffs, including 
Bolivia, in its function as an auditor.  
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priorities of economic, human and sustainable development. The agricultural department was dis-
solved and disseminated to other departments. This measure was criticized particularly by develop-
ment aid organizations, who were confronted with coordination-difficulties of their activities and finding 
someone responsible for their inquiries. The PGDES prioritized economic activation and securing of 
sustainable development within the country through the creation of the Estrategia para la Transforma-
ción Productiva del Agro (Strategy for the Productive Transformation of the Agrarian Sector, ETPA) 
(Petersen 1996: 57). The program included technical advances such as investment in science and 
education by intensifying educational and health investments in rural areas through the Programa de 
Saneamiento Básico Rural (Program for Rural Basic Sanitation, PROSABAR), the Proyecto Integral 
de Desarrollo Infantil (Integrative Project for Childhood Development, PIDI). The ETPA also encour-
aged national cultivation of natural resources and prioritized street and water building through the Pro-
grama Nacional de Riego (National Irrigation Program, PRONAR). The coordination between those 
responsible for creating an integrated agricultural policy faced many difficulties, as the agricultural 
department no longer existed (Petersen 1996: 58). Two new laws in the agricultural sector were im-
plemented in July 1996: the Ley Forestal (Forest Law) and the Law of the INRA (Instituto Nacional de 
Reforma Agraria, National Institute for the Agricultural Reform). Both implemented a new and overdue 
re-organization of the land distribution of 1953, favoring the indigenous population through the 
Proyecto Nacional de Administración de Tierras  (National Project for the A dministration of Land, 
PNAT). All of these new laws and institutions were not received well by the population, resulting in 
many peasant marches and culminating in a two-week long protest in October 1996 in La Paz. Large 
agricultural interest groups used the reforms for their benefit as it included a property tax reduction (to 
1.5 percent) (Petersen 1996: 59). 
The political parties promise of 1993 to decentralize, was reversed in 1994 by t he 
constitutional reform. Now, the departmental executive branches were strengthened through creation 
of presidents for each department and a corresponding administrational organ ( Consejo 
Departamental) and municipal councils (Gobiernos Municipales) and mayors. All served on a five year 
basis. Bolivia’s character as a Unitarian republic did not change through the PGDES. However, for 
many regions the government was present for the first time, enabled by the Law for Popular 
Participation of 1994, the second most important aspect of the Goni-era apart from the capitalization of 
state firms (Mercado 1996: 44). 
3.3.1 The Law for Popular Participation 
In April 1994, the government established the presence of the state in all political, economic and ad-
ministrative matters in all regions of Bolivia by passing of the Law for Popular Participation (Ley de 
Participación Popular, LPP). The LPP, which became effective in January of 1996, intended to form a 
strong bond between community administrations and the national government (Mercado 1996: 45). 
The LPP took responsibility and funds away from the national government in the areas of education, 
health, culture, sports, water management and street construction
52 and gave it to the communities. 
This change had obvious effects on rural regions as some had governmental presence until then (Birle 
1996: 17). Popular participation was encouraged by altering the distribution of the state budget and 
                                                 
52 Communities are responsible for the administration and maintenance of their infrastructure (schools, clinics, sport fields, 
streets) and their employees.  
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creating communal governments through the Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (Territorial Organi-
zations of the Basis, OTB) such as the comunidades campesinas (campesino communities), pueblos 
indigenas (indigenous people), juntas vecinales (gathering of neighbors) (see Kohl and Farthing 2006: 
98 – 101). These groups were to control the planning and spending process within their communities 
and assure the participation of former “blank spots.” The Comités de Vigilancia (monitoring commit-
tees) should end the marginalization of indigenous and ethnic groups through their right to veto or 
revise the decisions made by the municipal administration. Thus, government money could be spent 
more effectively according to people’s wishes and needs. By 1996 192 of 311 communities had 
founded Comités de Vigilancia. Altering societal control within Bolivian society also included handing 
rural development to the communities. They were now responsible for securing foods and encouraging 
gender equality. Within the first two years after the law was passed, 311 governments for communities 
were established (of which 30 percent consisted of 5,000 people or less (Grootaert and Narayan 2001: 
11)); prior there had been only three dozen (Mercado 1996: 45). The LPP encouraged indigenous 
organizations and coca growers to enter government on the municipal level (Assies 2004: 33). 
To finance their projects the communities received a budget half made up of national taxes, 
based on a per-person system according to the results of the 1992 census (in favor of ethnic, 
indigenous and rural inclusion) and another half all departments received in equal amounts (profit from 
the taxes paid by the oil and mine industry (which make up 25 percent of total Bolivian GDP)) as well 
as dues (regalías) from other natural resources from the individual department’s territory (Mercado 
1996: 44f). Formerly, the national government was funded by 40 percent of taxes and 50 percent of 
income from the oil industry. The important change was that all communities, regardless of their rural 
or urban location, received a part of the 25 percent of total national income from oil, which was 
specifically allotted to this purpose through the LPP. The law was implemented in three stages
53 and 
increased the total budget attributed to local governments from 76.5 million US-dollars in 1990 to 
155.5 million US-dollars in 1996. The re-distribution of monies gave rural areas, which prior had no 
funds a possibility to finally invest in the establishing of local government structures (Mercado 1996: 
48; Kohl and Farthing 2006: 97). 
To assure popular participation, the government created the National Secretary for Popular 
Participation, who became part of the national administration. The distribution of resources between 
capitals and rural areas changed: in 1995 cities held 39 percent of all monies, the remaining 61 
percent went to rural areas. Unfortunately these numbers cited by Mercado (1997) are not compared 
to figures from former years. It is mere speculation that they manifest the improvement of peoples 
livelihood. Grootaert and Narayan reveal that  
before the reform the three main cities received 84% of all devolved funds while the majority of rural communities 
received nothing. After the reform the share of the three cities fell to 29% and provincial and rural area budgets increased from 
42% to over 3000%. (2001: 11) 
It is a fact, that investment activities in quality and quantity increased through the LPP: during 
the second half of 1994 3,700 investment projects were registered, in 1995 it was 10,000 new pro-
jects. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether all of the year or just the first half is included in this figure. 
However, the distribution of funds was as follows: 48.6 percent on housing and city construction, 16.9 
                                                 
53 1. Establish new roles, structure and organisation of the new executives; 2. re-define the role and activities of the central state 
government; 3. strengthen the relationship between civil society and public administration (Mercado 1996: 47). Implementation 
is different for every department, depending on its strengths and weaknesses.  
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percent on basic preventive health needs, 16.8 percent designated to education and culture, 5.3 per-
cent for transport and 3.3 to health and security. A government estimate claims 52,000 new employ-
ment opportunities, particularly in the field of construction and urban infrastructure, were created by 
the LPP, about 24,000 p.a. (in 1994 and 1995). Most of these jobs were located in urban areas 
(Mercado 1996: 48).
54 At the same time the LPP was implemented, Goni sold state firms to retrieve 
the state from the economy. 
3.3.2 Capitalization of State Companies 
While the LPP created jobs in the urban construction sector, other workers lost employment through 
the privatization of state firms. Goni announced to keep inflation rates steady at ten percent p.a. and 
declared institutional independence of the Bolivian Central Bank: He created a finance regulation sys-
tem (Sistema de Regulacion Financiera- SIREFI).
55 The capitalization of state companies combined 
IFI and Goni-wishes, intertwining privatization, state-withdrawal from the economy and a pension re-
form (Manz 1996: 77) 
Throughout the legislative period 1993 to 1997, the MNR had to distance itself from the prom-
ise they made during their election campaign: to create six percent growth and 500,000 new jobs p.a. 
by 1997. Growth remained at four percent p.a., new jobs were scarce. This led to animosities within 
the population, as the re-structuring of the state apparatus (shrinking the number of ministries from 23 
to 9) already entailed massive dismissals (Mercado 1996: 54). The unemployment rates increased 
further after 24 of 72 state companies were sold by 1995
56 -- a small amount considering Bolivia’s 
neoliberal era began in 1985. Selling state property was not popular within the MNR, as they banned 
foreign capital from the nation during the 1952 Revolution and dispossessed the tin barons half a cen-
tury ago (Faguet 2005: 5). The process of selling state firms was already initiated during the Paz 
Zamora government after 1989 through pressure of the IMF and the IBRD. Privatization had to be 
made legal again, which it was by votes from the MNR and ADN (Soliz Rada 2002: 5; Kohl and Far-
thing 2006: 81). During the Paz Zamora administration, the MNR had criticized the MIR for privatizing 
state property (even though it only affected small firms). It was not the privatization per sé the MNR 
questioned, but the way it was being done (Petersen 1994: 55). This earned the MNR heavy discus-
sions within its own lines, leading to a halt of capitalization activities until 1995, when the inner-party 
issues were overcome. In 1995 Goni declared the six largest state companies with monopolistic stand-
ing
57 in Bolivia ready for sale (Petersen 1996: 55). This decisions was hastily made, as Goni’s term 
was coming to an end (Manz 1996: 78). Legally, the capitalization of state firms and the withdrawal of 
the state from the economy (ending its existence as an entrepreneur) was implemented through a 
national planning system, a national system for public investment (Subsistema de Información sobre 
Planificación, SNIP) and the system for operational planning (Sistema de Programación de Opera-
ciones, SPO). These were implemented in June and July 1996; a national plan should coordinate 
these systems, which was estimated to be a difficult endeavor by foreign development aide officials, 
because many ministries and officials competed with one another and stood in the way of integration. 
                                                 
54 Kohl and Farthing cite the creation of 30,000 new jobs by decentralization measures: „twice the number eliminated within the 
national government’s administration (2006: 101). 
55 For a detailed description of this decree please see Meagher (2002). 
56 This number excludes the army. 
57 Lloyd Aereo Boliviano (LAB, Bolivian Airline); Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones de Bolivia, (National Telecommuni-
cations Enterprise ENTEL), ENDE; YFPB and Empresa Metalurgica VINTO (National Smelting Company, VINTO-EMV) (Soliz 
Rada 2002: 15; Kohl 2006: 82).  
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This was an obstacle to progress, but was interpreted as a sign that popular participation was begin-
ning to fruit (Petersen 1996: 57). 
Capitalization was expected to earn two billion US-dollars. However the 24 state companies 
which were sold by 1994 (up to the year and a half hiatus initiated by the MNR) only earned 20 million 
US-dollars and it was estimated the remaining 48 would bring another 130 million US-dollars, of which 
50 million were expected from ENDE ( Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, National Electricity 
Enterprise). By October 1996 four of the largest state companies had been sold
58 and the government 
was determined to sell YPFB (and capitalize the oil and gas reserves of the nation (Soliz Rada 2002: 
21)) and VINTO-EMV by the end of 1996. Particularly selling YPFB was a challenge, as it was 
untouchable terrain to the unions, but it happened. In 1996, the YPFB was privatized and a new 
Hydrocarbons law (1698) was passed. The new law “introduced a system of joint risk contracts with 
residual YPFB and of concessions to be regulated by a newly created Superintendence for 
Hydrocarbons” and included a tax reduction to support exploration, exploitation and commercialization 
of the gas reserves for private operators. The law also increased consumer prices (Assies 2004: 28). 
The revenue from selling state firms was to enter a pension fund for the Bolivian population. Selling 
itself was a complicated process: investors were to create a company with the same value the 
enterprise they intended to buy. The state and investor companies then merged and were privatized. 
The private investor received 50 percent of auctions as well as all management rights; the remaining 
half of auctions were ‘given’ to all adult Bolivians
59 in form of pensions (Manz 1996: 83). The law lists 
the Bolivian population as ‘benefactors’ of the shares but not as owners.
60 The official owner of these 
actions is the Collective Capitalization Fund which is not a legal person (Soliz Rada 2002: 19f). The 
pension system, Bono de Solidaridad (Solidarity Bonus, BonoSol) was established on the basis of 
selling the six monopolistic companies and all Bolivians who were legally adults by 31 December 1995 
were qualified for it. Only 30 percent of funds went to the elderly (Soliz Rada 2002: 19).  
The reform of the pension system was criticized within Bolivia, particularly after the 
government lost much revenue through capitalization (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 83). All Bolivians over 
the age of 65 qualified for pension; the previous system covered only 11 percent of the working 
population. The age barrier for the new pension system was questioned and labeled discriminatory 
against the poor, whose life expectancy is lower (beneath 65 years of age) than of the wealthy (Manz 
1996: 77; Von Gleich 1998: 59f). Contribution dues (which are ten percent of wages on all income) 
and length were increased by the reform and created problems for those who had previously paid into 
the pension fund. They had only contributed 15 as opposed to 25 years and only paid 180 dues 
instead of the now required 300. 300 payments were criticized as unrealistic, as secure employment is 
scarce. To compensate the deficits created by the pension reform, the Bolivian government took out 
loans of five million US-dollars. The COB and the MBL opposed Goni’s pension fund reform, but votes 
from MRKTL, MNR and UCS enabled the privatization plans (Manz 1996: 77, 82). Perhaps the 
PGDES had geared at ending elite-influence on the executive branch (a long-time goal of the MNR). 
Rather, the decision-making abilities of the executive withered (Birle 1996: 17). 
                                                 
58 The train company went to Chile, which was registered with horror in the Bolivian population. 
59 Those being 18 years of age or over by 31 December 1995 – Soliz Rada cites adults as being 21 years of age (2002: 19).  
60 Soliz Rada cites 50 percent of capital shares belonging to the foreign investor, 9 percent to the state workers of the sold 
company and only 41 percent of shares belonging to all Bolivian adults (2002: 17).  
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3.3.3 The other side of the reforms: perception of the Plan de Todos in the Bolivian population 
Goni’s governmental policies altered the dependence of societal, economic, ecologic and  political 
circumstances on the creation and consolidation of economic sustainability. The government linked 
specific reform goals (privatizing state companies, modernizing rural areas) to non-economic goals 
(Petersen 1996: 53). The negative effects of the  reforms were many. As Mercado puts it: “The 
dramatic effects of the savings and structural adjustment politics could only be compensated partially 
through this reform” (1996: 48). The reform changed Bolivia’s “judicial system to a neoliberal 
appendix” (Soliz Rada 2002: 6). For one, the creation of the “super-ministries” and the loss of 
responsible agencies led to rivalries and competition between officials. Transferring responsibility from 
the central administration to the departments in compliance with the LPP proved tedious and difficult. 
Middle-sized communities became highly dependant upon co-participation funds (profit of national tax 
on natural resources) for their budgets, as they earned no tax profit (Birle 1996; Mercado 1996: 49). 
Despite the existence of monitoring committees ( Comités de Vigilancia), many regions prioritized 
spending on “decoration” such as the construction of houses and parks, neglecting those aspects the 
reform was to improve: education, the economy and particularly health (Mercado 1996: 49).
61 The 
national administration reacted by passing a decree demanding social spending receive higher priority. 
The question remains whether this was enough motivation to actually do so. Unfortunately, the three 
governmental levels (national, departmental and communal) remained uncoordinated, particularly in 
the matter of overall orientation for investment (Mercado 1996: 50; Zoomers 1999: 4). The government 
brought forth strategic development plans to include specific visions for human, sustainable and 
economic development on all governmental levels. Popular participation and decentralization were to 
be one common strategy within one institutional frame work within which leading, coordinating and 
controlling responsibilities were coherent and specific. The structural reform of the state designated 20 
percent of the state household to the communities. Half of the money was used wisely. Household 
deficit expanded to 4 percent of GDP after sinking steadily throughout the prior years. The increase is 
due to the new pension system and the natural catastrophes, whose consequences needed attention 
(F.A.Z. et al 1999: 187). Furthermore, the selling of state firms did not earn revenues from increased 
production or compensated losses, contrary to expectations. Rather companies invested profit outside 
Bolivia and the agricultural sector grew exponentially while others didn’t (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 86, 
90, 92).  
The Ley de Reforma Educativa (Law for Educational Reform, LRE) implemented through the 
PGDES promised to achieve equal education for men and women by 2010 (Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 
66). Well intentioned, the LRE took away decision-making power from the teachers union – without 
asking. This decision is to be seen from both sides. For one, less power for the all-mighty teachers 
union was necessary. The teachers protested for higher wages on a yearly basis. Pupils suffered from 
the bad education not only because of the unfortunate conditions schools were in, but also because of 
the absence of the instructors who were out on the streets demanding higher wages. Teachers went 
on general strike in February 1995 to voice their opposition against the LRE and met violent clashes 
                                                 
61 Faguet cites 79 percent of municipal investment to have gone into education, urban development and water sanitation (2005: 
9). His study finds: „that central government, with a much larger budget and free reign over all of Bolivia’s municipalities, chose 
a very unequal distribution of investment across space, while decentralized government distributes public investment much 
more evenly throughout the country“ (2005: 11).  
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with the police. The teachers not only criticized their loss of influence due to the LRE but also that it 
was not in interest of the country, but rather in interest of the IFIs and neoliberalism. The teachers 
union claimed the LRE did not strengthen education in rural areas, even though most Bolivians live 
there. Ströbele-Gregor contradicts this point: work-structures have made migration in between cities 
and rural areas a reality for most (1996: 71). Obviously, migration is need-based (work, education and 
other services) and not voluntary. Thus critique by the teachers union was legitimate. In her assess-
ment of the LRE and the LPP, Ströbele-Gregor claims he indigenous and rural population profited from 
these measures. More women and indigenous are included in education, even though the system 
barely reaches the goals of qualification and integration. 
All unions suffered a loss of power throughout the implementation of the PGDES.
62 As in the 
1980s, the COB continued to lose power. It was no longer the second most important actor in politics, 
having been unable to develop its own hegemonic project. It lost many members due to the reforms as 
previously, membership was obligatory for workers whose guild was presented within the COB.
63 Both 
the campesino branch of the COB (CSUTCB) and the union for informal workers were granted little 
power within the COB during the 1990s.
64 This is surprising as the agrarian and mining sector remain 
important to Bolivia’s economy. Despite modernization measures these sectors still made up a 
combined 23 percent of GDP in 1998 (F.A.Z. et al. 1999: 185). COB’s policy is thus not in congruence 
with Bolivian reality (Krempin 1990: 35). One of the political streams within the COB was anti-
imperialist, the FSTMB pressured their goals within the COB. 
Another factor weakening the COB came directly from neoliberal reforms of the market and 
employment policies. An increasing amount of workers were only employed temporarily in three month 
contracts (called Eventuales (Incidentals)). These workers are not organized in unions, explaining a 
part of the decline in COB member numbers. In solidarity with the teachers union, the CSUTCB 
founded the Organización de Pueblos Originarios (Organization of Indigenous People). Together they 
developed a concept of bilingual and bicultural education which included respect and strengthening of 
culture within curricula, cooperation between community and school and the use of the native tongue 
and criticized the exclusion of the indigenous culture in the classroom (Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 70). The 
CSUTCB, the Federación de Productores de Coca (Coca Producers Federation) and the Organización 
de Pueblos Originarios  opposed all neoliberal reforms, particularly because of the increased 
government control over the unions (implementing monitoring exams, productivity control systems, 
making membership optional and altering the wage system). As a result:  
Neoliberalism has had the effect of more flexible contract regulations and shown that only a small willingness exists to 
negotiate solutions. (Eróstegui 1996: 41) 
The COB as a whole opposed the education reform for political reasons. It agreed with the teachers 
union that the educational reform (as all reforms per sé) serviced the demands of the IFIs and claimed 
these decisions were not made by the government itself but the IFIs.  
                                                 
62 For a detailed history of the COB and the continuous decline of their power until 1990, please see Krempin 1990. 
63 Every worker who signed a contract with a company that has a union is automatically a member. For the workers took the 
existence of the unions for granted and assumed it would defend their interests. This is why campesinos toil in the agrarian 
sector and not anywhere else and don’t have an own union. 
64 The CSUTCB was integrated into the COB in 1979 and holds 13 percent of delegate seats in the COB conference (Krempin 
1990: 33).  
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The schism within the COB deepened through confrontation with the economic and political 
reforms by the Goni administration. The first stream was revolutionary and believed the COB’s largest 
problem was neoliberalism and that it should be replaced with a new system. The second, democratic, 
stream, argued that the world had changed, that part of this change was neoliberalism and that new 
(not-class based) actors (such as the indigenous, women, the informal sector and the youth) had 
gained influence and that the COB should attend to their demands. The COB would overcome crisis 
once the unions had modernized. New democratic structures were to be implemented through 
dialogue with the workers: 
The union sits between chairs, all of which make life difficult. Both neoliberalism  – which is viewed as more 
threatening than the revolutionary train of thought – and the conservative flow within the workers movement account for this. 
(Eróstegui T. 1996: 41) 
After a month of protesting, the COB and the government reached an agreement in April of 1995. Yet 
teachers continued protesting the educational reform (Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 69). On 18 April 1995 
COB leaders were arrested and the state of emergency was declared. Opposition to the PGDES 
continued. In July and August 1996, the COB published a declaration which spoke of a historic duty 
calling to inhibit neoliberal change: 
We, the workers and peasants, who defend the historical traditions of the COB and belong to the revolutionary and 
multinational union movement, condemn neoliberalism and its policies of privatizing and transnationalising the state economy 
(…) We fight for multinational socialism, for a society without oppressed and oppressors, without exploiters and exploited. 
(Eróstegui T. 1996: 39) 
This document (or any others passed by the COB)
65 are not interpreted as a plea by the entire Bolivian 
population, according to Eróstegui. The declaration excludes aspects such as gender equality and an 
independent declaration by the indigenous people which is not linked to the struggle of the proletariat. 
Lizárraga Zamora, who analyzed the need for an educational reform in the upper education sector in 
Bolivia, claims that the educational reform was received with great enthusiasm by the lower classes as 
all other reforms (2001: 120). This should be questioned. The document by the COB does not mention 
globalization of the world economy as a negative of positive factor for workers and  campesinos. 
Eróstegui interprets: “[I]t can be noted, that the (…) COB contributed next to nothing to the national 
political debate” (1996: 40). Seemingly Paz Estenssoros goal of debilitating the unions, which he 
labeled “an obstacle to economic development”, as hegemonic neoliberal discourse would agree, was 
achieved by the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 57). 
Political parties in Bolivia are uninvolved in the contribution toward a solution of the countries 
economic and political problems (Hofmeister 1996). A survey conducted in the mid-1990s cites most 
Bolivians agreeing to this statement and even blaming politicians for the backwardness of Bolivian 
society (Boletín Opinión Pública 6 August 1996 in Hofmeister 1996: 31). These opinions stand con-
trary to the trust demonstrated to populist parties CONDEPA and the UCS (who adapted ideas of the 
indigenous) and the fact that indigenous or Marxist parties had virtually no influence on politics (Hof-
meister 1996: 32). The so-called Katarismo was a prominent and radical movement in the unions in 
the 1970s and did not survive on a party-level. An Aymará and campesino movement, Tupaj Katari is 
named after rebel brothers Tupaj Amaru and Tupaj Katari who confronted the Spanish crown between 
1780 and 1782 and represented a xenophobic ideology (Grupo de Estudios Históricos 2002: 1049). 
                                                 
65  Declaración Politica  (Political Declaration); Plataforma Estratégica  (Strategic Platform); Objetivos Estratégicos  (Strategic 
Objective); Objetivos Tácticos (Tactic Objectives).  
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The brothers sought to end the exploitation of Aymará though political and economic institutions. The 
Tupaj Katari movement turned the brother’s last words prior to his beheading to reality: “I will die, but 
will return as thousands upon thousands” (Hurtado 1986).
66 The importance of ideas propagated by 
the Katarista movement diminished, yet their popularity spread across the country in the eastern low-
lands and  Quechua and  Aymará speaking highlands (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 58). Numerous a t-
tempts to found an indigenous party failed, because most indigenous leaders lacked a social basis. 
Perhaps the forms of political representation within a party and within the party system is not the only difficulty to 
stipulate with the traditions in participation and balancing of interests of the indigenous communities. (Hofmeister 1996: 31) 
The moderate ideas of Víctor Hugo Cárdenas (vice president to Goni) were more popular (even 
though the party only received two percent during the election) than those of other indigenous leaders, 
as they wanted an intercultural democracy (Grupo de Estudios Históricos 2002: 1136f). Indigenous 
parties often refer to Tupaj Katari in their names. 
The 1996 reform of the legislative system (to make it similar to the German electoral system) 
were supposed to create higher efficacy and soothe the stark control by party leaders over parliament. 
Congress (consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate) vote for the president between 
the candidates ranked first and second in the national election. Should two rounds in Congress not 
bring a candidate an absolute majority, the candidate with most votes is president (Birle 1996). The 
three percent threshold parties had to now pass in order to enter congress might benefit smaller 
(particularly indigenous) parties to mobilize and raise consciousness for their issues, perhaps even 
create a greater feeling of responsibility among them (Hofmeister 1997: 35). Prior to the reform, the 
legislative branch (consisting of 130 representatives and 27 senators (3 per department) was 
inefficient and disorganized. The power to control the executive branch or law creation was rarely used 
(F.A.Z. et al 1999: 184). Capacities of government members remain limited. Parliamentarians of 
smaller parties often do not own an office, the law-making-process is unfamiliar to most. Development 
aid organizations held workshops on the matter of law-making and other formalities. These deficits are 
well known to the parliamentarians, who introduced measures such as time limits on speeches or 
reduced the number of working groups to improve the situation. The PGDES attempted to reduce 
corruption in the justice system, which has a bad reputation in the population, because it discriminated 
against the poor: they can’t afford bribes, lawyers or court costs. Standards to elect judges (such as a 
two-third majority and specification of skills) were also implemented by the PGDES (Birle 1996: 17-
19). These reforms might have changed Bolivian political structure: between 1950 and 1979 Bolivia 
had no parliament, as the opposition had no influence (Mansilla 1987: 101). 
Structural problems have remained unsolved despite the PGDES. Development aid projects 
are still uncoordinated, overlapping and demonstrate contradictory behavior (Birle 1996: 24). Another 
issue, which the PGDES did not help and which was mentioned in several texts read for this thesis is 
the unconditional loyalty of local (high level) officials to donors and the resulting depreciation of their 
Bolivian employers (Birle 1996: 23). The population blames the government (e.g. that of Paz Zamora) 
for listening more to economic and particular power interests than those of the population (Hofmeister 
1996: 31). The capitalization process was been criticized for creating costs which can not be recom-
pensed: 188.9 million US-dollars of loans were taken from the IBRD, IMF and CAF in order to conduct 
research and advertising for the process (CEDLA 2005: 42). Making Bolivia the center of Latin Amer-
                                                 
66 For a detailed account of this movements history, goals and important personalities, please see Hurtado 1986.  
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ica and using its landlocked position as an advantage was one of Goni’s primary goals (Birle 1996: 
21). An investor guide to MERCOSUR attributes growth to private projects. These were needed to 
finish the 3,150 km long pipeline from Santa Cruz to São Paulo in Brazil that was inaugurated in Feb-
ruary 1999. Further construction on the pipeline was to occur throughout the year 2000 and is known 
as a bona fide investment project, guided by Bánzer (in his second presidential term). Bánzer contin-
ued Sánchez de Lozadas political and economic course. However, Bolivia, who is a member of nine 
free trade zones, remains dependant upon imports. Its export quota reached roughly 20 percent in 
1998 in contrast to a 29 percent import rate attributed to the changes in consumption patterns of the 
population. The public sector is less profitable for workers, as it seems. The private economy pays 
wages four times higher than the public sector (F.A.Z. et al. 1999: 181, 191, 194). 
The international community was highly supportive of the PGDES. This was underlined during 
a conference on sustainable development in Santa Cruz in December 1996 to which all presidents of 
the American hemisphere attended. Items on the agenda included: (a) achieving economic growth 
while reforming the productive sector to be more competitive internationally; (b) (social, economic, 
cultural and ethnic) redistribution, (c) rational and environmentally-friendly use of natural resources; (d) 
legitimacy of governments ( gobernabilidad) through consolidating democratic structures and proc-
esses (e.g. modernizing the judicial system, higher rationality in government decision-making and 
larger effectiveness of administrational actions) (Petersen 1996: 53). Interpreting these agenda items 
into the Bolivian reforms, it seems as if the efforts of the PGDES
67 were overbearing 
Goni’s government was more engaged in reforming and implementing sustainable develop-
ment than anyone in Latin America. His involvement toward environmentally friendly, sustainable, 
social and economic reforms was outstanding (Petersen 1996: 53). His environmental-friendliness is 
refuted by H.F.C. Mansillas study on sustainable development and the attitudes by the Latin American 
elites toward this concept. The concept adapts well into Latin American culture (except Cuba, which 
lacks consciousness of the limits of the earth and nature) and into neoliberal policies as it propagates 
the notion of private ownership of nature. The financial gain from selling and exporting expensive 
woods has brought more profit to Latin American than any other resource, explaining why the envi-
ronment within the elites of the continent. Bolivia ranked second, after Brazil, being responsible for 7 
percent of elimination of rain forest areas world wide in 1996. More interestingly, stubbing in Bolivia  
began only in 1975, increasing exponentially, in particular after the Rio Summit in 1992 (see table 2). 
Wood replaced minerals in their formerly important role within the economies 
throughout all of Latin America (Mansilla 2000: 7, 12, 15). 
It difficult to find the roots for environmental destruction in Latin America, partially 
because the indigenous people are romanticized as a minority living happily, 
humble and in harmony with nature. This is wrong. Indigenous are a majority and 
most have adapted to western (modern) lifestyle, using farming methods that are 
harmful to the environment (Mansilla 2000: 19; Pacheco 2003: 3  - 7). Latin 
American continues to discriminate the indigenous people, who are viewed as half-human, because 
their lifestyle is not modern or western. They are seen as a rock in the road toward industrialization in 
                                                 
67 Restructuring of the decentralized government (September 1993); change of the constitution (December 1994); political and 
administrative decentralisation (April 1994 and July 1995). 
Table 2 
Forestal cutting in 
Bolivia 1980 - 1997 
Year  Hectare 
1980  90,000 
1990  170,000 
1997  525.000 - 
750.000 
Table: based on 
Mansilla 2000: 14  
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eyes of the elite. Bolivian indigenous have protested this discrimination, particularly since 15 August 
1990. Unfortunately without success. In the same breath as discrimination of the indigenous, there is a 
wide-spread adoration of western representatives and life style. Neoliberalism and globalization have 
brought consumption and behavioral patterns to Latin America, arching over the use of free-time and 
orienting one’s economy toward export. Latin American elites want to modernize as quickly as possi-
ble (Mansilla 2000:18-22). Adoration of western things extends to the form of bondage by many local 
employees and a consequent disregard of the own cultural background (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 36). 
This schism becomes apparent in the area of environmental issues: Indigenous people claim 
the landless tropics to be part of their culture and history, whereas whites and mestizos think these 
lands should be exploited. They also believe that the population of their countries are too small to do 
harm to the limitless natural resources. Latter idea hails from the belief that internationally recognized 
nations always have many citizens and that this legitimizes one’s culture and identity. Some elites 
even compare their countries to Israel or the Netherlands in terms of size and population. This is easily 
contradicted: some areas can not be used for agricultural or habitation purposes; a fact which is 
particularly true for Bolivia. Across all territory, population density is 7.2 persons/km²; but when 
calculating population density or arable and inhabitable land, population density is 100 persons/km² 
(Mansilla 2000: 20f). 
Within the country, those responsible for environmental hazards push responsibility from one 
to another, particularly in the area of Bolivia’s main environmental problem: desertification. In 1998, 
minister for sustainable development Erick Reyes Villa officially stated that 41 percent of Bolivian 
territory is in the process of unavoidable desertification. The Association of Wood Industrials of Bolivia 
blames the peasants, particularly coca growers, for the destruction of tropic forests. The director of the 
National Forest Agency claimed that tropic areas are yet to be explored by wood companies. Existent 
pollution was to be blamed on the makers: northern countries. They should be held responsible, also 
on a financial level. Particularly Bolivian national identity is linked to the myth of incredible richness of 
the country (which is simultaneously a large development potential), that is not taken advantage of 
because of external pressure (Mansilla 2000: 23, 25-29, 36). Surveys show that conserving the 
environment is not on the top of the Bolivian societies priority-list,
68 perhaps because industrialized 
countries are believed to be the primary pollutants. Saving the environment should be their 
responsibility.  
In 1990, the Paz Zamora administration declared a five-year “historic-ecologic hiatus” by pass-
ing a law demanding a pause during which “the environment was to be treated with special care” 
(Mansilla 2000: 37). As the agrarian minister explained this was to guarantee a longer exploitation of 
forest resources. The minister of sustainable development and the environment explained that the 
historical-ecologic hiatus would not impact the economy, that environmental-friendliness and economic 
development were compatible (Mansilla 2000: 38). A new law for the “rational” exploitation of forests 
by the Bolivian society raised taxes to be paid by the stubbing companies in interest of a more careful 
use of the forests (read: one US-dollar per hectare p.a.). The law changed nothing: creating no re-
building measures and the limits on hectares to be stubbed were easily surpassed through bribes. No 
                                                 
68 A survey of 1996 indicates that only 20 percent of the rural population perceive the damage on nature. Two thirds of the rural 
population does not care for environmental matters and half of the total population perceives pollution to be in the air and the 
water. Exploitation of the forests is not perceived as an issue of environmental pollution (Mansilla 2000: 24).  
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governments since reported on the results of this five year period. Wood companies have admitted to 
have continued activities all the same or even more. This is a prime for the impact of neoliberal poli-
cies on Latin American elites. Sustainable development is nothing more but a concept to pay lip ser-
vice to (Mansilla 2000: 39, 43).  
Neoliberalism assumes that the privatization of all natural resources is best for the free reign 
of market forces. Most Bolivian forests are already privately owned. Bolivian private entrepreneurs go 
as far as to claim that privatization of forests will ensure the “spontaneous” regeneration of 
endangered wood species and that if current speed of exploitation and “ care” are kept up, then 
another 18,750 years of wood cutting are guaranteed (Mansilla 2000: 40, 42). Guillermo Roig 
Pacheco, one of Bolivia’s most profitable wood entrepreneurs (80 percent of his production is exported 
to the US and Europe) meant it, when he said that his company does not harm the environment. His 
workers only cut either very old or sick trees, both of which would die eventually anyway, he said. 
The  Consejo Empresarial para el Desarollo  Sustenible (Council of Entrepreneurs for 
Sustainable D evelopment) claimed that the free market saves the environment best. Free play of 
economic forces will conserve eco systems. Their key to sustainable development is privatization. The 
pressure exerted from the outside to care for environmental issues is not as large as the pressure to 
adapt free market policies: the IFIs favor control of ecological safety, just as long as it does not burden 
economic growth. The post-MDG-Summit-meeting in Santa Cruz in December of 1996 brought forth a 
declaration and an action plan, speaking vaguely of environmental conservation. Rather, the 
document deals with conventional problems on trade, economic growth, external investment and drug 
production. Only two points (13 and 16) speak directly of the environment (Mansilla 2000: 43, 46, 48f). 
Gierhake points out that in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru responsibility for matters of environmental 
sustainability are “spread” across several state actors, in contrast to matters of fissile energy sources, 
which are strictly regulated (2001). 
  Some suspected that Goni’s implementation of an own ministry for sustainable development 
was nothing more than an attempt to secure foreign investment and aid – an argument extendable to 
all reforms. Certainly the restructuring related to the PGDES should be judged critically: one develop-
ment theory was placed above all others. There is no political consciousness on the matter of envi-
ronmental conservation within the political and ideological streams of Bolivia or its population, particu-
larly when elites believe that sustainable development and population growth are compatible (Mansilla 
2000: 50, 54). The high acclaim for Goni and his reforms might be due to his ability for public relations 
and opportunism. Also, the PGDES favored western thought and the attempt to give the economy 
more power and debilitate the state only gave more power to transnational companies, as national 
private enterprise is quite weak (Soliz Rada 2002: 24). Securing private ownership was welcomed in 
Bolivia, as many dictators severely threatened this concept. Office work was always valued higher 
(socially and financially) than any other work, which has not inhibited the informal (mostly illegal) sec-
tor to be in the hands of a few private people (Mansilla 1987: 136, 139). Soliz Rada claims that the 
consequences of the PGDES decreased state corruption, but opened way for “neoliberal corruption” 
(2002: 25). Arze Vargas criticizes that the expansion of capital has become primary gear for poverty 
production, as the state is no longer responsible for redistributing wealth. Social aspects of politics are 
subdued to economic efficiency systems. He speaks of neoliberal hegemony which translates into  
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bourgeois rule of Bolivia at the cost of the marginalized (wealth-wise and geographically) (Arze Vargas 
2000: 3-6).  
Neoliberal policies account for the profound changes in the Bolivian workers landscape (see 
Lagos 1994 or Section 4.2), as it encouraged exploitation and a vicious cycle of poverty (Arze Vargas 
2000: 12). The schism between rich and poor in Bolivia inclined since 1982. There has been no redis-
tribution of wealth despite of Bolivia’s growth (in absolute terms) (CEDLA 2003: 4, 12). Similarly, the 
budget of Bolivia reflects the dependence of the country on foreign aid, and how much of the income 
from foreign donors might as well be taken right back to where it came from, so that it can pay off in-
terest rates which accumulated throughout the years: development aid accounted for 20 percent of 
GDP (between 670 and 750 million US-dollars) between 1988 and 1992,
69 indicating the amount of 
influence foreign governments in Bolivia. The state budget of 2002 was made up of 60.1 percent own 
income (one third from taxes paid by the working population) and 39.9 percent (or 1,150 million US-
dollars) of loans and donations, many of which were tied to conditions (CEDLA 2005: 12-14).
70 Bolivia 
spent most monies (21 percent of the budget) on paying back external debt (half account for paying off 
old loans and interest rates). Only 18.7 percent were invested in education; economic aspects rank 
third with 15.8 percent. Public administration costs received 12.7 percent of the budget. The least im-
portant source of income in 2002 was the most honored and benefited actor by neoliberal reforms: 
private industry. External and internal debt rose between 1994 and 2002 (CEDLA 2000: 33, 38, 43).  
Hegemony’s success is apparent. All of these donors are members of the IMF or the G-8, of 
course all propagators of neoliberalism, particularly free trade. The Bolivian state consequently only 
gathers its income from tax payers, rather than from capital – at it should, because foreign investment 
has not resulted in significant reduction of poverty or social justice. In 2003, productivity still showed 
negative tendencies, access to technology and productivity resources was limited; 65 percent of 
investment decisions were in the hands of private people. Economic surplus was for the most part in 
the hands of foreign capital and salaried employment was at 50 percent. Discrimination on the basis of 
gender, race and social background prevailed (CEDLA 2003: 13 – 15, 62). Lack of participation by civil 
society in the endeavor of all state reforms has been criticized (Faguet 2005: 5). Even though social 
groups (e.g. indigenous), NGOs and others showed interest in assessing neoliberal policies and their 
impact on Bolivian society, the channels established by the IFIs for this purpose are “unsuitable” 
(CEDLA 2003: 18 – 25). A study of the National Secretariat of Popular Participation revealed that in 80 
percent of the municipalities the monitoring committees did not contribute in writing the five year plans. 
In half of the municipalities none of the responsible groups participated at all (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 
103). Despite this, Faguet, a former  social investment expert of the IBRD in La Paz and faculty 
member of the London School of Economics (LSE), finds the decentralization reforms to have 
benefited most municipalities, the government is now more responsive to local needs (Faguet 2000, 
2000a 2002; 2002a, 2005, 2005a). Another example of scientific approval of hegemonic policies (see 
his CV at Faguet 2006). 
                                                 
69 In 1992, these sums were made up by 56 percent of multilateral sources and 44 from bilateral aid. The largest donor was the 
IADB (23 percent); followed by US-AID (12.1 percent) and the Andean Development Fund (10.3 percent). The largest bilateral 
donor is US-AID (27.5 percent or 86.7 million US-dollars), ranking second is Germany (18.6 percent or 58.9 million US-dollars) 
(Birle 1996: 23). 
70 For detailed figures on Bolivian income and its sources, please see CEDLA (2005).  
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The PGDES spoke to the political culture of Bolivia and aimed at creating ability to reach con-
sensus and compromise and coalitions previously unheard of (such as MNR and ADN; coalition be-
tween ADN and MIR) (Hofmeister 1996: 31).
71 On the other hand, it did just what it had come to pre-
vent: discriminating against certain parts of the population. Despite their failures during the 1980s and 
throughout the “revolution from above”, neoliberal reforms continued to be implemented throughout 
the 1990s. Thus, neoliberal critique reached its height: during the Water War of 2000 in Cochabamba 
and the Gas and Tax War of 2003. 
3.4 Critique at its height: the Neoliberal Wars. A break of hegemony and the basis for a new 
consensus? 
In 1997 Sánchez de Lozadas first administration ended, and former dictator Bánzer became 
president and continued along neoliberal lines. In the 1997 election, some coca growers and 
indigenous candidates gained a few seats in congress, but were not stark enough to be heard. 
Instead, Bánzer allied with the populist party CONDEPA, which had gained votes the MNR and the 
MIR lost. Throughout Bánzer's administration, citizen groups demanded the creation of a Citizen’s 
Council to prepare a constitutional reform. The Council was installed in May 2001. It decreased some 
immunities for politicians, strengthened decentralization, rights around domestic violence those 
household workers. Bolivia sought to be incorporated into the Free-Trade Area of the Americas 
(Assies 2004: 36). The negative effects of the collapse of the Argentine economy severely affected 
Bolivia. 
Bánzer’s alignment with hegemonic powers did not end at the economic level, but went 
further. Particularly Cochabamba suffered from an aggressive coca eradication program (Coca Cero, 
Zero Coca) during this administration, destroying the regional economy. Bánzer promised the US to 
eradicate all coca except 30,000 acres in Los Yungas needed for industrial production. The US did not 
offer compensation to the coca growers. In 2001 illegal coca growing resumed. Simultaneously, 
revenues from hydrocarbons decreased with tax income and many municipalities budgets declined 
(Kohl and Farthing 2006: 109, 111). In response to government policy, indigenous people organized 
around issues, particularly in the new parties, the MAS and the  Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti 
(Indigenous Pachakuti Movement, MIP). They challenged the state’s neoliberal ideology, focusing: 
on the predatory privatization of resources and basic services, and end to forced coca eradication, and pushed for 
greater investments throughout rural Bolivia (…) By freely combining indigenous, nationalist and anti-neoliberal discourses, they 
often incorporated the demands of other groups to broaden their base of support or increase their legitimacy. (Kohl and Farthing 
2006: 112) 
Bolivia’s indigenous movements are cited to be the most radical and powerful in the Americas. 
In recent years their importance increased, even though their identity is based on a social rather than 
ethnic categorization. Land rights have always been an issue of the indigenous movement (e.g. 
groups embarked on a 600 km long march for Dignity and Territory (La Marcha por la Dignidad y el 
Territorio) in July of 1990, with little success though). Indigenous in urban areas mobilized in the so-
called juntas vecinales to press their cities for basic urban services (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 114, 
117). One of the key players in the coca growers and indigenous movement, was Evo Morales, who 
was known in B olivia when he was voted leader of the coca growers federation of El Chapare. 
                                                 
71 MIR opposed the IFI suggestions until the party settled its differences with the ADN. MIR was blamed to lack decisiveness 
and corruption in the past. The ADN helped making Paz Zamora president, despite the long conflict that existed throughout the 
1970s culminating in a helicopter crash by instruction of Bánzer, which bruised Paz Zamora’s face (Hofmeister 1996: 33); Grupo 
de Estudios Historicos writes it was a crash of a small plane in which two people died.  
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Morales, born on 26 October 1959 in the Department of Oruro to Aymaran parents, was elected with a 
72.13 percent majority by population of the Department of Cochabamba (El Deber 2000; Morales 
Ayma 2001: 10).
72 It was through Morales that the issue of coca became linked to the Water War (both 
parts) of 2000 (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 123). Before his involvement with the coca growers federation, 
Morales was member of the Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty 
of the People, ASP), an organization close to the CSUTCB and the Izquierda Unida (United Left, IU), 
which counted on Morales to gain votes in urban and rural areas (El Diario 1997).
73 Morales promised 
to cooperate with Quechua and Aymará and everyone else, including intellectuals, particularly those 
persecuted and tortured during the dictatorships. The ASP changed its name to Instrumento por la 
Soberanía de los Pueblos (Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People), to underline its character as 
a non-traditional party and that is was an agglomeration of CSUTCB, CCB and CBFMBS (La Razón 
1998). Morales was expelled from ASP in March 1999 due to “betrayal” (Unknown 1999). In 2002, 
Morales’ became presidential candidate for the MAS and received 20.9 percent of votes in the elec-
tion. Quispe’s MIP received 6.1 percent and Reyes Villa and the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (New 
Republican Force, NFR) gained 20.9 percent. The MAS occupied 25 percent of national Congress and 
were the largest oppositional party. Quispe is an indigenous activist and neoliberalist critic. He resisted 
the 1996 INRA Law and was a key figure during the Water War, mobilizing campesinos in rural areas. 
During the Gas War in 2003, the Juntas Vecinales of El Alto turned into the most powerful grassroots 
organizations, replacing the coca growers who had held this position 1990s (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 
118; Gente 2000a). Social movements and their leaders were important actors in Bolivia’s “Neoliberal 
Wars” as Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing refer to the Water War of 2000 and the Gas and Tax War 
of 2003 (2006: 109). Both wars centered around the issues of benefiting transnational corporations at 
the cost of Bolivian consumers, in interest of liberalization of the economy and pleasing the IFIs and 
the governments of international donors.  
Privatization plans, particularly for water, are encouraged as part of SAPs or as condition to 
loans or finance supply. These conditions contradict the agreement by the Bonn Conference on Water 
held in December 2001, which states that water privatization “should not be applied as a condition of 
finance by any donors” (Hall and Lobina 2000: 10). The Water War 2000 is therefore only an example 
of many. Perhaps it is so popular, because a representative of the protestors, Oscar Oliveira, traveled 
                                                 
72 Morales and two of his siblings survived, four other siblings died between one and eight years of age. He recalls to have 
always been a fighter. He founded a soccer team when a child, which participated in championships. By selling wool of the 
sheep and lama with assistance of his father (who harvested potatoes), Morales bought soccer balls and uniforms for the team. 
At 16, he was elected technical director of his canton. During the 1980s Morales and his family left to El Chapare. He wanted to 
study journalism in Cochabamba. He quit school after middle school, despite being valedictorian throughout his entire school 
career. In 1981 he was elected secretary for sports in his syndicate, followed by a nomination as syndicate director, and director 
of the federation of the coca growers of the tropic, a post he still holds (Morales Ayma 2001: 11). Morales considered ‘Bánzer 
and he MNR’ the worst politicians of Bolivia (Morales Ayma 2001: 12). On April 10, 2000 Morales declared the amount of his 
property (78,000 US-dollars and half an a cre of coca) before stepping into parliament. Many funds stem from human rights 
awards he received in 1995 and 2000 (Los Tiempos 2002b). 
73 Even though 200 delegates of the ASP congress in Cochabamba voted for Morales, he wanted the direction of the party to 
change before he became their candidate (Los Tiempos 1997). Morales accepted the position on 18 March 1997, after the 
movement decided to campaign with the communist party. Morales promised to fight the neoliberal parties, and to propagate the 
interests of coca growers in development ideas (El Diario 1997a; 1997b; Kohl and Farthing 2006: 122). The ASP organized an 
urban (non-hierarchic) version of itself, the  Asamblea Popular Urbana (APU) and demanded an alternative to neoliberalism 
(Opinión 1997). Organizations such as the APU were founded in the hundreds since 1978, but only eight survived (Opinión 
1997a). On 1 May 1998, the ASP condemned US-anti-drug policy (Opinión 1998). They also asked for wage raises for teachers, 
workers and state employees and criticized unilingual education and that neoliberal policies destroy Bolivian enterprises and 
property. They criticized that development programs benefit a certain few, creating poverty rather than abolishing it. In April 
1998 500 delegates elected Morales president of the ASP (Los Tiempos 1998).  
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to the US and spoke in front of 10,000 protestors in Washington, D.C. in April 2000 who protested the 
IFIs (Opinión 2000h).  
Water services in Cochabamba were (and are again) in the hands of the original municipal 
company Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (Municipal Service of Drinking Water 
and Sewer Systems, SEMAPA). Prior to Aguas del Tunari (Waters of the Tunari) being in charge, 
SEMAPA insufficiently provided the city with water for over 40 years. Particularly rural areas suffered. 
There only 27 percent of the population have access to drinking water. Having visited the city of 
Cochabamba many times in her life since childhood, the author can confirm that water is an issue, 
particularly for the poorer population who do not have the privilege of an water tank which automati-
cally fills itself when water is available again (Abendroth 2004: 9; Peredo Beltrán 2004: 15-17). Fur-
thermore, SEMAPA lost half of its profit due to broken measurement-machinery and pipes. Poor peo-
ple pay more for less water which is additionally of questionable quality. The first privatization attempt 
of SEMAPA was made in 1996, after the PGDES became law during the first Goni administration 
(Abendroth 2004: 8, 10; Gebhardt 2002: 29). 
Throughout the 1990s, the problem of adequate access to water continued, creating the so-
called ‘Well War.’ The rural population opposed w ell-drilling, but was forcefully oppressed by the 
Bánzer government (Abendroth 2004: 12). In early 1999, as the government of Cochabamba still 
decided which company should receive the lucrative water privatization deal. Social groups gathered 
in late 1999 and formed the Coordinadora por la defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coordinator for the 
Defense of the Water and Life,  Coordinadora), to monitor the (covert) privatization process. The 
Coordinadora was most the important participant in the riots and was supported by Morales 
(Abendroth 2004: 12; Gebhardt 2002: 29; Kohl and Farthing 2006: 122; Presencia 2000: Los Tiempos 
2000). Morales support for the movement began on 20 September 2000, when he demanded 
president Bánzers renunciation. The coca growers were more involved in this part of the Water War 
than during early stages (CEDIB 2000;  La Razón 2000a). Morales was almost a rrested on 27 
September 2000 ( Opinión  2000i). Reyes Villa (NFR) was mayor of Cochabamba, had also been 
president of SEMAPA and the NFR was part of the coalition with the ruling ADN (Abendroth 2004: 14). 
The second privatization attempt of SEMAPA followed in September of 1999. It was sold to 
Aguas del Tunari, a consortium owned by US-based Bechtel (one of the worlds largest construction 
companies), which avoided to pay taxes by residing in the Netherlands (in form of a mail box). Pro-
tests against privatization began as soon as Aguas del Tunari were awarded a 40 year concession for 
the water and sanitation system of the city and water tariffs increased by up to 200 percent to cover 
the costs of privatization and Misicuni (a dam; 2,030 litre per second, enough to supply 2,400 ha with 
Water and generate 210 GW electricity p.a. (Los Tiempos 2006)). BNP Paribas, a French bank, sug-
gested that the realization of the Misicuni project (building a dam in the region; the most expensive of 
all options to provide the city with water) should be linked to the privatization of SEMAPA. The IFIs 
supported this suggestion, but thought it too costly. An article in Los Tiempos cites Misicuni to have 
been the cheapest of options, with 10 cents (US-dollar) per m³, whereas the alternative project, Corani 
would have amounted to 59 cents per m³ (Arretia 2000). Either way, the IFIs demanded the project be 
paid by consumers and should not receive subsidies from the state (Abendroth 2004: 15; Peredo Bel-
trán 2004: 40). BNP Paribas wrote the terms of reference for privatization, outlining two tariff increases  
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of 20 percent each: one upon beginning and one at the end of the project, before it would enter the 
commercial phase (Abendroth 2004: 14; Kohl and Farthing 2006: 120). These terms of reference were 
illegal under Bolivian procurement law. Part of the Aguas del Tunari-contract envisioned reducing wa-
ter availability at first and did not aim at achieving 100 percent of water-availability until in 36 years 
after contract-signing (Abendroth 2004: 20f, 24). Protests criticized the lack of information on the con-
tract, particularly during contract singing in September 1999. Only parts of the contract were revealed 
after protests in 2000. To legalize the privatization, Law 2029 (Ley de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado, 
Law for Drinking Water and Sewage) was passed on 9 December 1999. The Coordinadora contested 
the law as made water was an economic good (Peredo Beltrán 2004: 6). The law excluded societal 
aspects in its draft and was developed according to market principles. The orientation of tariffs on the 
US Consumer Price Index was heavily criticized by peasant associations in margin areas in the south 
of Cochabamba (CSUTCB), who tied their demands to other issues (such as the INRA) and this orien-
tation is in fact ridiculous when taking into account the large income gap between the average Bolivian 
and US-citizen (Abendroth 2004: 22; Peredo Beltrán 2004: 6; Pulso 2000; Presencia 2000a). Due to 
the privatization water costs increased and eventually amounted to 22 percent of monthly wages of the 
average male and a third of the average female (Hall and Lobina 2002: 16; Peredo Beltrán 2004: 8; 
Kohl and Farthing 2006: 121).
74 A new alignment with the water system climbed to 450 US-dollars 
(average per capita income p.a. lies at 1,000 US-dollars); closure and re-activation cost nearly 15 US-
dollars each (Abendroth 2004: 22). Bechtel (2006) blames the price increases on adapted consumer 
behaviour of Cochabamban citizens as Aguas del Tunari amplified water availability by 30 percent.  
The IBRD, the IMF and the IADB supported the privatization of SEMAPA and the building of 
Misicuni. Privatization was a condition to debt-relief and toward more loans. During this time, the IBRD 
supported at least seven projects geared at protecting and regulating privatization initiatives 
(Abendroth 2004: 16). As previously mentioned, the IFIs first opposed the Misicuni-project, because it 
was costly, but had no objection to the Bolivian population carrying these costs; an insolence. The IFIs 
also supported Law 2029 and bought stocks of Aguas del Illimani (Waters of the Illimani, the former 
municipal water company of La Paz), which has problems remaining profitable and providing the poor 
with basic sanitation (Hall and Lobina 2002: 6; Peredo Beltrán 2004: 23; Arretia 2000). Fortunate for 
Aguas del Illimani, there is no pressure to extend their services to the poor, as the contract determines 
that services be rendered based on the paying ability of customers rather than basing these decisions 
on public policy. El Alto residents consume very little water, ‘harming’ Aguas del Illimani (Suez-owned) 
bottom line and disappointing the company in their investment, leading to protests in April 2002 by the 
population (Hall and Lobina 2002: 6). The distance of the IFIs toward the privatization projects can not 
be verified. They benefited from and encouraged the events both in Cochabamba and other Bolivian 
cities (Peredo Beltrán 2004: 11, 13f, 18-22). 
Protests against the new law and privatization plans began on 28 December 1999 and contin-
ued throughout January of 2000, with road blockades. After water was privatized and price raises were 
announced, a general strike broke out in January 2000, fights the police could not control. The Coor-
dinadora published a manifest saying rights would be fought and not begged for. Bolivia’s central gov-
                                                 
74 For a study on the effects of water privatization in the Cochabamba area on women and women’s involvement in the Water 
War, please see Peredo Beltrán 2004.  
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ernment proposed a last offer of only one 20 percent tariff increase, sparking more protests (Aben-
droth 2004: 26f). In February, the population in rural areas surrounding Cochabamba, La Paz and 
Santa Cruz began blocking roads. At the end of February, the Coordinadora left the negotiation table 
with the government, as they were provided with insufficient information, particularly details on fi-
nances. Protests increased and parts of the contract were published. Journalists are cited to have had 
problems deciphering the contract as they lacked legal skills. The guild of economists of Cochabamba 
questioned the legitimacy of the concession and the concession-takers presence in the country after 
analyzing the contract (Abendroth 2004: 27). It was revealed that the conception of Misicuni took up 
67 percent of the total contract, which the Coordinadora criticized as catering to the IFIs (Opinión 
2000e; Opinión 2000g). In March 2000, the Coordinadora held a voluntary popular referendum, show-
ing that 99 percent of participating voters rejected the privatization and the changes that came with it 
(Kohl and Farthing 2006: 121; Opinión 2000f).  
Fights turned bloody on 4 and 5 April. The military told Bánzer it no longer wanted to confront 
its own people, upon which more military was sent from La Paz, particularly after one person died in 
the riots by use of strong ammunition by the government. Simultaneously the police threatened to 
initiate a strike, and received a 50 percent wage raise as appeasement (Gebhardt 2002: 33). Morales, 
congressional representative of Cochabamba, questioned the violence on part of the government 
(Presencia 2000). The church mediated in the conflict unsuccessfully. The archbishop was dissatisfied 
with the government, after leaders of the  Coordinadora were arrested on their way home from a 
meeting with the government that was cancelled. These leaders were warned by the catholic church. 
Some obliged and hid in a church. Other Coordinadora leaders were kidnapped (Abendroth 2004: 29; 
Opinión 2000d; La Razón 2000). The archbishop declared himself ‘voluntary prisoner’ and negotiated 
for the release of the leaders in vain (Abendroth 2004: 28). The church’s involvement in the Water 
War, shows not all of the Bolivian elite accepted neoliberal hegemony, perhaps indicating a break of 
neoliberal hegemony then. Support by the church might have emphasized the discipline of the rioters: 
not one store was looted (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 122). On 7 April 2000, the government announced 
the contract with Aguas de Tunari was going to be resolved. 
On 8 April 2000, the sister of one of the Coordinadora members in hiding proposed elevating 
flags in every house, which within minutes many did, particularly after the press negatively reported on 
the government, one newspaper (presumably  Los Tiempos) titling “The government lies and 
oppresses.” On 9 April, the riots became vehement and fire was set to public buildings and vehicles. 
The military replaced fake with real munitions and set up snipers around the central Plaza. Areas in 
Cochabamba with many TV-sets were cut off the electricity circulation, particularly the mountain on 
which radio and TV antennas stand, capping live media for hours (Gebhardt 2002: 34). 
The concession to  Aguas del Tunari was terminated on 20 April 2000, whose investment 
amounted to one million US-dollars (according to a government source). The company may have 
planned to finance Misicuni solely on the basis of tariff increases (Abendroth 2004: 19; Peredo Beltrán 
2004: 7). Aguas del Tunari expected a 64 million US-dollars income every year, amounting to 2426,2 
million US-dollars over the 40 years of contract (70,000 US-dollars per day) (Gente 2000). Since then, 
Bechtel, owner of half the stocks at Aguas del Tunari, sued the Bolivian government for a 25 million 
US-dollars compensation (three times the original investment sum) with the IBRDs International Cen- 
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ter for Settlement of Investment Disputes in November 2001, after having sought and failed to receive 
compensation in July from the government directly (Fritz 2004: 5). The government still states there 
will be no public subsidy for water services in Cochabamba, that all burdens will be placed on the con-
sumers, an indication that no lessons were learnt (Abendroth 2004: 16; Los Tiempos 2000a). The 
government tried implementing a new law (2066) which grants the public the right to opinion on tariffs. 
This was criticized by the IFIs and donor governments. By the end of 2003, 10 drafts of this law ex-
isted and no decision had been made. The critique of privatization process continued throughout the 
year 2000. The result were 20 dead, 335 wounded, 152 arrests, 26 (recorded) cases of torture, 2 blind 
and one missing person (Abendroth 2004: 32, 29). 
Bánzer stepped down in August of 2001, due to cancer. Jorge Quiroga followed him as 
president. Quiroga suffered the anger of social movements, when he promised land tenure rights to 
landlords who had received property during the García Meza dictatorship. Indigenous groups then 
founded the  Movimiento Sin Tierra (Movement without Land, MST) and were joined by the coca 
growers (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 124). Goni won the 2002 election with just 22 percent and became 
president a second time. Assies cites protests in Bolivia to arise at regular intervals since the Water 
War, proving that democracy is not yet implemented, but that “armed neoliberalism” rules the country; 
a concept that involves social militarization and the criminalization of protests (Seoane 2003 in Assies 
2004: 26f). Thus, resistance to neoliberal policies continued, climaxing at the Gas War.  Outside 
pressure for Goni was high when he took office: the coca eradication had to continue, as the US 
warned and the IBRD was supporting the Bechtel’s claim for compensation (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 
125f). The conflict between Bechtel and Bolivia was settled in January 2006 with no compensation 
being paid from either side. Bechtel then withdrew complaint before the IBRDs International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute (Bechtel 2006).  
The MAS legitimacy grew in eyes of the Bolivian population. Particularly after the MNR, MIR 
and UCS ignored MAS delegates, who held one fourth of the seats in Congress during the second 
Goni administration. They did not recognized demands by the MAS (or solidarity with rioters) might be 
legitimate popular goals (Assies 2004: 36). After being ignored in official discourse, Morales promised 
to take the discussion to the streets (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 125). Morales left his post as director of 
the coca growers in February 2002, and was declared the official presidential candidate in March 2002 
(Los Tiempos 2002). Morales linked the coca growers situation to the problems of the agricultural in-
dustry in Cochabamba, claiming both needed a different economic model, as “this one is inhumane” 
(Opinión 2002). His involvement in social unrests continued (e.g. throughout the Neoliberal Wars), In 
June 2002, Morales was asked to pay 25.000 US-dollars to compensate damages to a hotel done by 
a blockade in 2001 (La Prensa 2002). In July 2002, Morales stated that he would not form a coalition 
with the MNR or NFR, and that he would combat the “pacts of corruption, perversion, nepotism and 
negotiation between the representatives of the parties” (La Patria 2002). The MNR and ADN said 
nothing on his nomination as presidential candidate for the MAS ( El Diario 2002). In April 2002, 
Morales proposed a bank for the poor with no interest rates and the cutting the politicians salaries (Los 
Tiempos 2002a). Morales campaign was financed by the coca growers. 200 syndicates gave 50 lbs of 
coca each (La Patria 2002a). Morales popularity increased throughout 2002, when he was asked to 
leave parliament on the basis of accusations of a newspaper article from 2 October 2002 and of which  
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he declared himself to be innocent (UPS Editorial 2002: 4). He was accused of authoring crimes 
against uniformed police and military in the Chapare, which occurred during a riot against Presidential 
Decree 26.415 which “closed the remaining legal coca market in the Chapare” (Kohl and Farthing 
2006: 125). He offered to step back, should proof be shown for the allegations against him on 3 No-
vember 2000 (Opinión 2000; El Potosí 2000). Many campesino delegates supported Morales, reject-
ing that their country was only governed by whites in suits (Unknown 2000). Morales was invited to the 
ethical commission of Congress 24 hours before the interview would take place. The commission 
never proved the accusations but another day later Morales was expelled from parliament. Bánzer and 
Goni both voted against him (UPS Editorial 2002: 8). Morales has claimed to be anti-drug-trafficking 
and has criticized the lack of alternatives for coca growers (Morales Ayma 2000a). His rivalry with 
Felipe Quispe is prominent since the split of the CSUTCB and the MAS in October 2000 (Opinión 
2000b). The MAS upheld the road block without the CSUTCB despite the state of emergency and 
continued demanding the de-militarization of El Chapare (Fernández 2000; La Prensa 2000). The 
MAS asked for a solution to all economic problems caused by Coca Cero (Opinión 2000c). Morales 
referred to the Chapare as the gist of Bolivian poverty (Morales Ayma 2000a) and the government, the 
parties and the NGOs should be fought in order to maintain sovereignty. He said the poor need a party 
of Quechuas and Aymarás, a party speaking truths (Morales Ayma 1995: 3) and is anti-neoliberal 
(Escobar 1997). Morales propagated commercializing coca (not eradication). His anti-US-imperialism-
attitude made him popular and explains his success in the 2002 elections which gained the MAS 27 of 
130 seats in Congress. 
  The riots of 2003, similar to the Water War, opposed the handing over of the countries largest 
resource to transnational corporations. During the first part of the Gas and Tax war, protests in Febru-
ary opposed a tax hike that was pressured onto Goni by the IMF as part of efforts to reduce the na-
tional deficit of the GDP from 8.5 to 5.5 percent. Protests continued in October and ousted Goni (Kohl 
and Farthing 2006: 126). As the PGDES overall, the privatization of the hydrocarbons sector was criti-
cized by the Bolivian population and labeled as a ‘garage sale of the national patrimony,’ particularly 
after reforms failed to bring the promised growth (Assies 2004: 28). The amount of gas in the reserves 
increased miraculously during privatization, from 6.6 trillion ft.³ in 1996 to 52.3 trillion ft.³ in 2002, mak-
ing Bolivia the largest owner of gas in southern Latin America. The IFIs quickly made the “monetariza-
tion” of these riches a condition for further loans to Bolivia; in 1999 Bolivia began exporting gas to 
Brazil and the hydrocarbons sector became the most dynamic, accounting for 21.6 percent of total 
exports (99.7 million US-dollars) in 2003. (Assies 2004: 29). Given the great energy need in the US 
and Mexico, Bolivia decided to export Liquefied Natural Gas to generate electricity and gave the Sem-
pra Energy consortium (REPSOL, British Petrol, British Gas) a concession. Gas was to be shipped 
from either a Chilean or Peruvian port. The project was estimated to bring revenues of 310 million US-
dollars p.a. but required  investment of 5,000 million US-dollars (of which 1,800 million US-dollars 
would be invested in Bolivia). The issue of access to the sea was brought up again, hoping to use the 
project as leverage to gain Bolivia’s territory back, particularly since Chile needed gas (Assies 2004: 
29). It was also criticized that some companies only paid 70 cent per 1,000
75 British Thermic Units 
(BTU), but Brazil paid 1.30 US-dollars for the same amount. Processing facilities were to be located in 
                                                 
75 Other sources say it is one million BTU, which is more likely (Weitzman 2006).  
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Bolivia to generate employment, prioritizing their population and industry. Quiroga did not succeed in 
striking a deal prior to the June 2002 elections. The MAS and Morales opposed export through Chile, 
a position many agreed to, after income taxes for citizens increased in February 2003. The offices of 
the MNR, MIR and NFR were set on fire, ministries were looted and 30 people died. It was obvious the 
government had already decided to export gas through Chile (perhaps through Patillos). The issue of 
the access to the sea is bound play a role in Bolivian politics, particularly in connection to the issue of 
gas as Mexico and the US remain interested in Bolivia’s riches. Morales, Oscar Olivera and Ramírez 
Lopez, a retired general, stated that preparations for the construction of a pipeline toward Chile were 
underway; leading to a proposal by the MAS and the NFR to hold a referendum on the issue (Assies 
2004: 29f). The population in the Department of Tarija (which holds 85 percent of gas reserves) rose 
to defend exportation plans, while Goni’s popularity dwindled to a mere nine percent, after the COB 
announced it opposed export through Chile as well. The MAS declared the Gas War in August of 
2003, explaining that all proposals had failed and announcing protests in which alternative proposals 
were to be presented. The Aymará population was involved, after one of their community leaders, 
Edwin Huampo, was accused of killing cattle rustlers and arrested. Another Aymará leader, Felipe 
Quispe, organized a hunger strike around Huampos arrest and added the issue of gas to his list (but 
voiced no solidarity with the MAS). Quispe was supported by 1,000 people at the Radio Station of San 
Gabriel in El Alto and roads between Lake Titicaca and La Paz were blocked, trapping hundreds of 
tourists (Assies 2004: 30). Protests spread to Cochabamba, Sucre, Oruro and Potosí. At the same 
time, Congress decided new minister nominations of the Supreme and the Constitutional Court, the 
Judiciary Council and a new Human Rights Ombudsman. The so-called Defensoria del Pueblo (De-
fense of the People) post was held by Ana María Romero since the post was first created in 1997. 
Romero repeatedly criticized the governments for violently repressing protests (e.g. during the Water 
War), which gained her much prestige in the population (Assies 2004: 30; La Razón 2000a). As pro-
tests continued, on 13 October, vice-president Carlos Mesa withdrew his support for the president. 
Economy minister Jorge Torres (MIR) resigned. Romero called out a hunger strike on 15 October 
2003 in which human rights advocates, intellectuals and NGO workers participated (similar protests 
brought down Bánzer in 1978). On 17 October, after Mesa called for a congressional meeting, Reyes 
Villa (NFR) and Paz Zamora (MIR, who repeatedly backed Goni) suggested the president step down, 
in response to the public pressure. Goni fled in a hurry, not reading the resignation letter himself (As-
sies 2004: 25). Carlos Mesa became president. Mesa announced plans for a Constituent Assembly in 
which society could express their opinions concerning the use of natural resources and land, democ-
ratic participation and the re-founding of Bolivia (Assies 2004: 37). During his presidency, Mesa prom-
ised to raise corporate tax from 18 to 50 percent by revising of the hydrocarbons law, but he continued 
along the lines of the previous 20 years of neoliberal policy due to US pressure (Kohl and Farthing 
2006: 130). Mesa tried including campesino demands in his program, despite difficulties. His largest 
accomplishment was the 2004 gas referendum (on the issue of whether to export gas through Chile or 
Peru). Mesa stepped down in June 2005, leaving his vice president, Eduardo Rodríguez to hold elec-
tions within 180 days. Evo Morales was elected in December 2005. 
As outlined in the first three chapters of this thesis, neoliberal policy always implemented from 
above and outside the country. As the protests to the first and second generation of neoliberal reforms  
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show, many groups in the population opposed neoliberalism, as they knew the changes would deterio-
rate their life standards. No one has ever been compensated for these losses. This confirms that neo-
liberal hegemony as Cox envisioned it existed and that it absorbed counter-hegemonic ideas. Social 
movements were widely supported by the (rural) population. Bolivia’s elite is to blame for this devel-
opment, as they continuously ignored the indigenous, poor and rural points of view, even when these 
were legitimately part of the government. The elite underestimated the power of the new social forces, 
particularly during the Neoliberal Wars. Opposition to neoliberal policies gained only short-term results 
and had no long-term effects. The election of Morales’ in December 2005 manifested that more people 
realized that neoliberal policies will not solve Bolivia’s structural problems It is astonishing how oblivi-
ous the elite was to growing threat to their power by social movements. They might have thought 
every other social movement was as debilitated as the COB. 
The fear of the MAS and Morales by the elite r eaches amusing heights. Particularly the 
Oriente views him with tremor, seeing a threat in every decree and intention. Most likely they are afraid 
of vengeance for treating millions of people badly for decades. There is no indication for this type of 
behavior though. Rather it seems as if justice is being done through peaceful means such as the land 
reform (giving unused arable land to the squatting and landless). The nationalization of the gas 
reserves might finally allow Bolivia, as opposed to transnational corporations, to profit from these 
riches. Reforms by the MAS do not prove that a change of neoliberal consensus in elite discourse took 
place. Proof or rejection of the h ypothesis around which this entire thesis centers is provided in 
Chapter 5, which presents the newspaper analysis. To further explore why the elite fears Morales the 
next chapter discusses relevant topics in contemporary Bolivian politics and economy. The author 
follows the preceding history of Bolivia with sections on the issue of the uninhibited access to the sea, 
coca and cocaine, after a brief discussion on political culture in Bolivia.  
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4 Topics of Relevance in contemporary Bolivian politics and economy 
Cox said hegemonies and societies can be explained on a historic level. After an outline of Bolivia’s 
(neoliberal) history, the author now considers four factors influencing contemporary Bolivian politics 
and economy. She explains political culture, the conditions of life of the rural, indigenous, poor and 
uneducated and the issues of coca/cocaine and access to the sea. 
4.1 A discourse on political culture in Bolivia 
Politics in Bolivia has always been a means of getting rich and the corrupt character of the state apparatus has from the 
beginning been a trademark of the institutional history of this country. (José Luis Tejada Sorzano in Mansilla 1987: 110) 
Bolivia is the most dysfunctional democracy in Latin America. Poor political practice, and lack of 
collective consciousness left the country at the same time as prosperity did and are to blame for 
Bolivia’s problems additionally to its land-locked position (Mansilla 1987: 83). Private industry’s 
influence in politics (and corruption in general) is vast, and has helped dictators such as Bánzer. In 
turn, they e xpanded the state apparatus and created employment for the bribers. The concept of 
Caudillo (leader) is firmly integrated in Bolivian political culture:  
[T]he observations of Bolivian and Latin American parties are true: dominance of a caudillo, lack of inner-party 
democracy, little contact to the population, the strive for power and benefit, little programmatic profile and opportunistic 
tendencies to not talk about the problem of corruption, are constant companions to the parties development. (Hofmeister 1996: 
32) 
In Caudillismo, issues are not resolved by negotiation. This explains the success of the military 
and their support for dictatorships: the armies honor, moral and value codex excludes rationality, 
prudence and honesty. Caudillismo exited within the MNR and it is why the power and size of the state 
expanded steadily and without being questioned after the revolution. Not criticizing authority is an 
inheritance of Inca culture and remains an integral part of Bolivian society. It has benefited the 
conquerors and governments (as outlined in Section 3.1).
76 Similar moral and religious values can be 
traced from Simon Bolivar to Fidel Castro: the masses think of rulers as educators. Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro was the most important caudillo of the 1900s, more so than Paz Zamora or Goni. The 
century-long use of corruption by the elite to maintain power created a “’natural’ distrust of 
governments by the population. Still structures such as the state, society, party, community and 
bureaucracy are highly respected (Mansilla 1987: 92f, 94, 98, 100, 21ff). 
Octavio Paz once compared the Spanish-American civilization to a building that is 
simultaneously a cloister, a fortress and a palace; created to survive, but not to change (Mansilla 
1987: 34, 40, 127). To communist Catoira Marín the 1952 Revolution is a farce. The MNR found their 
ideal habitat in capitalism, became part of the elite and bred a second and third generation of 
bourgeois, betraying the Bolivian worker. These three generations (dispersed among several political 
parties) are united in the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (Federation of Private 
Entrepreneurs of Bolivia), which he refers to as “luciferesque” (Catoira Marín 1994: 87). Bolivian 
workers cannot expect change of the system or an improvement of their livelihood from the MNR:
77  
Our intellectuals pretend to be politicians and only talk about economic growth as if the enrichment of a few privileged 
is synonymous with the development and progress of an entire people. (Catoira Marín 1994: 112) 
                                                 
76 Even in universities critical thinking and analysis is absent; proven by the little research that is conducted and pedagogical 
methods of learning by heart (Mansilla 1987: 24, 29). 
77 Utopia lies in socialism and will be achieved by a class struggle and class consciousness by the Bolivian workers and their 
party. The struggle should involve one coordinated effort, because the bourgeoisie will destroy small measures by means which 
it deems necessary: by military or civil measures, social democratic ideas or being overtly neoliberal (and pro-US) and through 
playing with the worker “like a cat with the rat while the situation of the Bolivian population becomes ever so desperate” (Catoira 
Marín 1994: 19, 26).  
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The workers struggle must be carried out in three phases: preparation, execution and evalua-
tion, particularly in Santa Cruz. Even the miners struggle was absorbed by and subdued to the MNR. 
The COB contributed to the downfall of the workers movement through its strive for pluralism (Catoira 
Marín 1994: 27, 31, 49). Catoira Marín admonishes that hunger strikes by workers have yielded no 
result, but that without workers, there is no production and without production there is no society 
(1994: 59).  
The MNR replaced a dialogue within the elite with enthusiasm for elite ideals in the masses 
after the Revolution (Mansilla 1987: 108). The MNR revolutionaries became rich and used illegal 
means to accumulate their fortunes (Catoira Marín 1994: 68, 70). Anger is comprehensible: members 
of the MNR were involved in all military coups since 1964 (Hofmeister 1996: 32). Post revolution, the 
size and power of the state grew: 
Politics has become a lucrative business in Bolivia (…) yesterday [the MNR] claimed to be socialists, today they are 
neoliberals without blushing from shame. (Catoira Marín 1994: 99) 
Thus, many professionals chose to work for the state rather than for private business, proving 
a correlation between a larger public administration and the growth of the urban population (Catoira 
Marín 1994: 98). The MNR is more provincial than cosmopolitan. Its ideology favors clientilism, pater-
nalism, economic and technical progress and is anti-imperial. Principles of freedom and individual 
rights are disadvantaged in their political program. Highly qualified young urban citizens benefited best 
from post-revolutionary politics: 80 percent of state employees work in La Paz, Cochabamba and 
Santa Cruz; explaining a simultaneous loss of work force in the primary sector (agrarian and mining). 
The tertiary sector grew as well
78, but no equivalent growth in GDP was noted (Mansilla 1987: 106, 
118f, 123). Their reforms profited middle class companies who had close ties to the MNR. Bolivian 
industrialists/entrepreneurs are opportunists, who owe their success to state support (and to involve-
ment with the military). They did not internalize bourgeois ideology, but inherited the goals and ideals 
of the social, cultural and political standards of the old, land owning aristocracy without questioning 
them. This is how urbanization, industrialization and the expanding of the middle class after the revolu-
tion, did not contribute to democracy or the independence of the nation (Mansilla 1987: 37f, 59, 109). 
The COB, another factor to consider, catered to leftist needs and lacked revolutionary direction and 
failed to change events so that they would improve livelihoods of many (Lagos 1994: 22). Assies 
speaks of a three party system in Bolivia. The MNR, the MIR and the ADN each earn between 16 and 
30 percent in the elections and then enter into coalition with one another, centering negotiations 
around the distribution of minister posts across the parties rather than programmatic issues. This is 
why little of the concerns from the lower social classes are heard ‘above’ (Assies 2004: 32). 
The power of the state grew in post-revolutionary Bolivia. The revolution reforms exemplify the 
undemocratic structures of the country. None of the changes were approved by parliament, they were 
not even handed to the legislative branch for revision. Rather the MNR forced modifications upon the 
country. The habit of deciding on important issues without consulting with parliament remained a habit 
for decades to come.
79 More importantly, this practice was never criticized, questioned or noted by the 
opposition or anyone else (Mansilla 1987: 102). Unsurprisingly, the UCS and CONDEPA received 
                                                 
78 64 percent of La Paz work force was employed there in 1977. 
79 Examples are: prohibiting the union movement and political parties, making changes to civil, penal, family and trade laws.  
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much support after their founding. Their appeal was tied to their charismatic leaders. After their 
deaths, many supporters drifted to the MAS and other parties in later elections, as these parties 
shared the populist discontent for the neoliberal system (Assies 2004: 32).  
Octavio Paz criticized intellectuals (MNR) of Bolivia for using rationality and sensibility as a 
weapon to defend known structures rather than exploring those unknown (Paz 1982 in Mansilla 1987: 
113). Similarly, Catoira Marín claims foreign company owners will not develop Bolivia which sends its 
‘degenerate ideology’ separate from our life style and customs (Catoira Marín 1994: 111). Goods are 
exported from Bolivia and made into final products for re-importation. Bolivia is forced to live from 
international charity: “Which brain do they speak of when referring to the intellectual sector?” he asks 
(Catoira Marín 1994: 110). Catoira Maríns words may be radical, but they are legitimate, given that 
Bolivia is not yet a full democracy, but spoken of as a democradura (word game using both democracy 
and dictatorship in one term) in which neoliberal policies and demands are forcefully implemented by 
the  government. Oppositional demands are not even considered when violence is used as in the 
Water and Gas conflicts (see Section 3.4) (Assies 2004: 33).  
Another factor playing into the poverty and indefinite struggle of the Bolivian population is the 
discrimination of the indigenous (up to 70 percent of the population) and the failure of the governments 
and elites to allow the masses to enter the educational system, as the following section depicts. 
4.2 Low social mobility, the education system, the indigenous, the poor, the rural population 
and the elite 
“Indeed since the [1953 land reform] campesinos have brought more land under the plow and, since the early 1970s, some 70 
percent of the households have also adopted the use of chemical fertilizer and pesticides for potato cropping. This has 
inevitably forced campesinos into more intense participation in markets and heightened dependency on credit (…) Campesinos 
also purchase more products now than they did formerly. Notably, the buy chemical inputs and agro-industrial commodities such 
as flour, sugar, animal fat, cooking oil, macaroni, sugar-cane alcohol, and rice (…) vegetables and fruit (and things) they do not 
grow themselves (as well as…) clothing, school equipment and medicine” (Lagos 1994: 67). 
Investment in human capital (education) heightens the chances for a society’s development 
(Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 9). Throughout Bolivia’s history, the elites neglected the rural, poor and 
indigenous people in all spectrums of social, political, economic and cultural life, particularly in the 
education system. The following section shows certain aspects of B olivian society, such as the 
situation of the indigenous and their concept of development. It also shows how the poor are kept 
poor, regardless of whether in material or educational form (particularly in rural areas) and depicts the 
relationship between the masses and the elite. Also, the poor have been deprived of their cultural 
identity. As will be shown keeping the masses uneducated was a ‘strategy’ of the Bolivian 
governments (Revollo Fernández 2004: 68). Without consideration for these factors, it is impossible to 
understand Bolivian politics and its actors, underlining Cox’s and Gramsci’s idea of perception of 
societal processes. 
A study by Andersen (2001) show that the consequence of neglecting the educational system 
is low social mobility, which creates and upholds (like a vicious cycle) dead ends for the poor, rural 
and indigenous people on societal, cultural, political and economic levels. Bolivia has the lowest social 
mobility in Latin America due to the education system, because people marry only within their own 
social class, because of the level of urbanization and sexism (Andersen 2001: 7, 9; 2002). According 
to him, low social mobility is responsible for the failure of the structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
and the low effect of growth on poverty. Low social mobility benefits the structure in which social 
mobility is caused vice versa. In Andersen’s words:  
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Poor people have very little incentive to study hard and work hard, if they know that the likelihood that it will improve 
their socio-economic status is low. Rich people do not have very good incentives either, since they were born rich and know that 
they will remain rich no matter how they spend their time. In order to provide good incentives for hard work and entrepreneurial 
activity, countries need a certain level of social mobility and numerous examples of poor people who have made great advances 
due to hard work and ingenuity. (2001: 17) 
Perhaps Andersen should consider that the results (in terms of success and money) of poor 
people’s work is not as ‘fruitful’ and viewed as ‘hard work’ because the (low) value attributed to their 
labor. The depreciated value of workers toil is a major factor to keeping the poor in place (or the 
uneducated poor). Furthermore, poor people cannot achieve the amount of education so that they can 
get jobs which will earn them more money; they are busy surviving. The higher the education of a 
person, the higher his or her income will be. Most poor, indigenous and rural children quit school at an 
early age – due to economic need and not, as Andersen thinks, out of laziness. One cannot speak of 
“little incentive” but should refer to a structural lack of opportunity to improve one’s socio-economic 
status. Until today, the elite shapes society as that they (and neoliberal hegemony) can stay in power. 
From the founding of the Republic in 1825 to 1900, the access to education for the masses or 
the implementation of the rights of the indigenous experienced no significant progress. Lifting the 
feudal system was never considered by the elite, as they profited from it. The oligarchic elite believed 
that the indigenous did not need education, but just a basic level of schooling to integrate them into 
civilized society (Cordova de Hernichel 2000: 31, 33).
80 The state continued discrimination between 
1920 and 1930, through the castellanisation measure, which prohibited schools to teach any language 
but Spanish. Students and teachers of indigenous schools, who functioned in the underground and 
taught both native languages and Spanish, were threatened, attacked and hurt.
81 These underground 
schools are pioneers in demanding a bilingual, intercultural education system (Cordova de Hernichel 
2000: 35). 
So-called ‘core-schools’ were implemented in rural areas after 1930 (the prime example is 
Warisata).
82 These core-schools were characterized by vertical and horizontal strategies which 
integrated them into their community and whose curriculum was individually and d emocratically 
adapted to the social, cultural, regional (tropic or highland) and economic needs and abilities of the 
community (assisting students, teachers and all of the village members, including women and elderly). 
Throughout the 1940s, these schools were closed, eliminated and prohibited by will of the Bolivian 
elite, their students were incarcerated or murdered (Cordova de Hernichel 2000: 51). The state 
presented a new educational code in January 1955 (Codigo de la Educación Boliviana), said to be 
based on the core- school concept. The new plan did not include the key pedagogic elements of the 
Warisata-system, as these were considered ‘dangerous.’ The new educational plan was a “mere” 
alphabetization (castellanisation) effort for the indigenous,
83 instrumentalizing Warisata for government 
goals (Cordova de Hernichel 2000: 52). Only in 1983 the bilingual school system was re-allowed in 
Bolivia (Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 65). 
                                                 
80 A law from 11 November 1905 expressed the wish to support education measures for indigenous people, an endeavour which 
failed due to the lack of capacity (teachers and experts) and a national pedagogic concept. 
81 Only the bilingual school Bartolomé de las Casas received a connivance. In 1942 opposition to indigenous schools escalated, 
leading to the death of the most important indigenous chiefs, who were students at Bartolomé de las Casas. 
82 The ‘core school’ system ensured students stayed in the region and stopped urban migration. Even though these self-
suppliant, bilingual schools, which integrated traditional and modern systems of production, were in many ways beneficial to the 
communities and to their quality of life, they did not survive. The schools geared at activating the indigenous population politi-
cally and culturally. The high financial burdens placed on them by the government contributed its part to their fall (Cordova de 
Hernichel 2000: 45). 
83 70 percent of total Bolivian population as illiterate (90 percent in rural areas).  
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The feudal structures within Bolivia remained until the 1952 Revolution, which included a fairly 
successful alphabetization campaign (in Spanish, of course) through the educational reform. After 
1955, the government demanded an assimilatory school policy, oriented according to the European 
and US-American civilization model (Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 64). The MNR, back in the government of 
the 1950s, only permitted using the indigenous language to assist the castellanisation. By 1976 ‘only’ 
32 percent of the population was illiterate (Cordova de Hernichel 2000: 53). Indigenous efforts for own 
education were resisted by the government. The indigenous cultures have shown almost magic sur-
vival skills of their culture and language throughout modernization. The many radio stations of the 
country contribute to the conservation of Quechua and Aymará, many of which broadcast in native 
tongues. After 1952 the education system was placed under control of the nation-wide organization of 
teachers. Pedagogic schools were founded and a job was guaranteed to all graduates. Hopes were 
high and the teachers promised themselves a better future, as the society expected thorough 
schooling. The population backed the teachers movement without questioning quality, means and 
usefulness of education. Consequently, the teachers union (part of the COB) dominated the education 
apparatus, in which political and economic independence was more important than solving 
pedagogical problems (see Chapter 3). After democratization, new prospects for bilingual teaching 
opened. The government created the  Plan Nacional de Educación  (National Education Plan) 
integrating the bilingual education of teachers and the participation of indigenous groups in creating 
curricula (Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 65). A pilot project in the Chaco region encouraged to integrate 
Guaraní language and was supported by the German technical development organization throughout 
the early 1990s, involving 50 schools during five years. This positive climate forced Paz Zamora to 
reform the educational system; the Paz Estenssoro government accepted the p lan but never 
implemented it.  
The indigenous, poor and rural people were always at a disadvantage in the Bolivian educa-
tion system, proven by the large discrepancy between rural
84 and urban regions and between girls and 
boys. Rural children are less likely to attend school after primary, children attending public high 
schools are unlikely to attend university, as they have an autonomous acceptance system which 
makes them very selective and benefits students from private public high schools (Cordova de Her-
nichel 2000: 85). The higher educational system does not benefit those it is supposed to: the public 
(Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 81f).
85 Families who can afford it, send their children to private schools 
                                                 
84 Rural children obtain 3.5 years of schooling; the average urban child receives 10. Only 14 percent of students (851 from 
1,000) of rural schools grade fifth grade (primary); only half a percent graduate high school. Girls miss school to help their par-
ents: in Tiraque (Cochabamba), the average girl spends 71 hours fetching water, firewood, guarding cattle and on field work, 
while boys the same age only help out 36 hours a week (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 18). Boys have twice the time (6 hours) for 
homework as girls (3 hours). Illiteracy rates in rural areas reflect this: 28 percent of men are illiterate, compared to 66 percent of 
women. In 1995 the quitting of school was 70 to 80 percent for girls and 65 to 75 percent for boys in rural areas. In urban areas 
roughly a third of girls quit school, an estimated 12 to 24 percent of boys. The unequal budget distribution across the different 
school levels and regions leads to high rates of school quitters. The higher the grade, the less students; 20 percent of all na-
tional students complete 12th grade (Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 116, 123). 15.5 percent of urban women have not attended school 
ever as opposed to 3.8 percent of urban men. In rural areas 23.1 percent of men have no school record, as opposed to half of 
all rural women. 65 percent of all schools, but 82.5 percent in rural areas o ffer incomplete primary schooling (less than five 
years) and 90 percent of rural children do not attend 5th grade (Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 63). Child labour was only abolished in 
1990 with the signing of the UN Convention on Children’s Rights (OIT 1995: 7). For a detailed report on the organisation of 
labour in families please see CEPAL (2004) or Grootaert and Narayan (2001: 8-15 and 35 - 46). 
85 In the 1980s the university market was liberalized. Private upper education and competition between the public and private 
universities boomed their away from Bolivian reality. Until today there is no curricular standard or measures to create them; and 
the courses offered are not adapted to Bolivian needs. Only about 10 percent of instructors do academic research; 90 percent of 
research budgets are appointed to technical and natural science institutes, the remaining 10 are allocated to the humanities  
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(Ströbele-Gregor 1996: 66). These institutions function as selectors and keep the masses at a disad-
vantage: “[t]hey are a way to achieve and hold privilege and power” (Cordova de Hernichel 2000: 69). 
Children from non-Spanish speaking households are at disadvantage as any language other than 
Spanish is forbidden. The norms and values propagated within the curriculum do not match students’ 
background. Classicism is evident in the educational system of Bolivia for communist Catoira Marín.
86  
The 1952 Revolution brought a definitional change of the words indio (Indian, defines ethnic 
belonging), cholo (person of mixed race from the country, derogatory) and farmer. Landless colonos 
and sharecroppers were re-named  campesinos with effect of the agrarian reform to underline the 
structural transformation, which made “these independent producers vulnerable to new forms of domi-
nation and exploitation” (Lagos 1994: 159). The word campesino stands for peasant. The cultural con-
struction of class and identity are structurally related to ongoing processes of rural differentiation and 
class formation: 
In fact, these different interpretations of social reality are similar to the ‚traditional’ values, institutions, and forms of 
labor mobilization and exchange used by an emergent class to exploit the peasantry. (Lagos 1994: 131) 
The agrarian reform might have eliminated the words cholo, indio and white (k’ara),
87 but the 
new terms obscured social reality. Essentially, white skin is linked to urban characteristics, dark skin to 
rural areas and the peasantry – an inheritance of the colonial times. One’s ethnic identity is influenced 
by ones home, work and Spanish-speaking skills; “wealth and (…) land ownership do not whiten skin” 
(Lagos 1994: 155). The word campesino is overarching, while the terms indio, cholo and k’ara (blanco 
or white) underline social exclusion (e.g. to differentiate town elite from the village elite) and make 
ethnicity “yet another cultural form that defines lines of antagonism and alliance” or “effective means 
for social exclusions” (Lagos 1994: 151, 156). The term  campesino  is contested. Still, the term 
mobilizes. It overrides class differences. It unites an imagined class (as opposed to an imagined ethnic 
group) in a common struggle against the state or global forces. Joined, they place themselves within a 
‘modern’ discourse and reject “pervasive dominant images that relate the countryside with Indianness” 
(Lagos 1994: 156). Regional politics shape the intra- and interclass alliances (and opposition), which 
are based on co-villagers, kin and fictive-kin. Economic exchange kept the peasants reproducing 
themselves as peasants and the dominant groups in place, e.g. rural merchants. Only wars and other 
upheavals united peasants and other social groups and raised political consciousness (Lagos 1994: 
43, 160): “The history of the campesino movement has been intimately related to the developments in 
Bolivian national politics since the revolution of 1952” (Lagos 1994: 136). Unity is thus necessary as 
“[p]easants (…) must both confront the state and dominant groups and simultaneously sustain them. 
This fundamental structural ambivalence feeds both their dreams and their despair” (Lagos 1994: 
161). 
Campesinos seldom oppose merchants as a class. The population Lagos studied in Tiraque 
(Cochabamba) united twice for a common cause: before the 1950 against the hacendados and after 
the revolution to confront the state (by opening an own market, boycotting state markets, blocking 
roads and demanding better prices on their crops, and cheaper inputs for potatoes) (Lagos 1994: 130, 
134). Failure of campesinos to make their demands met lies in three factors: (a) the powerlessness of 
                                                                                                                                                   
departments – in sync with a culture which condemns critical thinking and questioning societal structures (see Sections 3.1 and 
4.1) (Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 163, 189). 
86 “In Bolivia, the one who studies does not work, and the one who works cannot study” (Catoira Marín 1994: 61). 
87 For a detailed description of the distinction between cholo, campesino and indio, please see Lagos 1994: 151 – 156).  
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the campesinos against the state; (b) the Associación de Productores de Papa (Association of Potato 
Producers, APP) has merchants and wealthy people in its ranks, but also poorer peasants. The APP 
decided to import fertilizers directly from Japan or Europe to circumvent commercial importing houses. 
This method required a 25 US-dollar deposit six months in advance, a sum most campesinos cannot 
afford; (c) rural merchants cannot transform their accumulated wealth into capital. They are therefore 
dependant upon larger capitalist forces and the state to do so (Lagos 1994: 130, 135, 161). Lagos 
suggests confronting dominant groups of the region instead of the state. 
Campesinos as a collective group face many difficulties delivered by the change of political 
and economic structures. Change in lifestyle after the Land Reform brought new forms of peasant- 
(and indigenous-) dominance by other social groups (e.g. merchants). Nonetheless, campesinos per-
ceive the 1952 revolution and the agrarian reform as having given them basic freedoms and auton-
omy, despite the changes of lifestyle and dependence on the new merchant the reforms brought, too. 
Campesinos have to intensify production to sell a larger share of their produce or labor and also en-
gage in non-farm activities to keep up with the newly created demands.
88 During their lives as landless 
colonos, campesinos were leased and sold with the haciendas. Colonos received 12 lbs. (un cesto) of 
coca per day and traded it for goods. Thus, coca shrubs were sold rather than the land upon which 
they grew. Many  campesinos households live their main staple, the potato which is the principal 
means of market and barter exchange (Lagos 1994: 30, 33, 68, 70, 79).
89 Cattle is a preferred animal. 
Herds may be brought to a field in the morning, tied down and picked up at sundown, whereas sheep 
need surveillance. Pigs and sheep, and cattle overall, are like saving accounts to the campesinos. 
Owning land is a concept foreign to indigenous society. Rather, humans belonged to the earth. The 
Pachamama (mother earth) is still honored with rituals and national holidays (the catholic church inte-
grated indigenous rituals into their catalogue) (Revollo Fernández 2004: 72).
90 Calculating costs of 
production or income for campesino households is difficult, as many non-commoditized and borrowed 
factors of production have to be considered.  
Inequality is apparent when observing poor campesinos buying fertilizers from richer campesi-
nos and taking up loans for this purpose – also difficult, as the credit market is well developed in Bo-
livia, but does not reach all households (Lagos 1994: 82, 83).
91 Since the mid 1970s credit was re-
directed to campesino households, as that by 1982 campesinos received 32 percent of total loan vol-
ume. Many transactions result in an untimely delivery of credit as that campesinos must deposit land 
titles at the bank as a guarantee to their loans. Credit was used “as a political instrument or in re-
sponse to political pressures brought on by the government by individuals and groups, typically me-
dium-sized and large-sized farmers” in the Oriente (Lagos 1994: 88). Some times, political considera-
                                                 
88 For a detailed analysis of land ownership in the Oriente, please see Choquehuanca Zeballos (2005). 
89 Harvests are divided by three: 40 percent are sold, and 40 percent go toward own consumption, the remaining 20 percent are 
planted during the next season. 
90 For a detailed description of indigenous culture and religion and concepts existent in these, please see Revollo Fernández 
2004. 
91 Many sources studied microfinance in Bolivia: Vogelsang cites Bolivia as one of the most developed and competitive microfi-
nance markets, which setting trend for the future (2001/2002: 47). In the case of the examined Caja de Los Andes, 54 percent 
of lenders were women but only 12 percent of loans went out for agricultural business. Navajas et. al. cite borrowers to be near 
the poverty line (“the richest of the poor”) and that urban poor are more likely to borrow than rural as they are more credit-worthy 
(2000: 333, 344). In his study on the effectiveness on micro finance in Bolivia and Bangladesh Schreiner admits that microfi-
nance cannot end poverty, but that it helps the poor more than other ways (1998: 12). Ortega Comucio adds that for “liberal 
economic reforms to survive and thrive, macroeconomic solutions are not enough; they must to be accompanied by active 
public policies aiming at bringing social balances which, if neglected as the Bolivian case, may generate profound effects in 
political stability and democratic rule“ (2005: 29).  
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tions would prohibit banks to press for repayment and state-financed loans were often diverted either 
to speculation or the processing of cocaine paste (Ladman et. al. 1979 in Lagos 1994). The uneven 
allocation of resources in Bolivia by the state contributed to the new allocation of wealth. Both the 
agrarian and cocaine industry rely on campesino households for the supply of a cheap and seasonal 
work force. Campesino households rely on these employment opportunities as well, despite intensify-
ing their production in recent years and participating in the market a s sellers and consumers. In-
creased participation by the campesinos in the market led to a devaluation of campesino-produced 
goods in comparison to industrial commodities. For instance, between 1973 and 1977 the prices of 
agricultural products increased by 300 percent; the price of industrial products increased by 500 per-
cent. Between 1979 and 1984 the price of potatoes increased by 186 percent, but prices for agricul-
tural inputs increased by 431 percent (Lagos 1994: 66, 67). As Lagos writes: “[s]ome (…) know the 
intimate connection between the state and the world economy. As one campesino leader who lived in 
a hinterland village put it: ‘Our exploiter is the International Monetary Fund’” (1994: 161). 
  Recalling the IMF and our linear concept of time and development, it is interesting to note that 
those of the Bolivia’s indigenous population is different. The indigenous believe that their gods accom-
pany them throughout their every-day life, handing out praise and punishment whenever it is suitable 
and immediately and find themselves in constant dialogue with their gods. Whereas in Christianity true 
belief is most important, the Andean religion believes in the right action, which keeps or restores har-
mony and balance and is based upon taking and giving. Individuals are viewed as ‘good’ when their 
actions keep societal structures that secure survival (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 21).
92 Reciprocity is still 
institutionalized by the peasant organization and is a part of law, in order to compensate for the so-
called Ayllu
93 which was lost to the Revolution. Reciprocity was also in interest of the LPP. Now known 
as the OTB, this institution requires the attendance of every (male) family head. Women meet in the 
so-called Club de Madres (Mothers Club) or other women’s associations. The reforms of the 1980s 
and the PGDES granted indigenous rights for the first time but also created problems. Indigenous and 
municipalities entered conflicts on jurisdictions (Pacheco 2003: 24). Farmers and development organi-
zations act according to their own logic (Zoomers 1999: 3).
94  
  Similarly to the deeply engrained idea of reciprocity, Quechua culture also has a different con-
cept of learning: watching until knowing. Most of the rural population informs itself through radio, which 
has served as an important instrument for conserving the many languages of Quechua and Aymará as 
well being proud of their cultural identity and traditions as Stadler-Kaulich finds in her study during the 
years 2000 and 2002 (2003: 10, 29, 47).
95 Quechua understanding of development is also different. 
                                                 
92 Andean religion emphasizes the reciprocity between nature and humans and between members of society. Those who make 
profit organize feasts for the entire community (which were prior to assure that no one got too rich). There are many versions of 
reciprocity in Quechua: Ayni (we work my field today, we work your field tomorrow), Minka (all families help build a social infra-
structure; e.g. a school), Humarqa (paying people for helping with food); Tumo (unpaid community service gaining someone 
social recognition), Pasante de fiesta (taking over monetary and non-monetary responsibility for a party); siembra de compania 
(sharing profit: A gives land and fertilizers, B gives seeds) (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 24). 
93 A pre-Inca structure which defined a person’s social and blood belonging either through being a relative by blood or by being 
a godparent (the number of godparents a person had in their life increased with age and the stages passed in life). The more 
godchildren an individual had, the higher his or her prestige. 
94 For suggestions as to how this situation can be improved, please see Zoomers 1999. 
95 An estimated 1,157 radio stations function across Bolivia, 460 stations are officially registered. There are different types of 
radio stations: state-owned, commercial, union-stations, religious, peasant, institutional (university- or community-owned) and 
educational (formal and non-formal content, local and regional and national news programmes). Many of the estimated over 
1,000 radio-stations function on a small scale. They are frequently upheld by one person who earns money by broadcasting 
greetings (in areas without telephones) and advertisements. The radio programmes are adapted to the indigenous concept of  
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They see it as an opening and expanding of the past, where the only change is context. Time is not a 
linear process with a beginning and an end, it is spiral in which the future is a repetition and expansion 
of cycles and rhythms. Within this spiral, development is a movement from center to periphery. When 
an obstacle is hit, the movement (or development) returns to its point of origin (by folding back to-
gether) where it imbibes sources and knowledge which proved successful in the past. When the solu-
tion is found and adapted development can continue with renewed potential and u nfolds again 
(Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 31f). Consequently, the western notion of development and its implementation 
vary significantly from the Andean indigenous concepts. This factor is ignored in western development 
aid, particularly when selecting people for participation in projects. Only participants in these projects 
benefit and western development officials blame the lack of education of the population on the failure 
of their programs. In fact, as Stadler-Kaulich points out, the rural population has great agricultural 
knowledge, hailing from the climatic and geographic context. Many regions specialize on one crop 
rather than planting many, as certain plants guarantee their survival (e.g. resistance to frost or 
drought). The indigenous believe that high profit from the Pachamama can only be received after ritual 
thankfulness rather than hard work. Western development aid contributes to the schism between poor 
and rich, powerful and powerless, contrary to the interests of the indigenous people who seek a better 
livelihood for all. Sustainable development can not function for the rural population, as there is a com-
munication problem when these conditions are not taken into consideration For example, a pro-boiling 
water campaign in rural areas failed, because water will most likely not be boiled before consumption. 
Those responsible for preparing the food (mostly females) lack time and resources to doing so 
(Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 35, 183). Also western development aid is very uncoordinated (regardless of 
their affiliation to the state, a private or religious initiative): 
[T]hey compete among themselves to establish spheres of influence in the region in order to capture campesino 
support, votes, or, as one campesino put it, ‘to justify their salaries and funding which they r eceive in the name of the 
campesinos.’ (Lagos 1994: 141) 
Andersen suggests encouraging rural to urban migration within Bolivia to solve the country’s 
problems. “[I]t is much cheaper for the government to provide good quality schooling when students 
are gathered in urban centers with economies of scale” (Andersen 2001: 17). Yes, Andersen consents 
his idea “sound[s] anti-poor”
96, but is also legitimate. He expanded it in 2002 and suggested boarding 
schools to prevent ‘bad’ migration. According to him, rural-urban migration is hot a problem in Bolivia 
(2002: 14f). Migration has been a ‘solution’ for many Bolivians for a long time. About 1,000 people 
leave Bolivia every day (20,000 a month; 140,000 p.a.). Some of the migrating women or children 
become prostitutes seeking “economic benefits” elsewhere (Plaza 2005). 
Andersen is correct in assuming that life in the cities is more prosperous than in rural areas. 
The 1992 census revealed that poverty in urban areas sank from 65 percent in 1976 to 51 percent in 
1992. Poverty in rural areas sank from 98 to 94 percent during the same time (Arze Vargas 2000: 5f; 
Von Gleich 1998: 23-34).
97 Seventy percent of illiterate live in rural areas, only 30 percent in the cities 
(Lizárraga Zamora 2001: 115). 86 percent of the urban population have access to drinking water, as 
                                                                                                                                                   
time and development, but are also popular, because they speak in their mother tongues (when Spanish is the second lan-
guage) (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 48, 49, 101; 131). 
96 “Although it sounds harsh and anti-poor, it would probably be most efficient to spend relatively little in rural areas and concen-
trate on providing good facilities (water, electricity, sanitation, health service, and education) for newly arrived migrants in towns 
and cities. This will encourage in exodus from poor rural areas, which will benefit both those who leave and those who stay and 
consolidate” (Andersen 2001: 21). 
97 For more detailed figures please see Arze Vargas (2000).  
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opposed to a mere 32 percent of the rural population. The distribution of sanitary institutions is similar 
(74 percent have access in urban, only 37 in the rural areas). 94 percent of the rural population are 
considered poor and unable to satisfy their basic needs, which is why rural families migrate to urban 
areas, especially after bad harvests or to send their male family heads away for work. The families 
remain in the rural areas. Bolivia is a young society, with 40 percent of the population being below 15 
years of age. Overall average life expectancy is 63 years for women and 60 years for men; the aver-
age rates in the rural areas lie below average. The distribution of poverty also shows the racism in 
Bolivia: about 4.1 million people of indigenous live in rural a reas, over a half of them belong to 
Quechua culture (Stadler-Kaulich 2003: 15f). Neoliberal policies bring problems to the indigenous as 
they stand in contrast to campesino lifestyle. As the vice president of the Central for Indigenous of the 
Oriente, Vicente Passoa, points out, the disappearing of flora and fauna and violation of basic human 
rights on a national and international level contribute to indigenous distress (Pessoa 2, 5). Indigenous 
culture, technology, knowledge and religion are not legitimate and discriminated as a consequence 
(Pessoa 6). Grootaert and Narayan admit a great overlapping of those poor and those indigenous 
(2001: 8). US AID points out, the eastern part of Bolivia was mostly unaffected by 1980s and 1990s 
reforms (2005: 7). The PGDES (particularly capitalization of state companies) benefited from the ine-
quality in the country, particularly from the unequal distribution of land, xenophobia and racism. 
The LPP was to alter the deficits in rural areas and strengthen communities functionally and 
financially. Obviously they cannot fix the errors of the past immediately. A new LRE should include 
respect for cultural diversity, better schooling for the teachers (multicultural sensitivity, up-to-date 
curricula) and a fairer distribution of the budget across the educational levels. It is in part the lack of 
support by the elite that makes improvement of the educational system fail. They do not care for this 
topic; a change of the educational system within the next two decades is thus not realistic (Lizárraga 
Zamora 2001: 116, 120). Similar things can be said about the structural reforms which Bolivia 
conducted during the 1980s (as outlined in Section 3.2): many failed as they did not alter the 
contribution/concern by the elite. The majority of Bolivians did not profit from the neoliberal policies. 
Rather, as Cox predicted (see Section 2.1.4), they saw a deterioration of their livelihoods, still not 
having employment or income (read: purchasing power) others enjoy (1981: 113). Most Bolivians are 
marginalized from the global economy. International capitalism is yet to prevent this poverty to fuel 
revolt if it wants to maintain hegemony. This is why the population of El Alto received much say in 
recent political decisions: they are close enough to the country’s capital, but a city of marginalized 
people (migrated poor, rural and i ndigenous), condensed on one spot voicing their opinion on 
government decisions (see Section 3.1), but separating ways on other matters. 
4.3 Access to the sea and its role in Bolivian foreign relations 
The issue unlimited access to the sea, reaches back to the colonial period, when both Chile 
and Bolivia were not geographically defined (Neumann 1997: 75).
98 The topic is important to Bolivian 
                                                 
98 Until today is not certain whether Bolivia or Chile ended or began at the 25 or 27
th degree of latitude. There were several 
border treaties in 1866, 1872 and 1874 attempting to define the exact borders, which did not settle the question of the owner-
ship. A tariff war over nitre exports followed, which affected British investors. By 1874 the treaties speak of a Chilean colony in 
the Atacama desert. Bolivia owned this territory, but the industry, mines and trade in the area were Chilean (Neumann 1997: 
84f, 89, 93, 96f). Chile accused Bolivia of breaking the 1874 treaty and announced it felt no longer bound to the agreements, 
leading to war (Neumann 1997: 97). Chile invaded Antofagasta on 14 February 1789 (Grupo de Estudios Históricos 2002: 447). 
Bolivia declared war on Chile in March 1879, involving Peru, because of a solidarity treaty between both countries, Chile de-
clared war in April. In March 1880 Bolivia was beaten, Peru in January 1881. The peace talks of 1883, which were encouraged  
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foreign relations and is mentioned in every campaign of any politician to day, as Bolivia lost more than 
half of its original territory in this conflict and the Chaco War (Pacheco 2003: 10). Territory tying Bolivia 
to the Pacific Ocean was lost to Chile in 1883 (final treaty is dated 1904) during a war that ended a 50-
year dispute between Chile and Bolivia, which was motivated by Anglo-Chilean interests (see Foot-
note 97) and since then Bolivia has been a landlocked nation (Grupo de Estudios Históricos 2002: 
448; 644). 
The conditions of Bolivia’s access to the sea are the most favorable of all landlocked nations. 
Nonetheless, the country (and its Latin American allies, who seek own profit) still wants its own exit to 
the sea (Neumann 1997: 115, 123). This is feasible, given that landlocked countries are at a 
disadvantage as they are isolated from world markets. On average, transportation costs of landlocked 
nations make up 2.7 percent of GDP (Neumann 1997: 37): „[A]ll but four of the twenty land-locked 
developing countries are on the list of countries by the UN as the least developed” (UN/Doc.TD/191, 
S. 200 06.01.1976 in Neumann 1997: 36) and half of landlocked states are least developed countries 
(LDCs). In interest of free trade, the UN Convention of the Sea secures unlimited access to ports 
(which do not have to be owned by the landlocked country) and free transit right on way to the sea. 
Geographic disadvantages of Bolivia (and the poor infrastructure within the country) create 
dependency on Chilean and Peruvian exits to the sea (e.g. Ilo in Peru, to which Bolivia has a 
guaranteed transit right since 1992), as they are closest. Transit through other neighboring countries is 
not an option due to distance (Neumann 1997: 118, 158). 
Bolivia and Chile had problematic political relations since the 1970s, and completely 
interrupted them from 1978 until 2006. Chilean officials attended Morales inauguration ceremonies, 
and Morales visited Michelle Bachelet’s inauguration as president later in the year. Despite diplomatic 
silence, Bolivia remained an important consumer market for Chilean products. Bolivia was also 
granted the best of options under international law, as opposed to Chad (which uses various means of 
transport before goods arrive at sea) and Nepal (India only lifted tariffs in 1970; Nepal depends on 
short bilateral accords granting it transportation rights to the sea) (Neumann 1997: 41, 163, 165, 167). 
Chile asks for no tariffs and the only reasonable complaint by Bolivia, according to Neumann, is that it 
may not chose the contractors within foreign ports, thus lacking cost control mechanisms. Bolivia 
wants the international community to pressure Chile into overturning a part of the lost territory to 
Bolivia. This is unlikely as Peru still has say in the matter (Neumann 1997: 126, 158, 222, 217). The 
issue of access to the sea is not only one of national pride or historic or simply political, but one of 
economic relevance. 
4.4 Coca and Cocaine 
The coca leaf has been a cultural good since the Inca Empire, important to lifestyle and religious ritu-
als, before it turned into a trade product and cash-substitute during prior to the revolution. The coca 
leaf and growing coca (not cocaine, as will be explained) is illegal under the 1961 UN Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs. Nonetheless, the chewing of coca or drinking its tea, both popular in the An-
                                                                                                                                                   
by the U.S., failed. The next peace talks ended with a truce in April 1884, resulting a loss of 153,000 km² for Bolivia, including 
the ports Antofagasta, Cobija, Mejillones and Tocopilla and other economic resources the Bolivian economy was dependant on. 
Chile then received a 25 percent administrational fee on imported products with a Bolivian destiny arrived through Arica and a 
30 percent war-compensation fee, further deteriorating the Bolivian economy (Neumann 1997: 97, 99, 100, 102). After the 
Pacific War, Bolivian mines were rehabilitated by Chilean and British capital and the mining industry grew spectacularly and 
benefited the three tin barons (Lagos 1994: 24).  
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dean culture, do not produce a ‘high’ or an addiction. Coca had an integrative function for the indige-
nous society, but also benefited the societal disintegration of the Bolivian indigenous and served “as a 
medium of cultural identification and as an expression of rebellion against Hispanic culture” (Stadler-
Kaulich 2003: 16; Mujeres Marchistas et. al. 1996: 3). Cocaine became known in the US in the early 
1900s, the beverage ‘Coca Cola’ received its name from the drug (Mujeres Marchistas et. al. 1996: 4). 
Politically, the issue of coca and cocaine is relevant since the 1970s, when the US implemented their 
first strict anti-drug policy in Latin America, tying the eradication-progress to development aid (of own 
and IFIs) and included sanctions based on yearly progress (Birle 1996: 22). The state’s policy on coca 
and cocaine varied throughout history. For example, dictator García Meza explicitly encouraged co-
caine production due to its overall economic profit (Gebhardt 2002: 16). Since 1982 no government 
conceived an effective national drug policy. US anti-drug policy has automatically been the Bolivian, 
too. Current Bolivian president, Evo Morales, is a coca grower and is leader of the Five Federations of 
the Cochabamba Tropic (where 83 percent of illegal coca is grown) (US AID 2005: 6).
99 Morales’ posi-
tion brought a new slant into the national and international debate on the coca leaf, particularly indus-
trialization (the promotion of coca-based goods, such as toothpaste, wine, ointments and, of course, 
tea). 
The ‘popularity’ of the coca/cocaine issue is explained easily. Bolivia grows a third of coca 
shrubs in Latin America and its economy is heavily dependant upon this crop for stability: in 1987 drug 
trade made up 24 percent of statistically recorded GDP (Shams 1992: 4, 7).
100 Coca is grown in two 
areas of Bolivia: Los Yungas and the Chapare, which produces all of Bolivian coca shrubs, not only by 
small farmers, but also in large farms owned by absent landlords (Shams 1992: 18).
101 According to 
the Drug Enforcement Administration of the U.S. Department of justice, Bolivia produced 197 tons of 
coca base in 1993 (U.S. Department of Justice 1994 in SEAMOS 1994: 131). From the 7.2 million 
people in Bolivia, an estimated 142.000 work in the coca/cocaine sector; including families, about 
457.000 people depend on the business for survival (Shams 1992: 17). Coca growing is not a ‘male’, 
but a family business. Involvement numbers vary: Birle speaks of ten percent of all Bolivians 
depending on the sector, whereas Kohl and Farthing speak of 35,000 (Shams 1996: 21; Kohl and 
Farthing 2001: 35-41 in Gebhardt 2002: 22). The cocaine business has to be regarded two 
perspectives. While consumption of cocaine is highly addictive and has hazardous consequences on 
the consumers, like any other drug, growing coca and cocaine production is also a means of putting 
food on the table for others, who have no alternative. 
Profit from cocaine accumulates to an estimated 500 to 726 million US-dollars p.a. (a 1995 es-
timate claims 330 to 900 million US-dollars in Birle (1996)) and stands opposite 830 million US-dollars 
legal export income. About a half to a third of the illegal profit is spent in the country; most on construc-
tion and services, particularly small urban business (especially in Santa Cruz) and to a lesser extent 
on the agrarian sector (cattle, cotton or sugar plantations). An estimated 300 to 700 million US-dollars 
                                                 
99 For detailed quotes and opinions on the Five Federations of the Cochabamba Tropic please see Mujeres Marchistas (1996). 
100 Kohl cites figures to account as much as half of formal economy (2006: 56). 
101 El Chapare and Los Yungas differ from one another. Whereas the Chapare is assumed to produce 2.7 metric tons of coca 
leaves per hectare in 1993 (four harvests p.a.), Los Yungas only produces 1.8 metric tons per hectare (three to four harvests 
p.a.) (U.S. Department of Justice 1994: 132). Coca leaves from Los Yungas have a higher alkaloid level (.85 percent) than 
those from the Chapare (.72 percent). The plants in El Chapare are two years older than those in Los Yungas, whose average 
age is 6.4 years. 97 percent of plants in Chapare are alive, whereas in Los Yungas it’s 99 percent. Los Yungas has a higher 
density of plants per hectare (165,690) than the Chapare (26,971). The Plants in Los Yungas are half as large as those in El 
Chapare (U.S. Department of Justice 1994 in SEAMOS 1994: 139).  
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from cocaine profit stay in Bolivia. This money supports the national economy, some of it re-enters the 
country as luxury goods (e.g. personal computers and cars) and an estimated 300,000 jobs in the 
formal sector owe their existence to drug trade. The national economy would collapse if all drug 
money were taken out. As Krempin (1990) outlines, the 1980s SAP relied on the illegal business to 
function. The coca industry pulls workers from legal jobs (miners, farmers, urban unemployed) and 
into the informal sector (Shams 1992: 8-12). These numbers are estimates, not even the government 
has reliable information on the topic (Laserna 1997: 210). 
The illegal sector secures rural families a standard of living (securing basic needs) they could 
otherwise not maintain. An estimated 86 percent of Chapare residents (growers and their families) are 
involved in coca growing, pushing away legal business; a statement Laserna contradicts (1997: 79; 
119). He claims that both coca and food crop growing increased with the rise of population in the area 
due to migration. Furthermore, those involved in drug trafficking and cocaine production enter the 
illegal economy by coincidence or on an irregular basis and opt out as soon as they find a legal 
income basis (retail commerce, public transportation) (Laserna 1997: 113).  Los Yungas and  El 
Chapare are not the only areas who profited from drug trade. The urban centers, especially Santa 
Cruz, benefited from the construction boom. Approximately 50,000 (or more) families commute 
regularly between urban and rural areas due to their involvement in the cocaine business. Wealth 
distribution within the coca and cocaine sector is unequal. Drug traffickers earn most. It is estimated 
that 35 percent of upper class (former large landowners) and upper middle class families (industrials, 
import and export firms) who hold posts in politics, the military and state bureaucracy, benefit from the 
trade. The effects of cocaine production are hazardous to the environment. Kerosene, carbonate, 
sulfur, ammonia, permanganate and chloride acid are used to make cocaine base and paste and 
destroy the habitat of the unique Bolivian flora and fauna (Shams 1992: 19, 22). Some Chapare rivers 
carry no more fish. There is no scientific evidence whether damage is caused by coca shrubs, but it is 
said the plant is undemanding of the soil and its harvester (Laserna 1997: 104). Cutting large portions 
of the rain forest to make coca plantations for newly arrived migrants does cause damage (Shams 
1992: 20). Within Bolivia, coca leaves undergo three phases (processing into coca paste, then coca 
base, finally cocaine). Either coca base or cocaine are exported, mostly through Columbia (Shams 
1995: 5). One kg. of cocaine (worth 20,000 to 40,000 US-dollars) requires 1.25 kg of coca base, which 
is extracted from 2 kg. of coca paste. One kg. of coca paste requires 96 kg. of coca leaves (Shams 
1992: 26).
102  
Since the 1970s the US pressured Bolivia into adopting an anti-drug program of their own in-
terests (Krempin 1990: 25; Laserna 1997: 163). In 1988 Law 1008 compromised US-will and those of 
local coca growers. The law was phrased vaguely and included geographic specifications, as it aimed 
to end coca growing outside of Los Yungas (12.000 hectare) and addressing the illegal plantations in 
El Chapare (80 percent of 30.000 hectare are illegal) (Birle 1996: 22). Income from cocaine is esti-
mated between 2 and 4 billion US-dollars p.a.; surpassing all legal income of 542 million p.a.. Only ten 
percent of the 120,000 acres of coca leaves harvested p.a. are for traditional consumption (Krempin 
1990: 23). Anti-drug policies of the Bolivian government were specified in the Trienal Plan, a program 
worth 300 million U S-dollars and based on three pillars: prohibition, alternatives and prevention 
                                                 
102 The U.S. Department of Justice claims 390 kg of coca make 1 kg of cocaine base (SEAMOS 1994: 132).  
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(Shams 1992: 35; Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 58). The Plan limited the impact of socio-economic effects 
due to the eradication and protect Bolivia and the international community from the social, political, 
economic and moral effects of drug-trafficking (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 58). It was to be implemented 
in Cochabamba and Los Yungas, eradicating 35,000 hectare during the first and 15,000 hectare in its 
second area. Losses were to be compensated with 2,000 US-dollars per hectare (a total of 100 million 
US-dollars were designated to this part of the program) (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 61).
103 The Trienal 
Plan failed as no alternatives to coca growing were found. No occupation or crop brings the same 
amount of ‘wealth’ – the securing of basic needs (Shams 1992: 36): 
coca producing farmers still count to the very poor, the uncertainty of [coca] keeps them from taking advantage of the 
boom to improve their life and work conditions on a medium and long term basis. (1997: 125) 
The government consented to eradicate 5,000 hectare p.a. (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 62f, 69). 
Two paramilitary groups which were created with financial, personal and ideological assistance from 
the US (read: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and secret information service) assisted 
eradication: the Fuerza Especial de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico (Special Force In the Fight Against 
Drug-Trafficking, FELCN) and the  Unidades Móviles de Patrullaje Rural (Mobile Units for Rural 
Patrolling, UMOPAR). Both groups were criticized for violating human rights (Laserna 1997: 134; 154). 
10 million US-dollars were handed over for eradicated coca plantations; but many new illegal 
plantations were grown. Morales labeled these efforts  as an “eradication of humans” (Morales in 
Mujeres Marchistas et. al.1996: 5f).  
The  Plan Integral de Desarollo y Sustitución (Comprehensive Plan for Development and 
Substitution, PIDYS), under a national council of five Bolivian ministers (foreign relations, interior, 
migration and justice, national defense, planning and coordination and peasant and agrarian issues) 
accompanied the Trienal plan. PIDYS wanted to change the agrarian structure, compensating the loss 
of harvest and fund health and education programs. The p olice and military cooperated in the 
eradication process (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 63f). In June 1986 150 US-soldiers helped the 
“leopards” (UMOPAR), by 1987 they were 350. Many saw this as an attempt to create a strategic point 
of defense (Krempin 1990: 25). The coca growers criticized the lack of measures implemented against 
cocaine-consuming in consumer-countries (especially the US). In March 1994 US Ambassador 
Richard Bowers blamed the coca growers for the death of thousands of US citizens and said they 
should accept total eradication. A year later Republican Congressional Representative of Indiana 
Burton suggested invading Bolivia to bombard the coca growers (Bowers 1994 and Burton 1995 in 
Mujeres Marchistas et. al. 1996: 8). Coca growers see themselves as political prisoners (Mujeres 
Marchistas 1996: 45, 56, 72). Cocaleros should be included in the economic development model, if 
eradication is to be successful (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 19–25). 
Coca growers groups are loosely organized (in the CSUTCB) since the 1930s and by an or-
ganic (not conscious) solidarity. Coca growers, a new class of campesinos, want to the industrializa-
tion of coca and threatened to confront eradication with force. Within coca grower organizations, all 
participants may voice their opinions, listen to those of others and shape the position of the organiza-
tion toward the state; the organizations also resolves conflicts on an interpersonal and institutional 
                                                 
103 One of the four sub programmes of the Trienal plan gave 150 million US-dollars for the cultivation of alternative crops, re-
gional development. Encouraging migration of peasants to the high valleys received 40 million US-dollars. The education of 
Bolivians on problems with drug consumption costs 10 million US-dollars.  
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level.
104 The syndicates determine the size of lots, wages and help to sell harvests and talk about how 
to deal with the violence all growers confront (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 28f, 32-35, 51, 55, 75-77). In 
December 1986 coca growers of the Chapare and Carrasco (Cochabamba) labeled the Trienal Plan 
as imperialist, anti-peasant and reported threats against them and their families. Coca growers did not 
want to comply with voluntary eradication until real alternatives were found. Human rights groups, the 
COB, syndic federations and others supported this opinion (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 78-80, 92).  
On 25
  May 1987,  campesinos blocked a road and the  Parotani  bridge to protest the 
government and the Trienal plan. UMOPAR and the Bolivian army tried to unblock the road and 
disperse protests, arresting 570 peasants and killing 3. Negotiations between the Cocaleros and the 
armed forces failed and the state accused the campesinos favoring drug-trafficking and that this was 
the motive for protesting (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 83). The campesinos consented to Law 1008 by 
mediation from the church and the COB and declared 20 September the National Day of the Coca 
Plant to continue to voice their protest. An investigation sought to explore the initiator of the fights of 
25
 May 1987; the peasants or UMOPAR. Opposition to Law 1008 and the Trienal plan continued 
throughout 1989. When Paz Zamora took the presidency coca growers formulated 10 questions on the 
national anti-coca policy in A ugust. They questioned US-involvement (which they labeled as an 
“assassination to state sovereignty”) and asked for realistic alternatives. Protests intensified from 
February 1987 to November 1989 and then declined (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 97, 99f; Shams 1992: 
53, 99). The Trienal Plan distinguished between traditional, superfluous and illegal production (Shams 
1992: 65) and is a prime example of US-involvement in Bolivia. It also revealed how poorly civil society 
(and human rights) is protected by the state: eradication related denunciations of sexual assault, rape 
and torture were not followed up (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 110; Mujeres Marchistas et. al. 1996: 18-
20). All measures against Cocaleros decline their quality of life. Cocaine prices rose in reaction to the 
repressive measures (probably earning someone, somewhere more profit than before). In February 
1990, the presidents of Bolivia, Columbia, Peru and the US met in Cartagena (Columbia), to specify 
anti-drug policies, particularly the use of military (in Bolivia’s the area is two and a half times the size of 
Germany). A follow-up meeting to evaluate the summit o f Cartagena in April 1991 criticized the 
repressive military measures and the lack of economic alternatives for Cocaleros on an international 
level. 
  A new era of eradication, envisioned to hit the country like a shock, began with the first Goni 
presidency. Called  Opción Cero (The Option of Zero), the program aimed at short-term results. It 
wanted to avoiding problems related to eradication by turning the Chapare into a national park. The 
program sought to create new production zones for other goods and construct basic infrastructure to 
assist this effort. The program is a result of talks between the COB, the armed forces, the church, the 
Federación de Cocaleros del Chapare and others, and includes promises to decriminalize the coca 
leaf internationally (SEAMOS 1994: 103-107, 110).
105 Morales was concerned about Opción Cero 
because it disrespected Cocaleros and all Bolivians, as compensation and alternatives to coca grow-
ing do not exist (SEAMOS 1994: 34, Mujeres Marchistas 1996: 23f). He claimed the government 
                                                 
104 Members are elected into different areas of expertise: general secretary, secretaries of conflicts, of relationships, of records, 
of sports, of press and advertising, of education, of justice, of residence and delegates representing the mass at the directive 
table. Some Cocaleros are affiliated to political parties. Solutions to economic and political matters need to be found on a na-
tional level (Arrueta Rodriguez 1994: 36, 44, 47, 54). 
105 For a detailed description of the programme, please see SEAMOS 1994: 89 - 99.  
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wanted to expel campesinos from El Chapare so that it could create space for private companies, a 
“hitlerist” idea. Also, there was no consensus between the government, the COB or civil society on 
Opción Cero. The struggle, said Morales, is about neoliberalism, which insufficiently solves Bolivia’s 
problems. Morales accused the US of double standards in their anti-drug war, which is as a fraud and 
a way to blackmail the third world. He said there is no such thing as alternative development as long 
as European milk is cheaper than Bolivian milk. Neoliberalism and the US are the root of the problem, 
which is why coca growers demand an alternative development plan. Future-president Carlos Mesa 
condemned contradictory behavior by Bolivians, who support the anti-drug fight, but also the issues of 
the coca farmers. Mesa consented Opción Cero to be bound to fail and admitted that the interests of 
industrialized states are seen as more important Bolivia’s, who has to solve both production and con-
sumption problems (Mesa 1994 in SEAMOS 1994: 36f, 65, 55, 57). Until no alternatives for Cocaleros 
exist, the coca and cocaine issue will be a matter of inner and outer politics. Legalizing coca interna-
tionally, would better coca growers’ livelihoods and hurt drug trafficking (Laserna 1997: 143, 172, 184). 
Goni criticized the US and other industrialized nations for not contributing to anti-drug efforts, particu-
larly when the international community does not open their markets to Bolivian products which could 
be grown instead of coca. 
A satisfactory solution to the coca/cocaine issue will not be found, alike an efficient education 
reform or more social mobility within Bolivia will not exist, if the elite does not make these problems of 
concern to them. Of course, these problems contribute to elite wealth and power. Cox not only said 
that hegemonies and societies can be explained on a historic level, but that the context in which 
discourse takes place should be considered. This was done in the preceding sections, which not only 
addressed political culture but also outlined how complicated Bolivian foreign relations are. Hopefully, 
this chapter created an understanding as to why Morales is dreaded by the elite and why the fact that 
the MAS currently govern the country cannot be interpreted as a change of neoliberal consensus. As 
promised, proof or rejection of this hypothesis will be revealed by the newspaper analysis in Chapter 
5.  
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5 Newspaper Analysis 
By Latin American standards, Bolivia’s press liberty is generous. The mass media, which employs 
about 800 journalists, enjoys a high degree of estimation by the population. This stands in contrast to 
a low opinion about state institutions. Most Bolivians believe the press acts in their interest (Gebhardt 
2002: 12, 24). Particularly, the radio is an important means of communication; statistics show there is 
one radio for every two people (Stadler-Kaulich 2002: 44). The print press and television are common 
in urban areas, whereas radios concentrate in rural areas. There are two types of media in Bolivia: 
state-owned (Televisión de Bolivia, TVB) and private (non-commercial and rural). Private and rural 
media have a higher influence, because of their greater availability, and because they are easy to 
maintain (Gebhardt 2002: 119f).
106 In rural areas church-owned media exert more influence, such as 
the Cadena Fides (Fides Chain) or the Red ERBOL (Educación Radiofónica de Bolivia, Education of 
Bolivia by Radio, ERBOL Network). Outside influence on the media landscape is also present in the 
form of the Prisa Group (owner of the Spanish newspaper El País), which owns La Razón and the TV-
chain ATB. According to Gebhardt there are no reliable data on the distribution of the media 
(particularly newspapers) in Bolivia. Before 1985, four families owned all newspapers and competed 
for readers and advertising (Gebhardt 2002: 84). One of these was the Canelas family, now Grupo 
Líder (Leader’s Group) to which La Prensa (labeled as the most influential paper in Bolivia, distribution 
of 7,000), El Deber (daily with the highest distribution 20,000), Los Tiempos (daily, distribution of 
12,000), Ahora el País (1,500), Correo del Sur (1,500), Extra (100,000), Gente (100,000) (the two 
latter are yellow press dailies) and PAT (Carlos Mesa’s TV station) belong (Gebhardt 2002: 58, 87, 
89).
107 There is only one independent newspaper in Bolivia: El Juguete Rabioso, which is analyzed in 
this chapter. Sergio Cáceres, one of the editors of El Juguete Rabioso  (EJR), cites the average 
newspaper to have a distribution of 2,500, whereas EJR reaches a distribution of 10,000. 
Journalists have a difficult life, earning 200 US-dollars a month on average for 44 to 57 
working hours a week. Average income lies at 275 US-dollars (in 1996) (F.A.Z. et a. 1999: 192), 
whereas a family of four needs 350 US-dollars to cover basic needs. Particularly the radio sector is a 
difficult field for journalists. Often journalists rent hours from radio stations and pay rent and their 
wages from the acquired advertisements. Depending on their employer, some journalists (at the large 
newspapers in La Paz) can earn up to 2,000 US-dollars a month.  
The media played different roles in each historical era of Bolivian history, but have always 
been subject to manipulation by the state. For example, the MNR was traditionally a journalist party, 
believing in freedom of the press, whereas this right was non-existent during the dictatorships. Bánzer 
would invite journalists to his office just to hit them in the face. García Meza bombarded radio stations 
with the air force (Viscarra Pando 1984: 17-20 in Gebhardt 2002: 12, 15). Later, other governments 
used the press as means to manipulate or desinform the population, e.g. in the case of the Water War 
2000. 
In an analysis of Cochabamba newspapers, Gebhardt points out that most reporting is slanted 
for several reasons: the working conditions of the reporter and the situation of press in general, corrup-
                                                 
106 Most of the time these radios are run by one person, who earns money by sending out greetings or messages in areas where 
phones are scarce. 
107 El Alteño (El Alto), Nuevo Sur (Tarija), El Norte (Montero), La Voz (Cochabamba), Canal 52 (Santa Cruz), Radio Nuevo 
Milenio (Santa Cruz) and Radio Mundial (Montero) belong to the Grupo Líder (Monasterios 2006a).  
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tion, routine and values. Interestingly, political affiliation does not count in Gebhardt's study. He cites 
newspapers to have no political affiliation, but if they do, they are likely to be conservative (Gebhardt 
2002: 46f; 70). As mentioned previously, newspapers are easier found in urban than in rural areas. 
Congruently, the reporters’ research is more comfortable and cheaper in cities than in the periphery, 
where journalists have to travel to. During the Water War in 2000, the print press sector was suffering 
financial losses and owed most of the workers three months worth of back wages. Thus, journalists 
continued to work, but kept research costs (phone and transportation), and working time, low. This 
attitude was benefited by the perception of journalists that this was a rural rather than an urban topic 
and that it did not affect them. These two factors may explain why none of the journalists in Gebhardt’s 
study quoted the IFIs, even though the issue surrounded their policies (2002: 73). Reporting merely 
focused on higher water prices but did not connect the increases to the damages the region would 
suffer as a consequence. Privatization was carried through covertly and the press only received parts 
of the Aguas del Tunari contract upon popular pressure, which they then had difficulty deciphering 
(Gebhardt 2002: 73). Another important factor in reporting is the understanding and speaking of 
Quechua. Four of 13 journalists in the study spoke Quechua and cited this skill to benefit research and 
enable the passing road blockades during the Neoliberal Wars (Gebhardt 2002: 73f). 
Even though Bolivia has a wide array of press to chose from, writing in the individual papers is 
often the same. Particularly since Palenque’s death in 1997, sensation-ladden reporting is popular as 
the disproportional high numbers of distribution of Gente and Extra show (Gebhardt 2002: 47f, 65, 76). 
The similarity of the writing is easily explained by two factors. For one, public institutions and 
journalists have acquired a kind of cycle in which information is distributed and written about. The 
average working day begins at 9 a.m., when journalists gather at a Plaza (city square) in Cochabamba 
and divide appointments among themselves, sending at least one person to each press conference. 
Journalists of different newspapers, who are friends, routinely meet up again after these conferences 
have taken place and exchange notes so that each profits from the information of another (Gebhardt 
2002: 76). Due to this cycle, certain times of the week are busy and show a different type of reporting 
than others (e.g. the Sunday and Monday editions are prepared during the working week). The 
governments knows this and can accordingly decide for when certain action should be carried through, 
depending how much coverage of the event they desire: the violent repression of protestors during the 
Water War in 2000 was conducted during the weekend, as the government knew reporters would not 
be on site (Gebhardt 2002: 77). 
Another influencing factor to reporting are values, particularly religious, especially catholic 
values (63 percent of journalists were catholic in Gebhardt’s study). When priests of the catholic 
church were accused of rape in 2001, only EJR reported on it extensively (Gebhardt 2002: 51, 108, 
110). While catholic values are certain to play into reporting, inhibiting journalists from questioning this 
authority, it is unlikely for this factor to have played an important role during the time frames important 
to this thesis. It is speculation on part of the author that the mediation by the archbishop during the 
Water War may have created sympathies for protestors or awoken interest in the issue. Unfortunately, 
Gebhardt includes no information on journalists’ reactions to the mediation by the church. 
The most important factor of influence to reporting are public relations and economic interests. 
Newspapers receive 90 percent of their income from advertising (Gebhardt 2002: 84). For example,  
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half of the stocks of the largest newspaper in Cochabamba, Los Tiempos (The Times), is owned by 
COBOCE (Cooperativa Boliviana de Cemento, Bolivian Cooperative for Cement). During the Water 
War 2000 COBOCE only had one competitor: SOBOCE (Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento, Bolivian 
Society for Cement), which was part of Aguas del Tunari (and held 5 percent of shares; (Abendroth 
2004: 18)). Reporting on the riots in  Los Tiempos favored rioters (see Section 3.4), as COBOCE 
wanted its competitor to lose the contract with Aguas Del Tunari, so it could receive the Misicuni-deal 
later. The state is also an important advertiser. PAT no longer receives any money from the state after 
showing live coverage of the military firing on protestors in the 2000 Water War (Gebhardt 2002: 86, 
102). 
Some newspapers have such an incredibly low distribution that it is questionable how they 
survive. Speculation claims that some economic or political actors are interested in upholding certain 
media, which report in their interest (e.g. negatively about an o pponent or positively about them). 
Newspapers can also be political actors. Max Fernández owned a beer brewery (Cerveceria Nacional, 
National Beer Brewery – but it is not what its money indicates) and 12 radio stations and is one of the 
largest advertisers in media. He and his companies get away without paying taxes.
108 Also, a TV chain 
is in hands of Ivo Kuljis, who was presidential candidate for the UCS and minister for e conomic 
development in 1997 (Bánzers administration). 
Similarly, political and economic actors have journalists that report favorably on them. These 
selected journalists are in turn provided with either more or exclusive information than competing 
writers. An examination conducted in February 2000 in Cochabamba revealed that many journalists at 
Los Tiempos received wages from the city (as gardeners or lawyers). Of course these journalists were 
not expected to water plants, but to positively report on the mayor, Reyes Villa (member of NFR and 
former director of SEMAPA) (Gebhardt 2002: 96, 101).
109 The scandal grew to national proportions, 
accusing many politicians (of Congress) in La Paz to have bribed journalists systematically. Strangely, 
the topic was dropped quite quickly, even though more cases of corruption were revealed. 
Gebhardt’s analysis reveals that the media spreads neoliberal ideology. They do so, because 
they depend on advertising and because the media is also a political actor (albeit an instrumentalized 
one) (2002: 108). Thus it is feasible to analyze the attitudes of the Bolivian elite by means of three 
newspapers, which each represent a political stream: conservative (La Prensa), moderate (La Epoca) 
and leftist (El Juguete Rabioso). This analysis recognizes that even though newspapers are supposed 
to be neutral sources of information, they intentionally or unintentionally convey opinions and evaluate 
events, actors and opinions. 
The analysis distributes articles across three possible levels of evaluation: neutral, positive or 
negative. To show more than general opinions the articles are placed in eight categories (rooted in 
critical theory, see Section 2.2 for an explanation), as follows: 
                                                 
108 Upon speaking about this to a very dear person, the author was told that Fernández did in fact not pay taxes, but that it was 
Fernandez donated the money to philanthropic institutions. The author cheekily assumes this very dear person, whose identity 
in connection with this information is herewith buried forever, got this information from a newspaper. 
109 Who was a presidential candidate in the 2002 election and who was scandalized by Goni, according to the documentary ‘Our 
brand is crisis’. In the days prior to handing in this thesis, the third advisor wrote the author an email containing an anecdote 
about an article in La Razón: Mayor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa has a son, Manfred jr. He was arrested together with 
other young men for fighting. Manfred jr. was released almost immediately and the police claimed he had only been accompany-
ing a friend and that the fights had just been a boys’s game, contrary to information in the police file and the person who notified 
the police. An article in La Opinión wrote almost the same story but on an unnamed “son of a local authority”. Los Tiempos 
wrote nothing on the matter (Opinión 2006; La Razón 2006).  
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1.  Neoliberalism and IFIs 
2.  Economic Policy and Development  
3.  MAS goals and policies  
4.  Hydrocarbons  
5.  Bolivia’s foreign relations (non-US) 
6.  Relations with the United States 
7.  Inner Politics in General 
8.  Comment, Editorial, Interview 
Articles record the attitude toward the ‘new’ elite (the rioters, the MAS, Morales and their goals). Cate-
gory 1 is the only exception; it examines the evaluation of neoliberalism and the IFIs on part of the ‘old’ 
elite. 
Finding adequate newspapers was a difficult task, as most mainstream newspapers are either 
conservative or sensationalist. Writing in Germany rather than Bolivia, the author chose newspapers 
with good websites. After an assessment of the available newspapers
110 it was decided to analyze La 
Prensa for a variety of reasons. La Prensa’s website is the most extensive of all available and it be-
longed to a consortium with El Deber (more conservative daily from Santa Cruz, where most entrepre-
neurs and traditionally conservative, pro-capitalist and pro-neoliberal people live), Correo del Sur (Su-
cre) and Los Tiempos (Cochabamba). La Epoca was the only moderate newspaper with a website 
(another weekly, Pulso was conservative). El Juguete Rabioso (The Angry Toy, EJR) is the only (criti-
cal) leftist newspaper available, but has a small website. Copies of the 2003 issues were found on a 
French website, the 2006 editions were kindly sent by Sergio Cáceres. 
The results of analysis are compared twice. First the results of one newspaper during both 
time frames are compared to (not) show changes in this particularly medium. Then, results of all 
newspapers are compared to create an all-encompassing evaluation for the Bolivian elite, which will 
either verify or reject the hypothesis: a change of discourse toward neoliberalism took place. 
5.1  Results from the analysis of La Prensa  
La Prensa was founded in 1998 in cooperation between El Deber and Los Tiempos. It employs 40 
highly-qualified and well-paid journalists and quickly became a leading newspaper in the country. De-
spite the economic crisis and strikes by the journalists, La Prensa maintained its position as the sec-
ond newspaper which writes out of La Paz, reaching half of La Paz newspaper readers. Currently the 
paper is still sorting out its problems, but still aims at becoming the nation’s best. La Prensa is read by 
the upper middle class, executives and intellectuals. The paper currently seeks to amplify its circle of 
readers but also wants to keep up high level journalism and a standard of moral and ethics (Monaste-
rios Vergara 2006). 
5.1.1  2 to 19 October 2003  
La Prensa published 17 issues during 
the first time frame of analysis, accu-
mulating to 303 evaluated articles. As 
table 3 shows, the most articles were 
placed in category 7, in which all arti-
cles concerning MAS i nvolvement in 
inner politics were evaluated. Category 
8 was highly represented; but this was 
                                                 
110 BBC News 2005. 
Table 3 : La Prensa, October 2003 
Category  Number of 
Articles  Percent  Rank 
1 Neoliberalism and IFIs  21  7  5 
2. Economic Policy and Development  14  5  6 
3. MAS goals and policy  52  17  3 
4. Hydrocarbons  23  8  4 
5. Bolivia’s foreign relations (non-US)  10  3  7 
6. Relations to the United States  7  2  8 
7. Inner Politics in General  109  36  1 
8. Comment, Opinion, Interview, etc.  67  22  2  
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predictable as Bolivian newspapers like to include ‘opinionated’ articles. 17 percent of articles were 
written in category 3, in which attitudes toward counter-hegemonic ideas are evaluated. Ranked four in 
the first time frame was hydrocarbons, indicating the importance of this topic at the time. Category 1 
ranked fifth. Most unpopular categories were: Economic policy and development, non-US foreign rela-
tions and category 6, indicating that foreign relations to neighbors were of more interest than those 
with the US. 
Across categories 2 
through 8,  La Prensa 
evaluated the d e-
mands of the rioters, 
the MAS and Morales 
in a neutral manner: 
65 percent of articles 
revealed neither a 
positive nor negative 
attitude toward these 
actors. However, the 
one fourth of articles 
(24 percent, 73 arti-
cles) reported nega-
tively on the MAS 
(see graphic 1). Only 
11 percent (37 arti-
cles) wrote positively. 
The number of negative articles could have been much higher, as many articles wrote negatively 
about rioters (condemning violence) but did not link rioters to political or economic goals or placed 
them in any other context. Generally La Prensa wrote negatively about the riots themselves, some 
articles even openly blamed the MAS or the government or even both, others did not. The analysis did 
not include an evaluation of side-effects surrounding the riots (e.g. violence), especially for those arti-
cles without connection to political goals, which create the impression that rioters had no reason to 
protest. But one cannot understand protestors or their motives when contexts of riots are not men-
tioned. La Prensa only cites reasons and motives in a few articles, which were probably hard to find for 
the average reader. These articles were placed in category 7 and categorized as ‘neutral’ as they did 
not report on the MAS or their goals. When articles connected the MAS to political or economic de-
mands they would be placed in categories 2 – 7 regardless of whether violence was an issue in this 
articles or not. This method is reflected in the overall evaluation across all categories, as depicted in 
graphic 2. The issue of inner politics in general (category 7) showed a neutral attitude, as explained 
previously. Out of 109 articles, three (3 percent) wrote positively about the MAS or rioters, 8 articles (7 
percent) were negative, 98 (90 percent) were neutral. Similarly category 4 contained 20 neutral articles 
(87 percent), one negative (4 percent) and 2 positive (9 percent). The negative article said the public is 
uninformed on the gas issue, which is why the topic is used to confuse and polarize (La Prensa 2003). 
 
graphic 1  
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One positive article quoted a rioter at Senkata (a gas plant) who saw exporting gas as a loss: 
“Are we demanding this just for us? Gas will be for everyone, for the rich and for the poor” (Montaños 
2003). The second positive article, written after Goni’s resignation, expressed hope that the demands 
of the rioters will be included in Carlos Mesa’s agenda (La Prensa 2003a). 
Articles written in category 5 (Bolivia’s non-US foreign relations) are mostly neutral. This 
category, which cites evaluation of the effects riots might have on foreign relations only included one 
(of possible nine) negative evaluation, resulting in 10 percent attributed to negative reporting in this 
category. Most articles concerned free trade agreements, Bolivia’s role in them as well as trading 
partners or donor governments,  evaluating in a neutral manner ( La Prensa 2003b). One article 
included many reactions by world leaders such as Pope John Paul II. and General-Secretary of the 
United Nations, Kofi Annan, to the social commotion in Bolivia. All asked for a peaceful solution to the 
conflict (EFE
111 2003). The Organization of American States (OAS) voices its backing of Sánchez de 
Lozada, and offered to mediate. The MAS is seen as a culprit, according to the article, the only 
negative in this category (ANF
112 2003). On 17 October 2003, three articles wrote neutrally about the 
MAS and the rioters and their demands. They also cited pleas (by Brazilian and French delegates 
attending the 
                                                 
111 EFE is a Spanish news agency. 
112 Agencia de Noticias Fides 
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meeting of IBRD and 
IMF to concoct a new 
poverty reduction 
strategy for Bolivia) to 
Goni to act quickly and 
wisely (EFE 2003a; 
2003b, 2003c). 
Most articles in cate-
gory 6 (Relations with 
the US) were neutral 
(57 percent). 43 per-
cent wrote negatively 
and not one evaluated 
the relations with the 
US positively. All con-
cern coca eradication, 
judging  Cocaleros 
involvement in the 
protests as counter-
productive ( La Prensa 
2003c; 2003d). Rela-
tions b etween Goni 
and the US govern-
ment and  cocalero 
demands were evalu-
ated neutrally (Ikeda 
2003;  La Prensa 
2003e; 2003f). The US 
officially condemned 
protests and backed 
Goni (an article even 
cites Goni gaining 
popularity with the US while his popularity within Bolivia dropped). In the third negative article of this 
category, the US is cited to have said it will not allow an “anti-democratic government” in Bolivia (EFE 
and La Prensa 2003). 
The remaining four categories reflect a clear divide on the MAS in the population. They also 
reveal partial agreement with the MAS and protestors and a rejection of neoliberalism as well as the 
conditions pressured on Bolivia by the IFIs. The percentages of positive and negative articles in the 
categories 1 and 3 almost mirror each other (see graphics 4 – 6). Half of articles in category 3 were 
neutral, compared to 42 percent in category 1. Similarly, 27 percent of articles in category 3 were 
negative and comparable one third of positive articles in category 1. 29 percent of negative articles on  
graphic 3 
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hegemony match the 
23 percent positive 
reporting on counter-
hegemonic forces and 
ideas. Nonetheless, 
uncertainty was most 
prominent in both 
categories, indicating a 
‘wait-and-see’ attitude 
by the elite in this con-
flict, as only 7 percent 
of articles reported 
positively on the MAS 
(see graphic 4). Over-
all opinion to the MAS 
was negative. As 
graphic 6  shows, 56 
percent of all com-
ments were negative. 
The author noticed that 
toward the end of the 
time-frame negative 
attitude included Goni, 
too, especially after 
Mesa broke with him. 
Either way, only 15 
percent of articles sup-
ported the MAS, and 
only one third of arti-
cles in category 8 were 
neutral. Most commen-
tators felt as victims of a conflict between two parties, neither which they were a part of or which rep-
resented their interests. Most articles condemned the violence and the deaths and pleaded for a 
peaceful solution of the conflict They indicated support and understanding of the issues at stake, but 
said neither party had a solution. 
5.1.2  22 January to 19 February 2006  
La Prensa published 29 issues during the second time frame of analysis of which 706 articles were 
included in the study. As in 2003, most articles were placed in category 7 (see table 4 on the next 
page). MAS goals and policies ranked second and category 8 accounted for one fifth of all articles, 
showing a decrease since 2003 when the topic tied for second with category 7. Hydrocarbons and 
category 2 held 9 percent of articles in 2006. 
 
graphic 5 
 
graphic 6  
 
82 
Hydrocarbons was equally important 
in 2003 (held 8 percent then). Cate-
gory 2 increased by 4 percent in 
comparison to the first time frame, 
not surprising considering the MAS is 
in government. The articles on non-
US foreign relations (category 5) 
doubled from 3 to 6 percent, indicat-
ing how reactions from foreign coun-
tries are considered. The percentage 
of articles written on relations with the 
US (category 6) remained about the same, rising from 2 to 3 percent. Evaluation of the MAS was re-
served (see graphic 7). Negative and neutral reporting remained the same, but positive reporting in-
creased by 7 percent. Whereas 65 percent of articles in categories 2 through 8 wrote about the MAS 
neutrally in 2003, 59 percent of articles did so in 2006. Negative article percentage shrank by 1 per-
cent (to 23 percent) Positive reporting increased. 18 percent of articles wrote positively on the MAS in 
comparison to 11 percent in 2003. This might indicate that some authors at La Prensa in the negative 
and neutral spectrum revised their attitude toward the MAS. 
As graphic 8 (on the 
next page) portrays still 
many articles expressed 
no opinion in category 7 
(same applies to cate-
gories 1, 3 and 4). 
Whereas in 2003, 90 
percent of articles (98 of 
109) in category 7 were 
neutral, only 78 percent 
(150 of 193) were in 
2006. In 2003 3 percent 
of articles were positive, 
12 percent were in 
2006. Negative articles 
in category 7 increased by 3 percent, from 7 to 10 percent (see graphic 8). Category 2 showed signifi-
cant changes: whereas in 2003 29 percent of articles reported favorably on the MAS or rioters in con-
nection to economic policy, it was only a mere 10 percent in 2006. This presents a drift of former MAS-
propagators to the negative spectrum: negative reporting grew from 7 to 21 percent (see graphic 9, 
page 84). Reporting in category 1 also changed significantly, the number of neutral and negative opin-
ions increasing. Thus, the elite seems to oppose neoliberalism: 29 percent of articles supported neo-
liberalism and the IFIs I 2003, a mere eight percent (2 articles) did in 2006 (see graphic 10, page 85). 
Table 4: La Prensa, January/February 2006 
Category  Number of 
Articles  Percent  Rank 
1 Neoliberalism and IFIs  25  4  6 
2. Economic Policy and Development  67  9  4 
3. MAS goals and policy  152  22  2 
4. Hydrocarbons  61  9  4 
5. Bolivia’s foreign relations (non-US)  43  6  5 
6. Relations to the United States  21  3  7 
7. Inner Politics in General  193  27  1 
8. Comment, Opinion, Interview, etc.  144  20  3 
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Even if negative arti-
cles in category 1 
increased by 7 per-
cent (from 29 to 36) 
neutral (indecisive) 
reporting on the mat-
ter increased more: by 
14 percent (from 42 to 
56 percent). Negative 
evaluation of MAS 
goals and policies 
remained almost at 
the same level. In 
2003, 27 percent of 
articles wrote nega-
tively about the MAS 
opposed to 26 percent 
(39 articles) in 2006. 
Positive reporting in 
category 3 decreased 
heavily from 29 per-
cent in 2003 to 10 (15 
articles) in 2006. Neu-
tral reporting i n-
creased, too, rising 22 
percent: from 42 in 
2003 to 64 (98 articles 
of 152) percent in 
2006. The attitude 
toward the MAS and 
Morales in (non-US) 
foreign relations also 
changed. 63 percent 
of articles were neu-
tral (see graphic 11, opposed to 90 percent in 2003); 28 percent wrote positively (12 articles; opposed 
to none in 2003) and 9 percent (4 articles) wrote negatively (10 percent in 2003). Foreign relations 
were thus positively evaluated. Also, the 2006 analysis shows that neutrality on this subject was also 
popular, accumulating 81 percent (17 articles) opposed to 5 percent positive (1 article) and 14 percent 
negative (3 articles) articles, showing a small improvement in the evaluation of the MAS. The authors 
at La Prensa continue to view the MAS and their opinions on hydrocarbons skeptically and seem to 
oppose nationalization: in 2003 87 percent of articles were neutral, in 2006 it was 83. Positive articles  
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shrank from 9 to 7 
percent, while negative 
reporting increased 
from 4 to 10 percent. 
Category 8 contrasted 
reporting in other cate-
gories. It was still 
mostly negative in 
2006 but it shrank by 
ten percent (from 58 to 
48 percent (69 arti-
cles)). Neutral articles 
increased from 27 t o 
12 percent (17 articles) 
as did positive articles 
(from 15 percent to 40 
percent (58 articles)). 
Morales’ popularity 
(name-dropping) i n-
creased from 2003 to 
2006, but society still 
seems to be polarized 
when it comes to judg-
ing him. Overall the 
positive e valuation of 
the MAS increased 
between 2003 and 
2006 in La Prensa (by 
7 percent) and negative reporting remained the same. The IFIs and Neoliberalism were seen more 
negatively in 2006 (by 7 percent) or neutral (a 14 percent). These numbers indicated that the conser-
vative paper shifted its opinion toward anti-neoliberalism. On the other hand, the MAS did not per-
suade its critics and only awoke a negative attitude toward the IFIs (or at least motivated reconsidera-
tion of people’s position). The elite obviously wants two things in a ‘have my pie and eat it, too’-way: 
an alternative to neoliberal hegemony which will keep them in power. The elite does not think the MAS 
can solve the country’s problems any more than they did in 2003: the MAS is not the alternative the 
elite is looking for. Either way, interest in neoliberalism simultaneously sunk with the negative/more 
neutral attitude, with articles in category 1 shrinking to half of what they were between 2003 and 2006. 
These numbers go hand in hand with Bolivia being less centered on the US and as being less iso-
lated: it hasopened up toward its neighbors and the population rewards these new-found allies with 
the deserved interest: articles in category 5 almost doubled. Judging from numbers, neoliberal he-
gemony is i n crisis, but counter-hegemony is not yet in place. 
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Perhaps conducting 
this analysis with vary-
ing degrees of positive 
or negative reporting 
(as from  –3 to +3) 
might have brought 
more information to the 
light, b ecause some 
articles were  right out 
nasty.
113 Morales is 
much of what he 
shows. Many things he 
states today through-
out he has said 
throughout his life. He 
stuck to his ideals. This 
is probably irritating to 
reporters (and oppo-
nents), as they hit hard 
ground. There are no 
layers to peel, nothing 
to interpret. Morales is 
predictable in terms of 
topics and opinions, 
but it is also hard to 
know in which area he 
will act next. The only 
ones he can really 
surprise and impress is 
the foreign press, a 
topic another thesis 
might (hopefully) eventually explore.  
                                                 
113 They undermined Morales legitimacy, by including little sneers on his poor Aymará and Quechua skills or mentioning often 
how early his cabinet meetings start (5 a.m.) and how he ignores conventions: e.g. the new ambassador to the US, Sacha 
Llorenti, was announced La Prensa wrote this was not standard procedure. Usually, this process occurs covertly. The name of 
an ambassador-to-be is announced when the receiving country has accepted said individual. Morales accused the banana 
producers of trafficking cocaine and claimed that transnational corporations conspired against him or that the US sent soldiers to 
Bolivia (as tourists) to spy on him. La Prensa also wrote that the salary-reduction strategy was not in accordance with bureauc-
racy. Many times, they made him seem ridiculous, like someone who lacked legitimacy. The petty reporting shows that the 
journalists did not have much material on the MAS or Morales’ which could really undermine his legitimacy. 
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5.2 Results from the analysis of La Epoca 
La Epoca is a weekly newspaper, which has more of a news-analysis than an informative function. It is 
free and available online and based in La Paz, but may also be read in print upon subscription. 
5.2.1   2 to 19 October 2003 
La Epoca published three issues during 
the first evaluation time frame, 2 to 19 
October 2003. The first issue appeared 
on 5 October, the second on 12 October 
and the last on 19 October 2003. Exactly 
95 articles of these three issues were 
chosen to be included in the analysis for 
this thesis. As table 5 depicts category 8 
ranked first with 44 percent, followed by 
MAS goals and policies. Category 1 
ranked third and the issue of Hydrocar-
bons and category 2 tied in fourth place. Relations to the US was not on during this first period of 
analysis, categories 6 and 7 each had four percent of all articles.  
Overall (summarized count of categories 2 through 8) the MAS was evaluated positively (48 
percent of articles). 39 percent (36 articles) wrote neutrally and only 17 percent reported in a negative 
fashion (see graphic 12). MAS goals and policies (category 3) were evaluated favorably: 19 of 23 were 
positive (82 percent), two articles showed a negative and neutral attitude (9 percent) (see graphic 13). 
One article wrote that many Bolivians consider themselves to belong to an indigenous group (Machi- 
 
graphic 11 
Table 5: La Epoca, October 2003 
Category 
Number 
of 
Articles 
Percent  Rank 
1 Neoliberalism and IFIs  9  9  3 
2. Economic Policy and Development  7  7  4 
3. MAS goals and policy  23  25  2 
4. Hydrocarbons  7  7  4 
5. Bolivia’s foreign relations (non-US)  4  4  5 
6. Relations to the United States  0  0  - 
7. Inner Politics in General  4  4  5 
8. Comment, Opinion, Interview, etc.  41  44  1  
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cao Argiró and Cox 
Mayorga 2003), others 
that indigenous were 
excluded all from p o-
litical and economic life 
and stigmatized (Bla-
cutt 2003, Peñaranda 
U. 2003,  La Epoca 
2003b, Molina 2003). 
The overall positive 
evaluation is explained 
due to the support for 
one opinion on part of 
the newspaper which 
agreed with the rioters: 
demanding Goni’s 
resignation and claim-
ing he has no legitimacy and that he should be held responsible for the deaths which were a result of 
the social commotion in the country (Peñaranda 2003a,  La Epoca 2003c; 2003d and 2003e; 
Peñaranda 2003b; Fajardo Pozo 2003; Klein 2003, Moldiz Mercado 2003 and 2003a). 
Similarly, 19 of 41 opinionated articles (category 8) evaluated the MAS and rioters goals as 
neutral, and 17 were positive, 5 were negative. Mostly the violence by the rioters was perceived as 
negative. The government was equally blamed for misbehaving and it was said that problems with 
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neoliberal policies begun earlier than these riots (Villegas 2003, Zelaya 2003, Torrico 2003 and 2003a; 
Rojas Rios 2003 and 2003a; González 2003, Reyesvilla 2003 and 2003a; Costa 2003, Bonadona 
2003, Blanes 2003, Benavente 2003; Molina 2003c; Soliz Rada 2003a; Terrazas 2003). Some 
doubted Goni’s resignation would be the ultimate solution to these problems with neoliberalism 
(Oporto 2003). The demands of rioters and the MAS in the area of hydrocarbons (category 4) were 
viewed favorably by La Epoca, 4 out of 7 articles wrote positively on this, opposed to 2 negative and 1 
neutral article. 
Particularly La Epoca picked up the criticism of the little profit Bolivia made from its vast natu-
ral resources. For every dollar Bolivia received, transnational corporations made 24 and above all they 
do not pay taxes (La Epoca 2003f, 2003g). One article opposing the MAS and its counter-hegemonic 
critique was written by Carlos Alberto Lopez, who attended LSE and Harvard. believes that not export-
ing gas to the US, Mexico or Chile will result in economic loss for the country, as external debt is ac-
cumulating. Loans could be paid off within 20 years from gas-export-profits or the country could invest 
in its poor infrastructure. A second article agrees and cites all the advantages to selling gas: 360 mil-
lion US-dollars could be invested toward health and education programs, transnational corporations or 
neoliberalism are not criticized either article (La Epoca 2003h). 
Similar indecision was noted in the area of inner politics in general (category 7). 5 articles 
were neutral, opposed to 1 positive and no negative articles. Category 2 (Economic Policy and Devel-
opment) echoes the findings of categories 3 and 8, perhaps not quantitatively, but qualitatively. Eco-
nomic loss caused by the riots was criticized due to interruption of exportation. But it was also under-
lined that indigenous have been excluded from economic life in general throughout history (La Epoca 
2003). These criticize the Goni administration for its undemocratic behavior and lack of legitimacy. 
They undermine this argument by citing he only received 22 percent of votes and only became presi-
dent due to the marketing strategies of his US-advisors. La Epoca traced back Bolivia’s problems to 
the entire neoliberal era (Moldíz Mercado 2003b) and writes about the need for new strategies toward 
social equality (La Epoca 2003i). The riots and attitudes of the MAS were judged to be counter produc-
tive, particularly in the area of foreign relations. Two articles in category 6 were negative and neutral, 
as exports (e.g. to Spain) suffered due to the riots (La Epoca 2003j). Generally these articles judged 
the relations to other countries and the Goni administration. One article cited international reactions to 
the riots (e.g. Pope John Paul II or Kofi Annan) which demand a peaceful solution (La Epoca 2003k). 
Interestingly enough no link to an improvement or worsening of relations with the US was made (no 
articles in this category).  
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The articles in the issues 
of  La Epoca published 
between 2 and 19 Octo-
ber 2003, i ncluded 9 in 
category one. Only 1 
article (11 percent) wrote 
positively on the hege-
monic system, 4 articles 
wrote positively and 
negatively (see graphic 
14). These results show 
that  La Epoca regards 
the consequences of the 
reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s critically (Moldíz 
Mercado 2003c) and 
their demands in the area of hydrocarbons (La Epoca 2003l). 7 articles evaluated the new poverty 
reduction strategy, 4 articles were neutral, 2 negative and one was positive. They mainly criticized that 
social groups were not consulted by the IMF (La Epoca 2003m). 
5.2.2   22 January to 19 February 2006 
 
La Epoca published four issues during 
the second time frame of analysis, 22 
January to 19  February 2006. The first 
issue appeared on 29 January 2006, the 
second and third on 5 and 12 February, 
the last on 19 February 2006. The issue 
of 22 January 2006 was not included in 
this analysis, as the articles were written 
prior to the inauguration ceremony of the 
MAS. Of these four editions, 111 articles 
were included within the analysis. As table 5 shows, most articles were attributed to category 8 as in 
2003. As in 2003, category 3 ranked second. While category 1 had third place in 2003 (with 9 percent) 
the category had no articles in 2006. Rather, category 7 ranked third (19 percent), opposed to 4 per-
cent (rank 5) in 2003. Category 2 was equally in 2003 and 2006 but rose from 7 to 8 percent. Whereas 
category 4 accounted for 7 percent of articles 2003, it only reached 4 percent in 2006. Interestingly, 
category 6 was non-existent in 2003 but was ranked 6
th in 2006. MAS popularity at La Epoca shrunk  
graphic 14 
Table 6: La Epoca, January/Februar 2006 
Category  Number of 
Articles  Percent  Rank 
1 Neoliberalism and IFIs  0  0  - 
2. Economic Policy and Development  9  8  4 
3. MAS goals and policy  22  20  2 
4. Hydrocarbons  4  4  5 
5. Bolivia’s foreign relations (non-US)  1  1  6 
6. Relations to the United States  2  2  7 
7. Inner Politics in General  21  19  3 
8. Comment, Opinion, Interview, etc.  52  46  1  
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between 2003 and 
2006. Whereas report-
ing on MAS or Morales 
or their goals was posi-
tive in 48 percent of 
articles in 2003, in 
2006 only 29 percent 
(32 articles) were so 
(see graphic 15). 
Negative reporting 
decreased by 2 per-
cent, resulting in 15 
percent of (or 17) arti-
cles showing a nega-
tive attitude toward the 
MAS in January and February 2006. The number of neutral articles took up 56 percent of total (52 
articles), as opposed to only 35 percent in 2003. 
Overall evaluation across categories (except category 1; see graphic 16) revealed that MAS 
relations to the US were seen favorably: on article cites the US embassy officially acknowledging that 
coca is not cocaine and that is has virtues. The paper says that this statement does not take care of 
one problem: who will raise the dead of the anti-drug war (Peñaranda U. 2006)? The second article in 
graphic 15 
 
graphic 16  
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this category writes that the US changed their coca-eradication strategy due to Morales support in the 
2005 election and despite complaining that the MAS administration sends ambivalent messages when 
it comes to eradication. The embassy also said that Bolivia is a prime example for successfully dealing 
with a drug problem of this kind (La Epoca 2006). Category 5 (Bolivia’s non-US foreign relations) in-
cluded one positive article. It speaks about migrants considering to return to Bolivia due to the new 
government (Pérez Uberhuaga 2003). 
Category 2 (Economic Policy and Development) was evaluated neutrally in 8 articles, once 
negatively but never positively (opposed to 2 positive and 5 neutral articles in 2003). The writers at La 
Epoca are more hesitant in evaluating the MAS or Morales economic policy but are also more likely to 
have a negative opinion. Most articles (5) concerned the issue of used apparel, which hit Bolivia quite 
hard. Donated used apparel from industrialized nations is not always used for charity purposes. Most 
of it is collected by professional companies (who may or not claim to use the apparel for charity), who 
sell clothes by bulk to buyers in poorer countries. 15 tons of used clothing enter Bolivia daily; 93 per-
cent of them illegally. The business exists in Bolivia for years and has created markets specialized 
with second-hand clothing (mainly from the US) in all major cities. About 20,000 jobs were lost (only in 
the formal economy), particularly affecting tailors and clothing shops (Müller 2006). Morales decided to 
make a decision concerning the prohibition of this sector in another six months (by Decree 28.614). All 
articles on this matter were published in the 5 February 2006 issue and evaluated Morales’ decision 
neutrally. All outlined the complexity of the problem and that the six moths will allow the government 
and second-hand clothing sellers to breathe and a decision needs to be made: “Bolivia is not a gar-
bage can” (La Epoca 2006a). The two other articles in category 2 focused on Morales’ dealing Bo-
livia’s privatized airline LAB, whose pilots striked throughout February. The MAS clarified that the state 
was not going to compensate the wrong-doings of previous governments or those of the many owners 
the LAB had since privatization in 1996 (La Epoca 2003b; 2003c).  
  Similarly MAS involvement in inner politics in general was regarded in a neutral manner. 18 of 
21 articles were neutral, while the remaining three were positive. Many of these articles did not directly 
speak of the MAS or Morales but dealt with the Goni administration, because of ‘the movie-incident.’ 
Interestingly enough, this was not mentioned in whereas La Epoca wrote extensively on it. During his 
election campaign of 2002 Goni was advised by Washington D.C.-based Sawyer and Miller. A camera 
team, directed by Rachel Boynton, followed the future-president and vice-president around and pro-
duced a movie called ‘Our brand is crisis.’ This movie was scheduled to air in Bolivia on HBO Olé. This 
date was cancelled upon Goni’s request. The movie shows Goni’s advisors to create a scandal around 
first rival and then-Cochabamba mayor Reyes Villa. In order to keep Gonis image clean, a member of 
the UCS agrees to do this for him (in a TV-ad campaign). Eight articles wrote about this issue and all 
reported negatively on Goni and the foreign electoral advisors (La Epoca 2006d; 2006e; 2006f, 2006g; 
Azurduy F. 2006). This took away attention from the more important event: Morales inauguration as 
president. Even articles in later issues speak of Goni and say it is unlikely he will be brought to trial 
soon – contrary to MAS goals (Paredes 2006a). Morales position as leader of the coca grower is seen 
as a sign for potential change of national policy in this area (La Epoca 2006h). Category 4 (Hydrocar-
bons) was evaluated hesitatingly and contained 3 neutral articles on the talks between YPFB and Ar-
gentina with perspective on exporting gas (La Epoca 2006i; 2006j; Sandoval 2006). The only positive  
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article in this category explored asked if Morales will “dare” to nationalize the gas reserves. The article 
ends with the following statement: We are not dependent because we are poor, but we are poor be-
cause we are dependent (Durán Chuquimia 2006). 
Category 3 showed the doubts and hopes for Morales as president and the division on this is-
sue. Whereas 9 articles (41 percent) of 22 wrote favorably on the MAS and their goals, one (5 percent) 
reported negatively and 12 (54 percent) were neutral. The negative article criticized Morales’ in want-
ing to make Sacha Llorenti (head of the human rights commission in Bolivia) the new Bolivian ambas-
sador (La Epoca 2006k). Positive articles asked for changes in Bolivia or patience until changes arrive 
(Molina (Fatima) 2006; Galeano 2006; Peredo 2006). Some articles warned that the MAS could over-
estimate itself, particularly because of the high expectations (La Epoca 2006l; 2006m; Valdez 2006). 
  Category 8 (Comment, Opinion, Interview, etc.) included 52 articles of which 32 spoke directly 
of the president or the government. Comments and editorials emphasized the great expectations held 
to the MAS government and wrote on its historic opportunity, which the government seized (e.g. by 
nominating the first indigenous with a  pollera (typical dress) as minister for justice. Casimira 
Rodríguez, a former house maid and pioneer in the house worker movement, was instrumental in the 
creation of law concerning home workers (working hours, conditions, etc.). She seeks to be the prime 
actor in bringing Goni to trial, promising he will receive “the penalty he deserves.” She also wants to 
reform the justice system so it serves all (Rodriguez 2006). One article represents elite opinion in all 
articles well, which is why it will be the only one discussed here. It lists 8 strengths and weaknesses of 
the MAS administration: (a) social and political changes are underway and (b) the government has 
included legitimate leaders (and intellectuals) in the process; (c) these leaders questioned the prevail-
ing economic order for years (d) making sure (as opposed to previous administrations) all policies 
have a social vision and (e) breaking a routine in catering to a certain few; (f) four women are part of 
the MAS cabinet; (g) a woman in pollera is now minister of justice; (f) thus this position is once not 
held by a lawyer (La Epoca 2006n). An article on the 8 negative aspects of the government expresses 
fear that the MAS will fall into other forms of “corporatism” by privileging certain groups such as social 
movements and syndicates, who might infiltrate the government and manipulate it according to their 
interests (which might not be national interests). This might debilitate its legitimacy in certain regions, 
particularly those with many entrepreneurs, and create rivalries between economic sectors. Whereas 
entrepreneurs did most lobby work before, it is now the turn of NGOs and similar organizations (par-
ticularly those in the anti-globalization fight) to voice their claims. Some members of cabinet might be 
inept for the tasks designated to them. 
  Overall, the MAS and their goals lost sympathy at La Epoca. Positive reporting shrank by 19 
percent (from 48 to 29 percent between 2003 and 2006), but negative articles did not increase as did 
the amount of neutral articles. Loss of sympathy is also apparent in category 3 (MAS goals and policy) 
where positive reporting halved (from 82 to 41 percent). Negative reporting decreased by half, while 
the number of neutral articles increased from 9 to 54 percent. This shows that the moderate newspa-
per is also of the opinion that the MAS will not solve the country’s problems. The issue of Neoliberal-
ism and IFIs lost all importance to La Epoca as in La Prensa (number of articles halved) so that no 
articles were written in 2006 despite the issue accounting for nine percent of articles in 2003. This  
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might indicate a split from neoliberal hegemony either through refusing to talk about certain ‘touchy’ 
subjects or because they are really not thought of as relevant any more. 
In contrast to La Prensa, La Epoca wrote in a less ‘nasty’ way of on Morales and more on a 
one-on-one level than as if positioned above him. Perhaps this is only because La Epoca was dis-
tracted from current events due to ‘Our Brand is Crisis’. While La Prensa was always concerned about 
what Morales was doing, La Epoca chose to concentrate on ‘Our Brand is Crisis’ and former president 
Goni. Perhaps La Epoca is still stuck demanding the paying off of a bill they wrote years ago or be-
cause they were the ones who broke the scandal. Either way, their emphasis on this ‘old issue’ shows 
somewhat a disinterest in the new government.  
5.3 Results from the analysis of El Juguete Rabioso  
EJR was founded in February 2000 to create an intellectual front to oppose the dominant political and 
cultural consensus in the media. It started out as a book-reviewing medium with little distribution. Until 
present EJR is the only independent medium of B olivia and employs two people permanently 
(Cáceres 2006). EJR quickly grew to a politics-evaluating medium with a distribution of 10,000 and is 
now one of the most read newspapers. According to the newspaper, the average (middle-class) Boliv-
ian, university students and intellectuals read it. EJR is part of the Bolivian version of the French 
newspaper Le Monde Diplomatique and edits the academic journal Barataria. EJR publishes a Euro-
pean edition (in Spanish) out of Paris (not part of the analysis). Abroad, the Bolivian edition of EJR is 
available electronically and upon subscription to the European edition (paper) on which this analysis is 
based. 
5.3.1  2 to 19 October 2003 
EJR published one edition during the first 
time frame of analysis, which included 
relevant seven articles (see table 7). 
Overall the evaluation of MAS was dis-
tributed in half of articles reporting neu-
trally and positively (see graphic 17). 
The category of inner politics in general 
received most attention. All articles were 
anti-Sánchez de Lozada, most reported 
neutrally on the riots and linked protest-
ing and political goals (Cáceres 2003 
and 2003b; Ramos Andrade 2003 and 
2003a; Gárcia Linera 2003; Tabera 2003). Reporting on the MAS was generally positive, but Morales 
was not the focus of reporting or blamed for the conflict. EJR reported ‘from below’ (unlike La Prensa) 
and chronicled the Gas War, including deaths and injuries, naming the dead and those arrested. They 
also underlined the lack of legitimacy of the Goni-government and explicitly held it responsible for the 
deaths of more than 70 people (Ramos Andrade 2003). 
Table 7: El Juguete Rabioso, October 2003 
Category 
Number 
of 
Articles 
Percent  Rank 
1 Neoliberalism and IFIs  1  14  2 
2. Economic Policy and Development  0  0  - 
3. MAS goals and policy  1  14  2 
4. Hydrocarbons  0  0  - 
5. Bolivia’s foreign relations (non-US)  0  0  - 
6. Relations to the United States  0  0  - 
7. Inner Politics in General  5  72  1 
8. Comment, Opinion, Interview, etc.  0  0  -  
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The only article in category 1 was negative and compared Goni to a transnational corporation. He is 
the owner of the fifth largest enterprise in the country and accused of only helping his cronies with the 
privatization program of the PGDES (“invest one dollar, receive ten”) and not the BonoSol. The article 
makes connections between Goni and Enron, Shell, the IBRD and T otal and out a former US-
ambassador to Bolivia as holding shares in a Bank. Goni is linked to the largest copper merchant in 
the world: Rio Tinto Zinc of Britain. EJR attributes the idea of exporting Gas via Chile to Bechtel, as 
British Petrol, British Gas, Pacific LNG and Shell are members in it. Goni is accused of never having 
been a politician, but only an entrepreneur. An article by future-vice-president García Linera (2003) on 
the population of El Alto describes the Gas War as an indigenous issue.  
5.3.2  22 January to 19 February 2006 
The analysis of EJR in 2006 includes 
one issue which was published on 29 
January 2006. Ten articles of this issue 
were included in the analysis (see table 
8). Opposed to 2003 the positive evalua-
tion toward the MAS and Evo Morales 
shrunk: almost half of articles reported 
neutrally on the new government, 38 
percent positively (3 articles) and 1 arti-
cle was categorized as negative. Alike 
the other newspapers, the attitude t o-
ward the MAS is more reserved than in 2003. Category 1 was also re-evaluated: not all articles are 
negative any more, but one is neutral (see graphic 18 on the next page). 
 
graphic 17 
Table 8: El Juguete Rabioso, January/February 2006 
Category 
Number 
of 
Articles 
Percent  Rank 
1 Neoliberalism and IFIs  3  27  3 
2. Economic Policy and Development  0  0  - 
3. MAS goals and policy  4  36,5  1 
4. Hydrocarbons  0  0  - 
5. Bolivia’s foreign relations (non-US)  0  0  - 
6. Relations to the United States  0  0  - 
7. Inner Politics in General  0  0  - 
8. Comment, Opinion, Interview, etc.  4  36,5  2  
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The first negative article questions whether the indigenous (or Andean population) will find a place in 
the capitalistic system or not, as captalism is so different to theirs. Perhaps the answer lies in an An-
dean capitalism, as vice-president García Linera proposed (Prada Alcoreza 2006: 7f). More of a re-
view, this article describes capitalism and dependency-theory and explains market strategy and Bo-
livia’s placement in the periphery. It concludes that the indigenous do not fit in the imperialistic-
capitalism as both systems are contradictory to one another. The second article writes on genetically 
manipulated soy and speculates it might already entered the Bolivian market (Ribeiro 2006: 11). The 
third article lists the areas and companies involved with the privatization of water, citing 44 percent of 
Bolivian drinking water to be in the hands of a cooperative “which does not seek luxury,” the other 44 
percent are state-administered and 12 percent is in private hands (El Juguete Rabioso 2006: 13). It 
cannot be speculated that EJR changed its mind on neoliberalism. Rather the neutral article shows 
that EJR can report objectively on matters such as neoliberalism. Both positive articles in category 3 
(MAS goals and policy) agreement with the MAS on three issues: (a) land distribution to benefit the 
poor (Otero 2006); (b) disfavoring privatization of the water (the article welcomes Bolivia’s first minister 
for water (Abel Mamani) and his mission to impede privatization of this basic right) and names several 
contracts in Bolivia which might be ended due to this endeavor (Lora 2006: 12); (c) one article cheers 
Morales’ cabinet –building, but criticizes (neutrally) that one pro-free-trade, neoliberal, capitalist person 
is in it (Walker San Miguel) (El Juguete Rabioso 2006a). The two neutral comments in EJR write on 
‘Our Brand is Crisis’ and US interference in the 2002 election campaign (e.g. financial assistance by 
the White House) and speculates rumors against Morales might have started due to the US campaign 
advisors as well (Meavé Diaz 2006; Lizárraga 2006). The negative comment is a sneer which contin-
ued the criticism of the pro-neoliberal cabinet-member, Walker San Miguel, who is compared to 
Johnny Walker (the whiskey), as both him and Johnny were present during the privatization of state 
companies. Cheers! (Cáceres 2006b). 
 
graphic 18  
 
96 
Similarly to the other newspapers, the critical and leftist EJR opted for evaluating Morales and 
the MAS less positively. While the 2003 evaluation was neutral or positive in equal parts, positive 
evaluation shrank by 13 percent between both time frames. Those 13 percent shifted to negative re-
porting. This number is so dismal, that it cannot indicate a sway of opinion, but reveals that EJR can 
criticize even those who are ‘on their side,’ even if it not the goals or actors themselves who are criti-
cized but their choice to include a member of dominating discourse in their ranks. The trend set in La 
Prensa and La Epoca was not followed by EJR. The Angry toy still believes that the MAS offers a vi-
able option to neoliberal hegemony and that it can solve the country’s problems.  
5.4 Overall Comparison and Interpretation of press analysis results 
  There seem to be two trends in the Bolivian elite which were found in the newspaper analysis. 
For one, the conservative daily and moderate weekly re-evaluated their position toward the MAS, riot-
ers and Morales and tend to write more neutral articles in 2006 than in 2003. Both agree that the MAS’ 
economic policy are not what the country needs. Their evaluation of neoliberalism and the IFIs also 
shows that they no longer favor this option (in one case the topic wasn’t even worth writing about in 
2006 and in the other positive reporting decreased dramatically). However, the also MAS failed to 
persuade its critics to join their ranks or to pulled over those who had no opinion. Overall, both ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ elite lost members, who are now spectators. The elite as a whole seems to currently watch 
Bolivian society, stuck between anti-neoliberal and neoliberal thought, concocting a solution on how to 
escape this pressure and stay in power. 
At first, this leaves the question open of what it is they would like instead of these actors. Ex-
cluding both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic options doesn’t leave too much to work with. 
Counter-hegemony is apparently not firmly standing in Bolivian society just yet. This particularly ap-
plies to the elite. The critics of the MAS stayed in their position, as numbers indicate. The elite seems 
to be in a difficult position. It has understood that neoliberal reforms did not bring the promised pro-
gress or wealth and have dissatisfied most of the population. The elite also knows that the population 
is dissatisfied with the elite as a result of the failure of neoliberal reforms and because they were force-
fully implemented. The elite is also not interested in consenting a change of power relations, especially 
if it will disadvantage them in the long run. 
The elite will use the MAS for their profit, as they have before. In 2003, evaluation of the riots 
turned positive, only when consensus in the elite was that Goni lacked legitimacy and that he had to 
leave. Thus, protestors aims were instrumentalized and diverted from the issue of gas and turned into 
the common goal of ousting Goni. This applies especially to La Prensa, who stuck with the president 
until Carlos Mesa withdrew his support for him. Similarly La Prensa quit nasty reporting on Morales 
when it saw that it was not needed any more, as enough of the ‘old folks’ thought negatively about the 
MAS anyway. Again, it is unfortunate that this analysis did not integrate to examine the varying de-
grees of positive or negative reporting. The author assumes the severity of negative and positive arti-
cles would have shrunk across time, particularly in La Prensa, but that their amount would have in-
creased.  
The loss of importance of neoliberalism and IFIs may mean that certain parts of the elite block 
discourse on this matter purposely: one cannot have an opinion on something which is not spoken of. 
Neoliberalism might not be worth mention, as they believe that it will stay in place regardless of who is  
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president. This finding goes hand in hand with the 200 percent increase of articles on neoliberalism 
and the IFIs in EJR, who discusses this topic more in 2006 than 2003. The elite should not underesti-
mate counter-hegemonic discourse as it has proven to organize differently when prohibited or debili-
tated (e.g. CONDEPA and UCS took in many former COB supporters; when these parties lost their 
leaders, MAS filled the gap). Support for the MAS and protestors never existed on part of the elite. It 
only prevailed while both had a common goal: ousting Sanchez de Lozada. 
Perhaps the solution to Bolivia’s problems and its future development concept will not come 
from either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic ideas. Rather, like so many times before, the solution 
will come from outside. The findings of the analysis support this hypothesis as the articles on relations 
with the US were less in 2006 than in 2003, while articles on foreign relation were more prominent. 
This cannot be confirmed by the critical leftist EJR, which still believes the MAS may solve the coun-
try’s problems and holds a negative attitude to the IFIs and hegemony. The EJR is objective in its 
monitoring and criticizing of the MAS and Morales The hypothesis, that a change of consensus in the 
Bolivian elite took place can therefore not be confirmed. Rather, hegemony and the old elite are in 
crisis and it is yet to be seen if counter-hegemony can become the new historic block.  
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6. Conclusion, Findings, Outlook 
This thesis considered Gramsci and Cox’ proposals to view societal change through a dialectical lens 
and to examine whether crisis in neoliberal hegemony (the 2003 Gas and Tax War) might change 
power relations by altering elite discourse consensus in a peripheral country. Gramsci stated that the 
reciprocal relations between the structure (economic relations) and the superstructure (the ethic-
political sphere) might be constituent entities of world order. Cox added that political conflicts in a so-
ciety will either maintain power relations of production or lead to the implementation of a new historic 
bloc. This thesis tied in at there and found that neoliberal hegemony in Bolivia is still in crisis, as the 
elite is not ready to hand over power.  
To continue as hegemony, neoliberalism has to stay engrained on all three levels of society: in 
economic, political and social structures. As Chapter 2 outlined, neoliberalism favors free trade and 
the unrestricted flow of capital and was culturally re-defined for Latin America by the IFIs in the Wash-
ington Consensus (see Section 2.1). Neoliberal values were internalized in peripheral countries such 
as Bolivia with help from their elites who coerced the masses into accepting the reforms of the 1980s 
and the PGDES (see Chapter 3). Help with the implementation of hegemonic policies and its system 
were tied to other political goals (coca eradication) by the head-hegemon (US) and its institutions 
(IFIs) (see Section 4.4). Bolivia was threatened that development aid (which benefits neoliberal poli-
cies’ implementation) would be cut upon not meeting these political demands; a threat that co-opted 
the elite as Cox predicted (see Section 2.1.1). The threat to cut the developmental assistance package 
was voiced again in 2002, when a leader of the anti-neoliberal movement ran for president. 
Anti-neoliberal sentiments in the population existed ever since democracy arrived to Bolivia in 
1982. Propagators of neoliberal reforms promised an improvement of the livelihoods of many, but 
hardly anyone believed them. Resistance to neoliberalism increased throughout the 1990s, when 
many noticed a deterioration of their livelihoods and that democracy failed to include the poor, indige-
nous and rural. About these marginalized people, Cox wrote that they would revolt against hegemony, 
if international capitalism was not able to neutralize its negative effects (poverty). If this counter-
hegemonic force was to overcome hegemony, it should establish alternative institutions and intellec-
tual resources by using the strategy of Transformismo. In Transformismo two groups of different politi-
cal spectrums unite and form a movement which is not class based. Then, this movement assimilates 
their policies to the dominant coalition to de-vilify them (see Section 2.1.3). Seemingly, this was done 
by the MAS and Morales, who received votes from those who previously supported CONDEPA, the 
UCS or who were active in the COB. The MAS is popular in urban and rural areas alike; two regions 
with different needs and demands but one goal (nationalization of gas reserves) and which include 
many groups of people under the umbrella term campesino (e.g. coca growers and agricultural work-
ers who do not agree with each other on all issues; see Section 4.2 and Molina 2006: 89f, 103-108). 
Thus, the blue print of critical theory may be applicable to Bolivia’s masses, but this is not what this 
thesis examined. 
So what about the elite? 
In the beginning of this thesis possible outcomes of the discourse analysis were outlined: (a) 
the newspaper study would confirm that counter-hegemonic goals are accepted by the Bolivian elite. 
Had the new administration received good press in 2006, it might indicate a change of consensus  
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toward neoliberalism, especially if press toward Morales and his party was negative in 2003; (b) the 
elite might disfavor the current government and its policies and still favor neoliberalism. This would 
have reflected itself that overall reporting on the MAS on the MAS would have been negative (in cate-
gories 2 through 8) and mostly positive on Neoliberalism and the IFIs (in category 1). Results showed 
a third, previously not considered, option (c) the elite does not consider Morales and the MAS the solu-
tion to Bolivian problems. However, the same applies to neoliberalism and the policies suggested by 
the IFIs. As Christian Parenti writes in an article in The Nation: “some local elites (…) have (…) 
weaned themselves from their sycophantic intellectual habits of believing whatever comes out of 
Washington” (2006: 22). An interview with Carlos Mesa in the panamenian newspaper La Prensa con-
firms this attitude further: “President Morales has made a strong bet and risk with the decrete on the 
nationalization of gas, but if it works only in 80 percent of the time, it will be an extraordinary success 
for the country (…) whose income will multiply” (Mesa 2006). The newspaper analysis confirms that 
the values and ideas of hegemonic discourse were reconsidered between 2003 and 2006 but counter-
hegemonic discourse not implemented a new historic bloc yet, because it does not favor the elite. 
Let’s face it: the elite doesn’t care which economic system is in place. It cares about its power 
and wealth and any system is fine as long as their power and money are preserved by it. The MAS 
government is only tolerated, because the elite has no alternative at the moment as the political middle 
of Bolivia (or an alternative to both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic ideas) is empty (Padilla 2006). 
This is not surprising, because in a way the election of the MAS indicates the beginning of a new era. 
While the country had many presidents since 1982, Chapters 3 and 4 showed that these presidents 
simply continued along the lines of the previous administrations in which they were involved. 
The historic chapter explained with the help of critical theory (institutions and patterns from the 
past are connected to changing modes of social reality; Cox 1981: 93f) that Bolivian elite benefited 
from the political culture of the Inca and the Conquista, particularly to oppress the masses and stay 
wealthy and powerful. Benefits, such as education, were only given to the indigenous, rural and poor if 
they also benefited the elite. When the elite thought the president should be ousted, it supported the 
masses in its protests against the exportation of gas through Chile and turned them into a matter of 
expelling the president (see Chapter 5). This confirms that hegemony can only be lifted if hegemony in 
all areas of society consents to do so. If the elite had not agreed that Sanchez de Lozada should re-
sign, the masses would still be protesting against him today. Perhaps this is also a matter of whom the 
elite views as a legitimate critic: Goni only resigned after intellectuals asked for his resignation and the 
most important politician in his cabinet, Carlos Mesa and other politicians such as Paz Zamora with-
drew their support. The elite thus maneuvered the protests away from their anti-neoliberal cause (and 
did not learn their lesson as they did not after the Water War of 2000). The moderate stream in the 
elite, represented by La Epoca, seems to think Morales so unimportant that in its first publication of the 
MAS administration it spent more time dwelling on the issue of ‘Our Brand is Crisis’ than on the new 
president. 
Molina, the editor-in-chief of the right wing conservative weekly Pulso, published a book in 
2006, in which he also says that Carlos Mesa and Goni were one. They brought together the intellec-
tual and entrepreneurial front and different political goals (e.g. fight for democracy but rigid economic 
reforms) (2006: 66-82). Furthermore, they took advantage of the fact that Bolivians believe the media  
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(represented by Carlos Mesa) acts in their interests, whereas opinion of the state is low. Molina attrib-
utes the success of the MAS a backlash of populist politics and cites internal problems will contribute 
to their failure (e.g. they will not be able to nationalize the gas reserves because foreign relations will 
be affected negatively) (2006: 112f). He accuses the MAS of returning to policies the MNR imple-
mented during the 1952 Revolution and that it is predicted to fail in the same ways (Molina 2006: 121-
124). Molina also addresses the issue of the Andean capitalism, which EJR already picked up in its 
2006 issue (see Section 5.3.2); an ideology that propagates a strong state and encourages the use of 
the state as a “baby bottle.” According to him, anti-neoliberalism leeches on the people’s bad habit to 
receive rather than produce themselves; on the perception that Bolivia is a victim of its history and 
exogenous forces. This is why the idea of nationalizing the gas reserves is so popular, but this is “ruin-
ing a business which could improve the livelihoods of many” (Molina 2006: 100f). The editor-in-chief of 
Pulso explains that these are reasons why the MAS does not speak of “a better life for all,” but of “a 
good life” (Molina 2006: 132). Molina concludes his analysis, by reminding his readers that “fortunately 
minorities exist and preserve themselves” – most likely a call to his fellow elite friends (2006: 150). 
Molina’s book underlines the findings of the newspaper analysis: the elite does not want to let their 
power go, especially not in the economic spectrum, when it already lost the political sphere.  
It seems as if they are hoping the MAS and Morales will get caught up in internal problems or 
be unable to build an own political agenda as the COB and other political actors did before them, 
whose leaders were more concerned with furthering their own career than with politics. As the news-
paper analysis showed, they are not afraid to encourage these problems by finding leverage to put on 
the new government. Cox cited that a change in power productions (subordinating of old dominant 
groups by new dominant groups) implements new hegemony. Counter-hegemonic actors might gain 
ground in the economic sector (which is still dominated by the ‘old’ elite) not only through the nationali-
zation of the gas reserves, but by legalizing the coca leaf on an international level, gaining Cocaleros 
more leverage and lobbying-weight. This would hurt those in the elite involved in drug-trafficking by 
depriving them of income. 
Morales, who won a landslide victory in Bolivia in December 2005, is a coca grower, a mi-
grant, a school-quitter, an avid lover of sports and an indigenous. During his first election campaign as 
a presidential candidate Morales said he did not want to speak of the actors in the circus, when refer-
ring to journalists, but to its director referring to US Ambassador Rocha. Despite is threat to cut devel-
opment to Bolivia should Morales be elected (probably a way to co-opt the Bolivian elite into following 
its instruction), the US did not do so. Either way, the White House is not pleased with Morales’ policies 
(Parenti 2006: 21) and neither is the elite, who is opting to wait and see and who will only interfere 
when the conflict between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces endangers their position as the 
wealthy and powerful. There is weariness toward Morales policies and in some cases opposition, but 
there is also fear (as explained in Chapters 3 and 4). For once the elite might not underestimate the 
power of the people and the legitimacy of their opinions, but only because they have everything to 
lose. Therefore, they, alike the MAS, have high hopes in finding help in non-US foreign relations (re-
porting in this category increased in all newspapers except EJR).  
No significant changes in Bolivian society (or hegemonic societies in general) will occur unless 
the elite agrees, as Gramsci and Cox predicted. However, currently counter-hegemonic forces hold  
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political power in Bolivia. Anti-neoliberal acts were implemented during the past six months: the gas 
reserves were nationalized, state employee wages were cut and a land reform was implemented – all 
against elite will. The elite is retrieving to the spheres in which it still dominates: the economic and 
social structures. Its task is to de-legitimate the counter-hegemonic administration politically and con-
tinue dominating all economic and social matters. The counter-hegemonic movement will only install 
itself as a new historic block if it creates alternative institutions and intellectual resources and enters 
the domains the ‘old’ elite still governs (as Cox suggested 183: 129). As the newspaper analysis re-
vealed the MAS was unable to persuade its critics and must cement counter-hegemony as a new his-
toric bloc without support from (and despite) its sceptics. Anti-neoliberal actors and their policies 
steadily enter the terrain of the bourgeoisie, who is no longer the sole holder of the intellectual, moral 
and economic leadership of the country. IFI and ‘old’ elite policies are no longer common sense. Not 
even in the old elite itself.  
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 Abstract 
 
Im Dezember 2005, gewannen Evo Morales und seine Partei, die Bewegung zum Sozialismus (MAS), 
mit über 50 Prozent der Stimmen die Wahlen in Bolivien. Dieses war das stärkste Wahlergebnis einer 
Partei seit Einführung der Demokratie 1982. Morales wurde im Januar 2006 als der zweite indigene 
Präsident Lateinamerikas eingeweiht. 
Die Einweihungszeremonie war gleichzeitig ein Triumph der anti-neoliberalen Bewegung Boli-
viens, welche im Wasserkrieg im Jahr 2000 und im Steuer- und Gaskrieg im Jahr 2003 ihren Höhe-
punkt erreichte. Morales und MAS unterstützten die sogenannten Neoliberalen Kriege. Der Sieg der 
MAS und von Morales in den Wahlen regt Spekulationen an, dass der Neoliberale Konsens in der 
Elite, der Bolivien zwei Jahrzehnte lang regierte, gebrochen ist. Die Frage nach einem Konsenswech-
sel ergibt sich nicht nur von Morales’ und MAS Partizipation in den Neoliberalen Kriegen, sondern 
auch weil die MAS viele Forderungen der Proteste 2000 und 2003 in ihr Parteiprogramm aufgenom-
men haben. Während sich Morales’ anti-neoliberale Denkweisen offensichtlich in der bolivianischen 
Bevölkerung großer Beliebtheit erfreuen, ist es nicht erwiesen, dass sich diese Popularität auf die Elite 
des Landes erstreckt. 
Der potentielle Konsensbruch bezüglich des Neoliberalismus in der Elite entstand jedoch nicht 
von ungefähr. Im Gegenteil: er baute sich über die gesamte Geschichte Boliviens hinweg auf und 
wurde von den Rahmenbedingungen im Land begünstigt. Mit Hilfe der kritischen Theorie von Antonio 
Gramsci und Robert W. Cox, welche in Kapitel 2 vorgestellt wird, erforscht diese Magisterarbeit ob der 
Neoliberale Konsens in der Bolivianischen Elite gebrochen ist. Mit Unterstützung des Konzeptes, dass 
Geschichte und Produktionsbeziehungen Gesellschaften und die Gegebenheiten in ihnen den hege-
monialen Diskurs formen, stellt diese Arbeit in den Kapiteln 3 Boliviens Geschichte bis dato dar und 
bespricht in Kapitel 4 wichtige Themen der aktuellen Bolivianischen Politik und Wirtschaft. Die Umset-
zung der neoliberalen Ideologie und Richtlinien in Bolivien wurde von den USA, den hegemonialen 
Institutionen (der Internationalen Währungsfond und der Weltbank) sowie der sich in der Regierung 
abwechselnden Elite propagiert und i mplementiert. Die neoliberalen Programme der 1980er und 
1990er wurden trotz bitteren Protesten seitens der Bevölkerung beibehalten, die sich gegen die nega-
tiven Konsequenzen der Programme wehrten. 
Da die kritischen Theorie Konflikte als Mechanismen sieht, die Machtverhältnisse verändern 
und einen Hegemon/ein hegemoniales System stürzen können, werden auch die Neoliberalen Kriege 
Boliviens besprochen. Insbesondere im Steuer und Gaskrieg 2003 baute sich ein anti-hegemonialer 
Diskurs auf. Dieser Konflikt, in dem die MAS mitagierte, wird besonders begutachtet weil er den Präsi-
denten Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (der neoliberale Kopf Boliviens) stürzte. 
Auf diesen Erkenntnissen basierend, wird in Kapitel 5 die Zeitungsanalyse vorgestellt. Diese 
wurde in zwei Zeiträumen vorgenommen: 2. bis 19. Oktober 2003 und 22. Januar bis 19. Februar 
2006 (erster Monat der MAS-Regierung). Es wurden drei Zeitungen analysiert, welche je eine politi-
sche Strömung in der Bolivianischen Elite repräsentieren (La Prensa, konservative Tageszeitung; La 
Epoca, moderate Wochenzeitung, El Juguete Rabioso, ein alle zwei Wochen erscheinende linke Zei-
tung). Die Befunde der Zeitungsanalyse zeigten, dass die Bolivianische Elite sich sowohl gegen die 
anti-neoliberale Politik der MAS wendet, aber auch den Neoliberalismus und die Internationalen Fi-
nanzinstitutionen den Rücken gekehrt hat. Sie bewies auch, dass die Elite im Jahr 2003 erneut die 
Massen zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil missbrauchten, in dem sie ihre Wut, die gegen die Privatisierung der 
Gas Reserven gerichtet war, auf den regierenden Präsidenten (Sanchez de Lozada) umlenkten. Inso-
fern zeigte die Zeitungsanalyse auch, dass ohne die Zustimmung der Elite in Bolivien ein friedlicher 
Systemwechsel unwahrscheinlich ist.  
Wie im Endfazit (Kapitel 6) beschrieben wird, hofft die bolivianische Elite, dass sich die MAS 
und Morales in inner- bzw. zwischen-parteilichen Scharmützeln verfängt, damit sich in der Zwischen-
zeit eine Alternative zwischen anti-hegemonialen und hegemonialem Diskurs findet, welche den 
Reichtum und die Macht der Elite erhält. Dies dürfte sich als schwierig erweisen, weil die politische 
Mitte Boliviens leer steht. 
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